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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DIALOGISM AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Koçan, Gürcan 
 
 
Ph.D. Department of Political Sciences and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Simon Wigley 
 
 
April 2003 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the notion of democracy not as a straightforward political process 
for decision-making, but as a type of dialogue. One of the main reasons for choosing this 
particular approach is to reveal the conditions of genuine democratic politics. A politics 
built on the image of people who can express themselves without fear and are free of 
obligation of sameness. Therefore, this thesis excavates the assumptions and complex 
relations of values by virtue of which democracy can be produced, reproduced and 
validated. It approaches Bakhtin’s idea of dialogue as an important but neglected concept 
in democratic studies and explores what dialogue is for Bakhtin, showing how his general 
theory of language and meaning not only implicates particular concepts of democracy 
such as addresser/ruler and addressee/ruled, but also reveals the conditions of freedom 
that is necessary to produce the momentum towards the enabling practices of political 
life. With respect to these, it discusses how Bakhtin’s idea of dialogue anticipates 
normative concerns that are central to contemporary democratic theory: Is it possible to 
establish a balance between unity and diversity or between the universal and the particular 
in a way that promotes recognition of differences as an instrument of democratic rule? 
Or, is it possible to prevent the inevitable tension between constituting a regulatory 
framework for political participation (which inevitably posits some fixity and exclusion) 
and celebrating heteroglossia? In order to address these issues, this thesis considers 
politics not only as a united body, but also a heteroglossic and multivoiced body. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
DİYALOGİZM AND DEMOKRASİ 
 
 
Koçan, Gürcan 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doçent Dr. Simon Wigley 
 
 
Nisan 2003 
 
 
Bu tez demokrasi olgusunu karar verme sürecinin ötesinde diyaloğun bir türü olarak 
açımlamaktadır. Bu yaklaşımı seçmedeki ana amaç, demokratik siyasetin şartlarını sadece 
“kendi kendini yönetme” ya da “halkın kendi üzerindeki iktidarı” gibi tanımlara bağlı 
kalmadan ve insanın ruhunu tutaksaklık altına alan çoğunluğun ya da kendisini çoğunluk 
olarak kabul ettirmeyi başarmış olan aynılık ve bütünlük iradesinin ötesinde yaşamın 
farklılıkları arasındaki  ilişkiyi çok daha derin bir biçimde diyalog çerçevesinde 
betimleyerek yeniden ortaya koymaktır. Yaşamın ve dilin özünde diyalog olduğunu ileri 
süren ünlü düşünür Mikhail Bakhtin’in felsefesinden faydalanarak diyalog olgusunu çeşitli 
yönlerden açımlamak, siyaseti homojen bir vücut bütünün ötesinde çok sesli, karmaşık ve 
heterglot bir etkileşim bütünü olarak algılamamızı sağlar. Bu karmaşık bütün içinde farklı 
dillerin ya da anlamların birbirinden bağımsız olmaması nedeniyle, siyasal etkileşim süreci 
farklı konumlar arasında belli bir merkezde uzlaşma üretebileceği gibi, bunların 
merkezden uzaklaşarak muğlaklık düzlemi içerisinde yeni anlamlar kazanarak hem 
kendilerine hem de diğer konumlara göre yeniden farklılışmasına yol açabilir. Bu nedenle 
demokrasinin yalnızca kendisinden anlamlı bir biçimde söz etmek güçtür çünkü 
demokrasinin en önemli kaynağı dildir ve bu dilde diyalogsaldır. Dilin sözkonusu 
diyalogsal özelligi dikkate alındığında, demokratik siyasi kurum ve pratikleri gerçekte ifade 
ettiği anlam, halkın en çok sayıda veya en katılımcı kısmınının ya da kendilerini halkın 
iradesi olarak kabul ettrimeyi başarmış olanların iradesinin ötesinde heteorjen doğası 
içersinde çoksesli bütünlüğün olduğunu ifade eder. Bu bütünlüğün temelinde her sesin, 
görüşün ya da konumun yanıtlanabilir olduğu ilkesi bulunur. Yanıtlanabilirilik ilkesi temel 
alındığında, demokratik sürece katılan bütün aktörler aynı anda hem yöneten (özne) hem 
de yönetilen (nesne) niteliğini kazanacağından siyasal sistem öziktidar özelliğini kazanır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, Diyalog, Öziktidar, Anayasa 
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There is neither a first nor last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it 
extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, 
those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once 
and for all) - they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future 
development of the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there 
are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain 
moments of the dialogue’s subsequent development along the way they are recalled and 
reinvigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every 
meaning will have its homecoming festival. (Bakhtin 1986: 170) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky wrote that if there were no God everything would 
be permitted. Simply put, it seems to me that in engaging in practices of democracy, 
people have lost the awareness that they have a “spirit” which allows for anything being 
possible or permitted. The only spirit people have to recognize is their own. In The 
Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky communicates with this spirit and with differing voices via 
the contradictory voices of the human condition. He places these voices in dialogue with 
one another and underlines the dilemma between happiness and freedom at the point of 
the dialogic meeting between two or more consciousnesses. This scenario is aptly 
represented by Alyosha Karamazov whose voice is associated with a deep sense of 
spirituality, and Ivan Fyodorovich Karamazov who speaks with the voice of an 
intellectual agnostic. Ivan’s speech is primarily informed by a skeptical mind. In the 
dialogue between Alyosha and Ivan, the latter is akin to a Grand Inquisitor in prose as he 
tells of a “fantasy,” or a “poem”. The prose starts with the portrayal of a Christ who 
comes back to earth again during the Spanish Inquisition in 16th century Seville. Walking 
through the town like an ordinary person, he performs miracles such as healing the sick, 
restoring vision to the blind and resurrecting a girl from the dead. In the meantime, the 
Cardinal Grand Inquisitor, after witnessing the performance of these miracles, not only 
arrests Christ but immediately incarcerates him as well. The Grand Inquisitor visits Christ 
in the prison that evening and discusses the numerous problems he has ascertained 
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regarding Christ’s return to earth. For example, the Grand Inquisitor suggests that 
Christ’s return is interfering with the earthly rule of the Church. He tells Christ that all 
power now lies in the hands of the Church, and not with him. The Grand Inquisitor 
argues that the people cannot handle the burden of free will and so the Church has 
abrogated the freedom of the masses in order to make them happy. Thus, they become 
slaves in order to receive bread from the Church. But, the Church has merely deceived 
them when claiming that they provided bread in the name of Christ. As the Grand 
Inquisitor says (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 297): 
Receiving loaves from us, of course, they will clearly see that what we 
have done is to take the loaves they won with their own hands in order 
to distribute it to them without any miracles, they will see that we have 
not turned stones into loaves, but truly, more than of the bread, they will 
be glad of the fact that they are receiving it from our hands!  
 
He tells Christ that this is what Christ should have done in the first place. The Church 
substitutes the “banner of earthly bread” for the “banner of freedom and the bread from 
heaven” as praised by Christ. As result, people stop suffering because they do not need to 
ask for freedom. He says that Christ should have been more miraculous in order to give 
people something to hold onto and believe in. People need security—and to the Grand 
Inquisitor, that is what the earthly Church offers (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 293): 
There are three powers, only three powers on the earth that are capable 
of eternally vanquishing and ensnaring the consciences of those feeble 
mutineers for their happiness—those powers: miracle, mystery and 
authority. You rejected the first, the second and the third and yourself 
gave the lead in doing so. When the wise and terrible Spirit set you on the 
pinnacle of the temple and said to you: ‘If you would know whether you 
are the Son of God then cast yourself down from hence, for it is written: 
the angels will take charge of him and bear him up, and he will not fall 
and dash himself pieces—and then you will know if you are the Son of 
God, and will prove how much faith you have in your Father.’ But 
having heard him through, you rejected his offer and did not give way 
and cast yourself down. Oh, of course, in that you acted proudly and 
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magnificently, like God, but people, that weak, mutinying tribe—are they 
god?  
 
These three forces—miracles, mystery, and authority—are necessary for establishing 
government on the earth. The Cardinal Grand Inquisitor argues that people are too weak 
to believe in a God if that deity does not perform miracles. The Grand Inquisitor explains 
that the execution of the decrees of the church is aligned with miracles. The means of a 
miracle is based on the same process as that of the Christ miracles which not only 
provide persuasion for the people but also impart the knowledge that he is the prophet of 
the God and will bring eventual salvation. He says (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 294): 
Oh, you knew that your great deed would be preserved in the Scriptures, 
would attain to the depth of the ages and to the outermost limits of the 
earth, and you hoped that in following you, man too would make do with 
God, not requiring a miracle. But you did not know that no sooner did 
man reject the miracle than he would at once reject God also, for man 
does not seek God so much as miracles. And since man is not strong 
enough to get by without the miracle, he creates new miracles for 
himself, his own now, bows down before the miracle of the quack and 
witchcraft of the peasant woman, even though he is a mutineer, heretic, 
atheist a hundred times over you. 
 
Miracles bear the power of convincement. In practicing this power, the church 
establishes its earthly authority. The Cardinal Grand Inquisitor also tells Christ that 
mystery is also necessary for manufacturing the obedience of the masses to the earthly 
authority of the church. He thinks that the mystery of God grants promises of 
immortality while the mystery of the church promises happiness. He says (Dostoyevsky, 
1993: 295): 
And if there is a mystery, then we were within our rights to propagate 
that mystery and teach them that it was not the free decision of their 
hearts and not love that mattered, but the mystery, which they must obey 
blindly, even in opposition to their consciences. And that was what we 
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did. We corrected your great deed and founded it upon miracle, mystery and 
authority. 
 
The Grand Inquisitor explains that he employs the forces of miracle, mystery, and 
authority to conquer and hold captive forever the consciences of people for their 
happiness. He believes that freedom for the masses is a sentence to suffering. He explains 
that he takes “the sword of Caesar” in order to establish his kingdom which in turn offers 
the miserable masses the security that they most need. The Grand Inquisitor proclaimed 
that his kingdom must “vanquish freedom” in order to make people happy and provide 
the total security that they avidly seek. He uses specific examples of children suffering, 
screaming for Christ to help them. He noted that though the children scream for Christ 
to help, there was a choice not to intervene in earthly relations and this choice makes 
them suffer. He says if Christ does not help them, then he is not omnipotent; he only 
chooses the strong to be saved. However, the earthly kingdom of the Grand Inquisitor 
took the responsibility for the masses that do not have desire to take responsibility for 
themselves and in turn, gave them freedom and life that the temporal reality chose. He 
explained that people could never be free because they are weak, vicious, worthless and 
rebellious, and he says that even the most rebellious could easily become obedient in 
exchange for happiness and security. He suggested that all human beings may be born 
free and equal but now they are in absolute submission because they have brought “their 
freedom to us and place it at our feet…” (Dostoyevsky, 1993: 291). In exchange for their 
freedom, the rule of his kingdom offers happiness to the people in security. He says 
Christ’s way, allowing the strong to be chosen, offers people only an element of freedom. 
Therefore, it is not effective nor desirable, as it does not give the people happiness and 
freedom simultaneously.  
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At the end of the Grand Inquisitor’s speech, the Cardinal waits for a response but Christ 
says nothing. He merely kisses the ninety-year-old man on his withered lips. That is the 
only response that is given to the old man. At this moment, the Grand Inquisitor changes 
his mind regarding the decision to burn Christ at the stake, and sets him free, telling him 
never to come back again. 
The Grand Inquisitor section of The Brothers Karamazov dealing with freedom and 
happiness delves deeply into questions of democracy. It underlines the argument that 
political systems abrogate people’s freedom because the rulers choose and constitute a 
social order for them, therefore taking away their freedom to choose. It compares the 
relationship between freedom and happiness. Considering freedom and happiness as two 
different states of being provides an interesting twist as to how we look at the concept of 
democracy. The issue here is about the possibility of a concept of democracy that 
generates a balance between freedom and bread, between freedom and power and 
influence, between freedom and security. Dostoyevsky creates a trace of this concept of 
democracy in the dialogues of The Brothers Karamazov. There are three important traces of 
democracy that we can find in the writings of Dostoyevsky. Firstly, there is the 
understanding that democracy is a dialogue. This form of dialogue refers to the 
juxtaposition of the plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses 
of different people. The second trace of democracy is that of free choice or rebellion 
exercised by heroes and it is fundamental to a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices. 
The genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is not only the chief characteristic of 
Dostoyevsky’s novels but also democracy. According Bakhtin (1997: 6):  
What unfolds in his novels is not a multitude of characters and fates in a 
single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; 
rather a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with his 
own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event. 
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In stressing the autonomy of voices, Dostoevsky imagines democracy not with voiceless 
people, but with free citizens capable of standing alongside the author (i.e. government), 
capable of disagreeing with or even rebelling against the author/government. In effect, 
the characters in Dostoevsky’s novels affirm their freedom precisely in their rebellion 
against the author and against any finalized definition of themselves. And finally, the third 
trace of democracy is the menippean satire that Bakhtin ascertains in the section of the 
Grand Inquisitor. (Bakhtin, 1997: 156) Understanding theses traces, dialogue, polyphony 
and menippean satire, their consequences and effects, are critical to the generation of what 
can be called dialogue. 
Bakhtin’s understanding of dialogue goes beyond mere conversation or a narrative system 
that is employed in the process of communication. It is an interaction of voices and it is 
geared towards new understandings, connections, or possibilities in the novel. It initiates 
the development of complex structures and ideas. In the Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 
Bakhtin noted, “all else is the means, dialogue is the end. A single voice ends nothing and 
resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence.” 
(Bakhtin 1997: 252) 
A central concern underlying Bakhtin’s approach to dialogue is to characterize the new 
authorial position in and around the idea of polyphony. Bakhtin describes the term 
“polyphony” in three ways. First, it means “plurality of plurality of independent and 
unmerged voices and consciousnesses.” (Bakhtin 1997: 6) Secondly, it refers to the 
equality and freedom of those voices to interact with each other and with the voice of the 
author in an arena in which no single voice—particularly not an authorial voice—has 
importance. (Bakhtin, 1997: 7) Thirdly, it is linked to “the unity of the event.” Here the 
event can be seen as the meeting and dialogue of different, independent voices. It is co-
existence, shared existence or being with another. (Bakhtin, 1997: 7) 
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Concerning the notion of dialogue in and around Dostoevsky’s polyphony, Bakhtin 
devotes a great deal of attention to menippean satire. Bakhtin’s characterizations of satire 
rest on contrasts—of unresolved exchange of ideas between the past and present and 
between characters who represent opposing values and ideologies. Bakhtin conceives of 
satire as an open form of dialogue that is free from situations of history, realism, and 
legend. Satire contains fantastic elements created in extraordinary situations for the 
purpose of testing philosophical truth, especially through the manipulation of 
perspective. A satiric exchange mixes the fantastic, symbolic, and even quasi-religious 
with “crude slum naturalism” and “a genre of ‘ultimate questions’,” combining bold 
invention with broad philosophical reflection. Satire as form of use includes the 
utilization of the spheres of heaven, earth, and hell to look at these ultimate questions. It 
refers to “experimental fantasticality,” that is, “observation from some unusual point of 
view.” It contains unusual states of insanity, split personality, dreams, and excessive 
passion, creating a “dialogic relationship to one’s own self.” Satiric forms of dialogue are 
full of scandal, eccentricities, inappropriate speech, violations of politeness and social 
expectations. Communicative agents of satire are produced with contradictory behaviour 
with combinations of various elements of social utopia. These agents insert a variety of 
other genres that are parodies and the questions presuppose (or impose) an integrated 
and stable universe of values and beliefs. In doing so, they express a concern with 
“current and topical issues.” Satiric forms of dialogue do not create discrimination 
between good and bad; it only creates interrogation of any claims that consist of a 
systematic understanding of the good. The goals of a satiric form of dialogue are to 
dismiss conventional and hierarchical relationships between claims of good and bad. 
Therefore, they contain “multi-styled” and “multi-toned” voices who express themselves 
in their own ways, as opposed to monologue, the single consciousness that tries to 
impose itself as the authority, for generation of the truth. (Bakhtin 1997:114-118) 
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Both polyphony and satire are literary devices utilized in Dostoevsky’s novels. Essentially, 
they enable the formation of narratives and provide the engines through which different 
forms of dialogue come into being. These different forms of dialogue will constitute key 
criteria for this research project as it is concerned with evaluating the application of 
different dialogical models to concepts of democracy. It will advance Bakhtin’s emphasis 
on considering dialogue within democratic contexts, but will also expand on that 
methodology to privilege both (a) particular context where the multi polyvocal polity 
occurs and (b) heteroglossia as the meeting in language of democracy where political 
actors express themselves in their own ways, in contrast to monoglossia, the single 
language. In this context, this research project will primarily be concerned with issues 
such as how dialogue itself as a starting point would be actualized as a conception of 
democracy.   
The conceptual integration of dialogue with democracy is inspired by the writings of 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975). Mikhail Bakhtin who is Russian literary critic, linguist and 
philosopher, lived and wrote who spent most of his life as a Soviet citizen, did his major 
work in the nineteen-twenties, -thirties, and -forties. He was part of a study group, now 
famous as the “Bakhtin circle,” which included such figures as P. N. Medvedev (1891-
1938), and V. N. Voloshinov (1884/5-1936). Most of his works went unpublished in the 
Soviet Union during the Stalin era and were almost unknown to generations of readers 
until the mid-1980s but have become influential since. 
Bakhtin’s works focused both literary theory examining the relation between literature 
and linguistics; and political theory, a critique of the monological hegemony precluding 
any social diversity imposed by the totalitarian Stalinist regime. Bakhtin valued 
heteroglossia (opposite monologia that is a system of norms, of one standard language, or 
an “official” language, a standard language that to push all the elements of societal 
 9 
communication, all of its various rhetorical modes into one single form, coming from 
one central point). Heteroglossia, a multiplicity of languages, the collection of all the 
forms of social speech, or rhetorical modes, that reveals the realities of multi-voiced 
dialogue or polyvocal polity that explicitly recognizes different voices and perspectives in 
unity. 
His approach to the notion of multi-voiced dialogue can be viewed as consistent with the 
concept of democracy. Bakhtin’s view of multi-voiced dialogue, and by extension 
democracy, is intrinsically plural and polyvocal. Just as each citizen develops his/her own 
voice through relationships with other citizens in a dynamic and vital interaction, 
Bakhtin’s emphasis on plurality and polyvocality provides a framework for conception of 
democracy as it imagines a political system that is free of a single authorial consciousness. 
The idea of a single authorial consciousness is based on the assumption that languages 
and their meanings are fixed, not modifiable as they are exposed to new voices. It may 
manifest itself in almost all social organizations, from totalizing systems or philosophies, 
to governments—a spectrum that ranges from a system of norms, of one standard 
language that everyone would have to conceive (and which would then be enforced by 
various mechanisms of politics. It demands that people accept it without questioning—
that they make it their own view or preference. It builds an external or authoritative 
source of meaning in order to bind people with power.  
In contrast to a single authorial consciousness as manifested in centralized power of every 
sort—charismatic, bureaucratic, class, military, political, party, and technocratic—Mikhail 
Bakhtin celebrates dialogism, heteroglossia and polyphony as reciprocal plays of voices. From 
this initial conception, this research project will advance Bakhtin’s emphasis on 
developing a concept of democracy within a framework of multiple contesting voices. 
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These contestations represent a variety of ideological positions and engage equally in 
dialogue; they are free from authorial judgment or constraint.  
This dissertation uses the notion of dialogue in a broad sense of politics. It views dialogue 
not only as a reciprocal relationship between political actors but also as a communication 
with the immediate social, historical and cultural contexts. This point is subtle but 
important. Language and hence meanings of democracy change both (a) when 
considered from within each different historical, social and cultural context, but also (b) 
when considered from the dialogue that occurs at the frontiers between different 
preferences and views. Therefore, this dissertation will not be geared toward the 
expression of an authoritative voice—a voice based on clear-cut normative principles or 
the assumptions that language and its meanings are fixed, not modifiable. Instead, it takes 
dialogism as a methodical structure for examining the very concept of democracy in a 
polyphonic and multivoiced context. Such polyphonic and multivoiced contexts awaken 
new and independent meanings of democracy while it dialogizes masses of meanings 
from within without relegating them to an isolated and static condition.  
In this context, this dissertation will begin by exploring the main elements associated with 
the concept of dialogue quite generally, and then consider the special advantages of 
Bakhtinian viewpoints in comparison to other viewpoints (e.g. Habermas) in the course 
of developing an alternative dialogical concept of democracy. From this comparison, this 
dissertation attempts to develop and to defend a Bakhtinian form of dialogical democracy 
as one that is more suitable for serving the purposes of democracy as dialogue. It argues 
that Bakhtin’s viewpoints on dialogue offer appealing conceptual tools with inclusive and 
freeing capacities that can be useful for the further conceptualization of democracy. The 
starting points for this line of reasoning are the circumstances for dialogue.  
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Circumstances of dialogue can be specified at two levels: the first level refers to language; 
and the second level refers to institutional and procedural conditions. Therefore, this 
dissertation is built on a two-part structure. The first aspect of this arrangement (chapters 
1, 2 and 3) describes combined meanings of dialogue and the list of conditions that play a 
decisive role in the constitution of dialogue in language. The second part of the structure 
(chapters 4, 5 and 6) considers the procedural aspects of dialogue in the political field by 
working through different normative conceptions of democracy.  
The first chapter aims to make the point that democracy is a form of dialogue. Therefore, 
it will specifically focus on the question of dialogue and provide an overview of generally 
conceived meanings of dialogue. Focusing mostly on the relations that dialogue reveals, it 
will underline not only that there are different forms of dialogue in reference to patterns 
of communicative performances and the ends to which they are directed, but also 
acknowledges that there are different kinds of relations (i.e., equal respect, difference in 
unity, and autonomy) that are revealed, i.e. the certain conditions that are required when 
dialogue occurs. In connection to these, at the end, this chapter will try to re-
conceptualize the complex idea of dialogue as both a democratic ideal and a political 
method.  
The first step in this reformulation of dialogue is to describe the ways in which people 
with different characteristics, styles, values, and assumptions engage in communication 
and what the results of the their communicative acts entail. Certain dialogical acts, 
notably that of Socrates, serve as starting point from which we can discern the different 
ways in which dialogue elicits modes interactive engagement. Socratic dialogues represent 
a highly informative and directed interactive engagement that questions various 
postulations and values that are presumed by everyday actions and judgments. They 
involve the use of active communication in the shared pursuit of knowledge and 
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understanding. They represent the external expression of an internal, dialectical thought 
process of back-and-forth ratiocination, question and answer or challenge and response 
in pursuit of epistemological and ontological discovery. These relational movements of 
question and answer as an avenue toward discovery have two communicative patterns: 
anacrisis, the “means for eliciting and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor”; and 
syncrisis, “the juxtaposition of various points of view on a specific object.” (Bakhtin, 1997: 
110-11) They move gradually and systematically, so that all participants gain insight into 
the substance of understanding through an experience of aporia. In Socratic dialogues, the 
experience of aporia refers to a situation of inconclusivity in which participants no longer 
know what to utter about the issue being queried. It creates perplexity, as it requires 
participants to advance their understanding, while it reminds them of the limits of their 
understanding and language. From here, the chapter describes dialogue as an interactive 
process of understanding. (Gadamer, 1979) 
In the course of dialogue, each participant reveals his or her understanding to the other 
person, sincerely accepts his or her point of view as a reflection and gets inside the 
other’s understanding to such an extent that an interlocutor understands what the other 
utters. In this process, the utterances that are expressed are not a fixed phenomenon 
containing objective meanings for understanding. Rather, they contain meanings that 
arise out of interaction. With the expression of utterances in the communicative field, 
each participant brings his or her understandings to encounters. They try to understand 
an utterance that can have various meanings if visualized from different vantage points. 
Such different vantage points refer to horizons of understanding that may fuse to each 
other’s space without necessarily having sameness. (Gadamer, 1979: 143) Sameness 
cannot be imposed, but rests on a fusion of understanding. In this sense, the 
understanding that participants bring to plays of dialogue is fused in encounters with the 
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difference of meanings. Therefore, in the field of dialogue, participants experience not 
only a fusion of horizons but also a unity in difference. 
From here, the chapter moves on to different conceptions of dialogue that are oriented 
towards different ends. There are three primary conceptions of dialogue. These categories 
describing conceptions are not absolute because all of them contain general 
characteristics of dialogue, such as tolerance, patience and respect for differences, a 
willingness to listen in consideration of everyone involved, the ability to be both 
addresser and addressee, and the disposition to express one’s views sincerely. These 
categories may have overlapping characteristics, but they can take on different forms if 
they are directed towards different ends with a discrete purpose. 
“Regulative” is the first conception of dialogue. This is a form of dialogue that marks 
regulation and consensus in interactive relations between the addresser and addressee. In 
other words, it guides interactive relations oriented toward the formation of 
understanding and consensus with respect to the rationality of arguments. This model of 
dialogue presupposes agreement about implicitly raised conventions as background 
conditions or the normative context of a communicative situation. Operating within the 
domain of a shared normative context, dialogue binds and guides interactions between 
addresser and addressee toward the formation of rational agreement. In regulative 
dialogue, participants take up an attitude towards each other as referents of an ethical 
world, that is, of an ethic constituted by shared normative rules. Participants keep an eye 
on whether their claims in communicative interaction accord with established norms and 
values. Therefore, they question, redeem and filter all claims that rest upon implicit 
norms through the medium of rationality. Rationality, which is a medium possessing 
evaluative and regulative standard, helps to ground all claims in the uncoerced consensus 
that such dialogue can achieve — including critical reflection on the conditions under 
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which that agreement is obtained. These conditions regulate communicative interactions 
and accord the outcomes of such dialogue generalizability not based upon absolute claims 
of truth, but secured on the nonrelative criterion of valid agreement among the parties 
concerned. 
“Truth orientation” is the second conception of dialogue. This form of dialogue evolves 
with forms of question and answer, challenge and response and the delivery of one 
understanding leading to another. It has the telos of truth in the form of innate principles 
of knowledge that exist in understanding. The telos of truth through the employment of 
strategic reason is the driving force of communication and it is not attainable at the end 
of dialogue. The initial situation of dialogue starts with conflicting points of view. The 
expression of views comes out through a clash and contest of ideas, or an opposing series 
of arguments, which seek to negate each other. In this way, expressions of views instruct 
various forms of persuasion. The basic form of persuasion refers to the use of particular 
evidence or methods of reasoning (inductive or deductive) to negate certain viewpoints 
that do not have validity and also to prove that another set of viewpoints has validity. 
This process of negation can clear the way for new understandings and the production of 
novel ideas. Thus, with the involvement of a high degree of reasoning, this process refers 
to the communicative representation of a dialectical process of assessment based on 
conjecture, a criticism of values and beliefs, and a reconstruction of ideas along with an 
exploration of new meanings. Truth-oriented dialogue serves to suspend judgments and 
overcome paradoxes, dilemmas and contradictions.  
“Celebration” is the third conception of dialogue. This is a form of dialogue that has an 
end in itself rather than being merely procedural (i.e. a way to reveal truth or reach 
agreement encounter, agreement, convergence, compromise, and synthesis among 
different positions or perspectives implied in and underlying any act of communication). 
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It is derived from diversity and moves in the direction of difference. Thus, it embodies 
and values the multiplicity of voices within languages. It exposes fixity of languages in 
order to make voices extend beyond categories concepts and stereotypes, as they often 
represent specific histories, memories and experiences. Thus, it provides an escape from 
the absolutism and dualism that demands deepened and sharpened positionalities. In 
essence, it makes positionalities relational rather than substantive. This means that all 
socially, culturally and politically positioned participants display their preferences and 
points of view in relation to the other. Thus, the most concrete configuration of 
celebratory dialogue can be seen not only as communication via exchanges in language, 
but also as freedom from social roles, statutes and conventions of the social world. It 
features polyphony, dialogism, heteroglossia, and centrifugal force, all of which are 
expressed in a movement outward from a center. Therefore, this form often takes place 
in the non-institutionalized context, for example in the public sphere. It is closely 
connected to the deontological attempts of participants, who do not try to maximize their 
situationality in an effort to achieve a greater share of a particular given set of scarce 
goods and services.  
After a general overview of dialogue in the first chapter, the second chapter will introduce 
a number of Bakhtin’s perspectives, terms, and assumptions (i.e. polyphony, 
heteroglossia, and carnival) on dialogue in order for examining the very concept 
democracy. The purpose of this excursus is to emphasize the notion that democracy has 
a multi-voiced character in the same fashion as dialogue conceptualized by Bakhtin. On 
the one hand, Bakhtin did not write specifically about politics, and hence does not 
directly address the combined issue of dialogue and democracy. On the other hand, 
Bakhtin was interested in the dialogical activity between different people or between 
selves and within language. According to the Bakhtinian view, each form of dialogue is 
 16 
somehow the product of mutual efforts of the participants who remain open to different 
modifications and interpretations of meaning regarding their actions and outlook. 
Keeping an open mind as to different modifications and interpretations of actions, 
dialogue provides freedom, creativity and independence with the establishment of 
reciprocal relationships. Retaining its own communicative characteristics, the dialogue 
may allow the development of agreement and understanding among the people  
The dialogical method is the instrument of communication and inherent in that method 
are processes, which fundamentally enable the formation of citizens, of the public sphere, 
and provide the engine by which democracy comes into being. Therefore, despite the fact 
that the notion of democracy that rarely explicitly appears in his work, Bakhtin seems to 
want to use dialogue as the basis for a democratic community.   
This principle points not only to the constant interaction among multiple languages, 
intentions, and contexts but also the reciprocal relationship in which addresser/ruler and 
addressee/ruled change their positions constantly. Reflecting on these terms, this chapter 
will identify democracy as a dialogical activity that establishes a mode of reciprocal 
relationships between addresser and addressee. This activity is produced via the material 
of a particular linguistic complex. Hence, politically meaningful democratic acts can only 
be considered in terms of linguistic dialogical processes. These processes play a decisive 
role for the political meanings of democratic acts, all of which is the product of a two-
sided act and which is realized only when brought into play. The political meanings of 
democratic acts are dynamic, which is to say, they evolve over the course of interaction; 
they are not exactly the same between one person and another; and it manifests the 
cultural and ideational assumptions that people bring to the dialogical realm. This is not 
to say that actors do not have full power over determining the political meaning of their 
democratic actions; instead, whatever political meaning is achieved for individual and 
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collective actions is a result of the interaction of what both addresser/ruler and 
addressee/ruled bring to the dialogical realm of language. 
After describing the democratic realm as a linguistically determined reciprocal 
relationship, the third chapter seeks to embark on democracy as it exists within and 
through language and hence in the interaction among different forms of life as 
represented by different uses of language. With this in the background the chapter builds 
upon the comparison of the language and dialogue theories of two prominent theorists: 
Bakhtin and Habermas. Here attention will be paid to the issues of dialogical freedom 
and the inclusivity of difference within these two theories, as this dissertation considers 
their framework in the process of searching more appropriate theories of dialogue for the 
construction of a new understanding of democracy. The chapter will examine their 
overall scheme and explain why this dissertation finds Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue to be 
a more suitable basis for democracy.  
The chapter will begin by contrasting Habermas’ theory of language and Bakhtin’s 
philosophy of language in terms of their conception of what language entails. At a 
broader level, Habermas’ theory of communicative action possesses three traits in 
connection with the interactive use of language: domains of reality, functions of speech, 
and the attitude of agents. In the domains of reality, Habermas sees language as the 
medium of the three interrelating worlds of the objective, the social, and the subjective. It 
shapes three relations into reality: representing facts, establishing legitimate (or valid) 
interpersonal relations, and expressing one’s subjectivity. At the functional level, 
Habermas describes language as an instrument for accomplishing both communication, 
through the dimension of validity, and truth disclosure, via the dimension of meaning. In 
connection to both domains of reality and functionality, Habermas examines the 
underlying assumptions, intentions, or values of competent interlocutors who employ 
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sentences in various types of language use. He depicts constative speech acts as 
references to things standing in the objective world, regulative speech acts as references 
to the norms and expressive speech acts references to individual experience. On the basis 
of three axis which are built into the very fabric of interactive language use, Habermas 
postulates an ideal speech situation; a situation of dialogue in which each person who is 
not internally or externally constrained by status differences or one-sidedly binding norms 
discovers an equal opportunity to participate and openly express and defend his/her ideas 
and criticize the ideas of others. For Habermas, the ideal speech situation is the basis of 
dialogue for producing uncoerced agreement and consensus, which is binding on all 
parties; a reasoned discussion for the deliberation and negotiation of differences and a 
therapeutic engagement for ontological and epistemological exploration. His view of an 
ideal speech situation also appears as a means of cognitive development and 
understanding, a method of critically comparing and assessing alternative claims, and a 
form of ethical order that is epistemically justified.  
In contrast to Habermas’ ideal speech scenario, Bakhtin’s idea describes dialogue in terms 
of the multivocality, openness, and ambiguities that are active in the use of language. For 
Bakhtin, dialogue is a term that is meant to capture the relational character of language. 
As opposed to Jürgen Habermas, for whom communicative action is consent-oriented 
aimed at reaching a rational agreement and a reconciliation of differences, Bakhtin sees 
dialogue as the mix and collision of perspectives and languages; in his terms dynamic 
interplay of centripetal forces that tend toward unity and centrifugal forces that tend 
toward difference. (Bakhtin, 1981:272-273) With this emphasis on dynamic interplay, 
polyphony and heteroglossia, Bakhtin considers dialogue as a phenomenon of 
consciousness. It can only be generated in consciousness and through communication 
among consciousnesses. However, it essentially comes into being only through individual 
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oral or written utterances in the various communicative activities of people. Dialogue, 
which is a part of the whole, structure of utterances, and interfere at all semantic and 
expressive layers of communication; hence, he suggests that words or sentences cannot 
have any meaning until they enter into an interactive field among people. Dialogue is 
always a part of an utterance. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117) The dialogical quality of utterances 
always makes the expression of words or sentences as a response to both past and future 
links in a communication chain.  
Bakhtin also associates dialogue with voice or an addressing consciousness because an 
utterance may only subsist when generated by a voice. Utterance always stems from a 
perspective, a voice. Thus, utterances become actions bringing into being a meaning and 
understanding. Voices always subsist in reference to the social, historical and cultural 
context; they cannot be separated from the realm in which they are expressed. Each 
utterance that is produced by a voice reflects in its own way a context that has produced 
it. Therefore, utterances are not independent of each other or dialogical when standing 
alone, rather they are produced in a context in which they mutually reflect each other in a 
communicative chain. In connection to the perspective and context in which they are 
uttered, each and every utterance is a response to prior utterances. When they become a 
response to preceding utterances, they not only correspond to the addresser’s voice, but 
also to the voice of the person to whom they are intended. When the voice fabricates an 
utterance, it not only responds to preceding utterances, but also anticipates the voice of 
the responses in potential utterances. In this way, dialogue may be attained. Therefore, 
Bakhtin’s view of dialogue consists of a complexity that cannot be reduced either to the 
rational communicative acts of actors or to purely linguistic relations. Such a view of 
dialogue has a dynamism all of its own containing the multi-dimensional elements of a 
narrative and also marked by an open-endedness of the issues and the plot. (Bakhtin 
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1986: 117) In this context, this comparison will show that the Habermasian and 
Bakhtinian theories of dialogue are in some ways similar as well as different. Both of 
them focus on the relationships that are established with language, and both take 
language and interaction as the underlying concepts on which the theory of dialogue is to 
be developed. However, what is different in their theories of dialogue are not only the 
particular practices, or the system of beliefs and values that support them, but also a 
larger and specific frame of reference in which their theories can be seen as bearing 
distinct understandings. 
From the conceptual discussion of dialogue and language, the fourth chapter will proceed 
with a discussion of democracy, as self-government in order to make a case that 
democracy is inherently reciprocal between rulers and ruleds. Thus, this chapter will begin 
to describe systems of self-government because they emerge at the interstices of being 
both the object and the subject of political deliberations.  
The central claim of this chapter is that self-government is essential property of both 
dialogue and democracy. Dialogue can only flourish and democracy will only survive if 
everyone is guaranteed their right to take turns in addressing/ruling and being 
addressed/ruled as equals. The term self-government primarily connotes a certain kind of 
unity between restraint and freedom, ruler and ruled and addresser and addressee through 
which the people are able to connect with one another and separate from one another in 
the dialogical process of democracy: where they can fulfill their potential for being 
responsibility to themselves and others. In the field of dialogue, the functionality of self-
government is to act as a framework of regulations, which empowers and facilitates the 
participants, encouraging relations of mutual respect and cooperation among them. 
Under this self-government they can organize, learn, and act with one another to 
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construct the more complex dialogical relationships of responsibility, which are necessary 
for democracy to occur.  
This chapter sees the idea of self-government as linkage of dialogue to democracy 
because of its double connotation: first, the self portrays attention to people who are 
active participants of a dialogical realm and are actively involved in determining their own 
communicative ends. In this sense, their sources of action lie between one and another 
though are not totally as an internal agent or the result of external forces, compulsion, 
etc. A governmental process emphasizing dialogue is both open and an open-ended 
process dealing with the development of regulatory space wherein every participant takes 
a turn as the addresser and addressee or to engage in the communicative activities that led 
to democracy. So, just as self-government includes the reciprocal principle of turn taking, 
it also includes the responsibility to give shape to the selfhood of oneself and other 
persons by communicative action.  
After a discussion of the concept of self-government, the fifth chapter will focus on the 
role of values and perceptions that normatively construct certain conceptions of 
democracy. As there are multitudes of normative frameworks of democracy, we always 
need to address the plurality of conceptions of democracy as part of democratic theory 
and practice. The chapter’s aim is not to advocate one model over another, but to offer 
an analysis that serves as a springboard for new understandings of democracy or political 
self-government, in relation to dialogue. There are two important classical accounts that 
have significant implications for our understanding of democracy. These accounts are the 
republican and the liberal conceptions of democracy. Both of them take as their starting 
point a different end (telos) towards which democracy is or ought to be striving. Their 
different premises are based on the common and public goals that they assign to the 
model of democracy, which they conceptualize. In theory, liberalism, which emphasizes 
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the plurality of values and methodological individualism, describes the telos of democracy 
as it is produced via the aggregation of individual preferences and interests. In contrast to 
liberalism, the republican approach, which underlines unity and methodological 
communitarianism, identifies the telos of democracy as the common good. For the 
republican democrat the common good refers to a shared good that cannot be obtained 
individually because it is generated through common deliberation and common action in 
reference to broad understandings of the common interests and values that democracy is 
supposed to strive to achieve.  
The difference between liberal and republican strands of democracy hinges on who the 
tension between unity and difference is resolved. Liberalism embraces individual freedom 
over collectivity. Hence, it links individual freedom to a system of rights in which 
individuals are free to choose and pursue their own ends. 
According to classical liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, the pursuit of chosen 
ends is equal to the pursuit of happiness. Regardless of the shading one gives to an 
individual’s pursuit of ends and their fulfillment, they define individual freedom. For a 
liberal then, in this context, what is good for the society (unity), is not necessarily good 
for each individual (difference) because each individual has a distinct and unique outlook, 
hence they have different desires and goals. The fulfillment of an individual’s wants and 
goals may be independent of that which his/her societies deems desirable. In contrast to 
liberalism, republicanism depicts freedom in connection to collectivity. Therefore, it 
views freedom as an integral part of a political and social community. Because republican 
philosophy is predicated on the view that freedom is societal, it requires citizens to be 
active participants in the public affairs of the community. It expects that citizens can only 
realize their freedom through this active participation. Republican philosophy stresses 
and requires that citizens acquire freedom through civic virtue in the guise of experience 
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and character formation, thus gaining the qualities and traits necessary for the pursuit of a 
shared conception of common good. In this regard, it believes that what is good for each 
individual is not necessarily good for the society because each individual is a part of the 
community or a greater whole from which they, in a sense, receive their sense of being, 
and hence the good of the whole is inseparable from the good of each part. For this 
reason, the republican approach requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in 
citizens the qualities of civic virtue.  
Both the liberal and republican approaches tend to raise the tension between the 
individual and the community, or difference and unity, and they are therefore unable to 
come to generate an adequate conceptualization of democracy. Even though in different 
ways they criticize each other, their approach to the concept of democracy appears to be 
either a collectivist one that leaves aside the crucial role-played by the individual or an 
individualist one that pays no attention to shared values. In contrast to the dichotomic 
approaches entailed by liberalism and republicanism, the dialogical approach tries to bring 
a balance between the individual and community while emphasizing each, in part, for the 
sake of the other. For the dialogical approach, the individual and the community or 
difference and unity are co-original – democracy cannot have one without the other, and 
it cannot eliminate one without eliminating the other. In a way, the referentiality and 
reflexivity elements are simultaneously in operation in the dialogical approach of 
democracy; it is a phenomenon wherein both the individual and the community 
concurrently refer to themselves and to aspects of each other as their own condition of 
possibility and as their own limit. Therefore, this chapter will argue that neither the 
republican nor liberal conceptions of democracy would be sufficient to settle this 
dilemma of unity/difference. The resolution of the dilemma can be seen as dialogical 
only to the extent that democracy can constitute free interaction among all differently 
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situated, but politically equal, participants whose unique qualities are protected and 
affirmed within unity. In other words, the dialogical realm of democracy structures the 
relationship between the individual/difference/plurality and the community/unity/whole 
in such a way that can protect individual/difference/plurality and the 
community/unity/whole. Nonetheless, because practical dialogical arrangements of 
democracy require choices of emphasis on behalf of the individual/difference/plurality 
or the community/unity/whole, functioning dialogical theories of democracy will 
distinguish themselves based on the emphasis they place on one or the other. Even when 
they do directly reflect one emphasis, the awareness and recognition of the alternative 
emphasis continues to provide the necessary balance. For where either emphasis is taken 
to an extreme, the dialogical character loses the moderation necessary for its durability 
and stability. To deny the importance of the individual/difference/plurality or the 
community is to attack the basis of a dialogical order. In this context, this chapter will 
review the dialogical theories that derive some of their premises from classical theories of 
democracy. In comparing different dialogical theories of democracy, this chapter will also 
attempt to elaborate the rudiments of a Bakhtinian dialogical concept of democracy.   
The sixth chapter, which sees democracy as a set of rules and procedures embedded 
ideally in the constitution, embarks on the background conditions of democracy. As 
taken up in this chapter, the constitution is the embodiment of procedures and 
institutionalized frameworks of self-government. The constitution as an expression of the 
development and deployment of an array of methods and institutions connotes a 
dialogical/regulative way to conduct political decision-making.  Further, procedures and 
institutions can be viewed as one source of self-government. In democracies, all political 
and legal acts ultimately correspond to procedures and institutions as referential sources. 
It is a mark of the referential character of such procedures that they are enacted and 
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utilized in all political actions in a dialogical means in order to perform a variety of 
proceedings for the formation, organization, governance, regulation, inspiration and 
justification of politics. It is an appraisal of the detrimental character of this referential 
source that very often is taken to be the final word, the ultimate frame of reference, the 
last recourse, and the very limit of possible political conflict. However, the deployment of 
an array of institutional and regulative mechanisms for democracy must remain 
incomplete, in the sense of happening, in order for it to remain as ideal in the sense of 
openness. One can assert that a once and for all organizational structure and set of rule 
for democracy is impossible because democracy is an ongoing open-ended process that 
cannot be closed. Thus, procedures and institutional mechanisms are important in two 
ways. First, they have the intrinsic quality of dialogue among those who are subject to 
binding collective decisions as they inherently incorporate the ideas of respect, freedom 
and equality. In essence, the communicative acts of citizens who are expected to govern 
their acts in dialogue with procedures and institutionalized frameworks of politics are 
treated by those constituent processes as equal participants. Second, the establishment of 
procedures and institutionalized frameworks of politics are instrumentally important: they 
help protect the basic rights of citizens as free participants. Further, they advance the 
concept of a free and equal citizen, as defined by the ends and projects with which they 
identify. In this context, the constitutional framework of democratic politics protects 
equality and freedom of people while preventing them from the tyranny of majority. 
More fundamentally, a constitutional system of democracy for the exercise of self-
government in which citizens are acted as equal restrains the exercise of power by 
protecting majorities from minority rule, avoiding at least some arbitrary violations of 
rights, and conceiving of the governor and governed in the same context and manner. In 
this situation, the constitution fulfills the role of a procedural and institutional 
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mechanism, which will generate conditions of self-governing citizens – i.e. being a ruler 
and the ruled at the same time – and hence help engender the birth of dialogical systems.  
 
CHAPTER I. WHAT IS DIALOGUE? 
I.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss first the very meaning of dialogue as separate from conversation. 
I argue that the very function of dialogue is different from conversation because it is a 
fluid, and deeply connected interaction that transcends the merely personal 
communication between two (or more) people alternately taking the role of speaker and 
listener.  
It is interaction mediated by utterance, language, meaning, understanding, time and space. 
In this regard, I examine the Socratic idea of dialogue. The Socratic method emphasizes 
the to-and-fro relation between question and answer as a process of new understanding 
and knowledge. It is a creative force, open, critical, and aimed at action. Furthermore, it is 
a dialectical process, from which one can learn about the world, others and oneself across 
various domains of knowledge: ontology, epistemology and political praxis. The 
application of dialogical reasoning breaks down accepted ways of seeing and doing to 
construct new approaches. The natural outcome of this is not truth but aporia. Aporia is a 
dialogical situation in which participants are no longer able to generate answers for the 
issues that are currently under discussion. In essence, it constitutes a state of perplexity. 
Once a state of aporia has been inspired, both the destructive and constructive 
components of the Socratic dialogue are achieved. Without pretending that they have 
achieved truth, participants engage in a collective search through further dialogue. (Kidd, 
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1992: 88-89)1 In this regard, Socratic dialogue serves to advance a dialogical collective 
search process wherein each participant’s views not only contribute to the dialogue but 
also in fact have merit.  
Secondly, I will examine dialogue as a process of understanding. I conceive dialogue as a 
way of reaching an understanding - a continual process that not only goes back and forth 
between participants and also occurs within each individual. Thus, it is a reciprocal 
practice of eliciting and juxtaposing ideas for and through understanding. Such dialogue is 
not only directed toward an understanding of one’s own and others’ ideas, but also 
toward the very persons who hold them. Dialogue is simultaneously an instrument and 
result of the understanding process. It occurs in, across, between, or through 
relationships of understanding.  
Thirdly, I shall argue that dialogue is not only a medium of understanding between 
communicating individuals, as well as selves, but also an emergent quality that represents 
necessity and contingency. Through this quality, participants in dialogue can 
simultaneously appear as reactive and responsive agents who are the objects of their 
actions. (i.e., self-governed)  
Finally, I shall take up the issue of the functionality of dialogue for its participants. In this 
part of the chapter, I will suggest three different models of dialogue – regulatory, truth-
oriented and celebratory – for clarifying the different meanings that might be attached to 
dialogue in the politics of democracy – a question that I will subsequently address in the 
chapter five.  
                                                 
1 In the same way, Bakhtin describes the image of ambivalence as fire in the dialogues of Carnival. Bakhtin 
calls ambivalence “a fire that simultaneously destroys and renews the world.” (Bakhtin 1997: 126)  
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I.2. Conditions of Dialogue  
My conception of dialogue is not one, which incorporates everyday conversations. 
Instead, I conceive of this term as a particular kind of communicative situation, which 
explicitly recognizes different voices, languages and perspectives. It is linguistic 
production formed in the process of social interaction. As linguistic activity, it relies upon 
sustained and mutual trust and respect, and belief in the sensibility and care of the demos 
(Benhabib, 1989: 152-153). It also refers to the fact that only presenting the interaction of 
at least two voices can reveal genuine knowledge: knowledge resides in interaction rather 
than in a set of sentences. Therefore, it represents a collective capacity of understanding 
that comes through reflective, reciprocal and self-reflexive interaction between two free 
and equal bodies occupying simultaneous but different spaces. (Freire, 1972: 61)  
Dialogue: 
1.a. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, to talk 
together. 
1.b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons.  
2.a. A literary work in the form of a conversation between two or more persons. 
2.b. Literary composition of this nature; the conversation written and spoken by 
actors on the stage; hence in recent use, the style of dramatic conversation or 
writings.  
3. Such composition set to music for two or more voices. 
 
 
 29 
Dialogism:  
1. The discussion of a subject under the form of dialogue, to the 
personages of which the author imputes ideas and sentiments. 
2. A conversational phrase or speech; dialogue, spoken and written. 
3. A term introduced for a form of argument having a single premise and 
disjunctive conclusion. 
 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, the terms dialogue and dialogism appear to be very closely 
related. However, these two particular terms are not easily defined. Both concepts are 
used in such a myriad of contexts and in such diverse manner in interchangeable ways, 
that it often seems there is no clear understanding of either concept. This speaks to a 
further need for clarifying these concepts conceived by different thinkers, and how we 
might employ them for conception of democracy.  
In a general sense, the term dialogism implies complex mix and clash of languages and 
voices with a wide variety of links and interrelationships that reflects complex sense of 
world. (Bakhtin, 1981: 263) Dialogism is the state of affairs created by heteroglossia. 
(Hirschkop, 1999: 67-108; Holquist, 1990: 14-17) It highlights the dynamism of 
multvoicedness inherent in all language. Dialogism contains a linguistic activity that 
describes ability to spark different and spontaneous communicative acts with no 
authoritative power. Dialogism is the stimulating flow that not only brings heteroglossia 
to life but also creates a language of democracy. It reflects the language of democracy not 
as single and unitary but complex and multiple. Dialogism is the base condition for 
dialogue, the mix and clash of languages and perspectives upon which such process of 
dialogue depends.  
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The etymological root of the word, dialogue, comes from unity of two Greek words, dia, 
which means, “through” or “across;” and logos, which is usually translated, “word” or 
“speech account.” Thus, the etymological meaning of dialogue refers to speech across, 
between or through meanings. David Bohm, in his book, Dialogue, calls dialogue a “flow 
of meaning.”(Bohm 1996) Dialogue is not debate or discussion. The term debate comes 
from Latin term debat that means fight, fighting and contention by means of words. 
Debate can be imagined as a language game the goal of which is to win an argument by 
besting an opponent. Dialogue is also different from discussion, which comes from Latin 
“discutere” (dis-apart + cutere to shake, strike). Discussions tend to be representing 
persuasive means of communication in which participants tries to convince each other of 
a point of view to gain agreement. In contrast to debate and discussion, the dialogue 
refers to both communicative process and language action. The process of dialogue, 
which relies upon sustained and mutual trust and respect, contains a critical and 
nonjudgmental reflectiveness, penetrating one’s own world and the others’ worlds as well 
as listening to the impact of language on each other, especially those to whom the 
language applies. This process leads to learning about views and values other than one’s 
own. It can be revealed new only by presenting the action of at least two voices. Actions 
take effect by virtue of language. Therefore, primary of the acts in communicative 
process are linguistic—they represent utterances by parties to the dialogue (or silences 
that are listened to as standing for an act). Utterances are not unrelated actions, but 
participate in larger language structures: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax here 
refers to the structure of visible forms language. It embodies grammatical rules for 
determining the basic constituents such as letters, words and sentences or the ways in 
which utterances can be formed. Semantics stands for systematic relation between 
utterances and space of their potential meanings. It includes the portrayal of individual 
constituents (e.g., words and sentences). Pragmatics deals with the use of language in 
 31 
context. The conditions of dialogue depend on three aspects of language. This means 
that the concept of dialogue cannot be simply described as an immediate, face-to-face 
conversational engagement between two or more persons because it depend on 
conditions of the context and linguistic background of the people who enter, interpret, 
and use the language 
In a similar vein, Socrates sees dialogue as a particular systematic activity directed toward 
searching for reality about life. (Vlastos, 1996: 34) This search is geared toward new self-
discovery and self-examination through understanding, which explicitly tests out 
prejudices (or prejudgments) about oneself and one’s pursuit of the truth. (Kidd, 1992: 
91) In seeking new understanding through dialogue, people become more critical about 
their ideas and proposed courses of action. For this reason, dialogue lies at the heart of 
the Socratic search for new meaning. Socratic dialogue advances a discourse of critique 
that breaks down certain ways of seeing and builds up novel ways of sight and action. It is 
a common inquiry for knowledge. The outcome of Socratic dialogues is not the 
development of common ground for the absolute truth, but to engage in a collective 
search for new ways of seeing and doing through further dialogue. 
For Socrates, the truth is always in and out of sight. The truth has an elusive quality that 
can only be captured moment by moment through constant refutation and confirmation 
of reasoned views. Otherwise, it could not be the object of common search or dialogue. 
On the one hand, this approach implies the rejection of the concept of absolute truth. 
On the other hand, partial truth is possible, and dialogue is the necessary action to 
achieving it. To this end, Socrates used dialogue as an active and responsive source for 
the production of original knowledge. In this approach, Socrates could be regarded as 
somewhat of a spiritual midwife who helped interlocutors recognize or experience 
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something that was not in fact true. (Plato 149, 210b; 1987b: 25-25, 130 and Burny, 1992: 
54-55)   
This feature of dialogue is correlated with either an epistemic or a linguistic situation that 
reveals new paths for knowledge through which interlocutors go beyond the limits of 
their own consciousness in terms of what they can individually see or experience. In 
other words, the basic force behind the Socratic dialogue is truth. This truth is neither 
born nor found in individual consciousness, but rather it is something that could only 
arise between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic 
interaction. Truths are temporally situated, contingent knowledge and they depend on 
reflective questioning process. In this process, dialogue aims to expose the problems of 
generally accepted concepts and beliefs that participants have asserted as truth. On the 
one hand, this process is characterized by mutual inquiry ensuing from the provocative 
words participants speak and engage the utterances they author and answer. Conversely, 
it may be referred to as a form of interrogation accompanied by multidirectional 
communication.2  
                                                 
2 In The Republic, through the voice of Socrates, Plato assessed the state of affairs of a group of people who 
had collectively been prisoners inside a cave since childhood. They were chained in such a way that they 
were unable to look towards the cave exit. There was a wall behind them, and on the other side of this 
wall people passed on images and shapes of different things, which appeared over the wall. Behind the 
prisoners, was refracted sunlight.  In essence, the prisoners were able to catch sight only of the shadows 
that these objects cast on the cave wall. Because these people had never known anything other than these 
shadowy images, they mistakenly believed that the shadows themselves were the “real” objects. The 
analogy, at least in this simplified form, is quite uncomplicated. The cave may correspond to the world of 
language used for descriptions of the world, and the people in chains may be equated with those whom 
have not yet learned about or experienced the tangible objects. The shadows are appearances that are 
accepted as real. In addition, the objects passed on the shadows are the real forms of these appearances, 
whose scenery can continuously be revealed to perceptive reflection. In other words, the movement from 
illusion and appearances towards the point where things are seen for what they really are represents the 
perceptive process in which knowledge of things from appearances on the cave wall is neither a singular 
conceptual structure of knowledge nor a sole universal principle for any true form. Rather the knowledge 
of things is a plurality of differently fixed illusions and perspectives; and simultaneously it is the 
knowledge that people develop of it by engaging in the processes of seeing, interpreting and 
understanding. Insight becomes the knowledge of what people see or observe, suffer and/or enjoy. For 
Plato, these insights are an innate source of reality as they can all be made explicit by the dialogical 
process. Clarification occurs through appropriate compulsion of dialogue where the knowledge of ideas 
with highest idea of good can be revealed by the means of critical questioning (e.g. dialectics). See Plato, 
Euthdemus 273a-290; (1987: 323-332) . 
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Multi-directional communication is a deeply complex endeavor, much more so than our 
ordinary ways of thinking of it. We can generally describe multidirectional 
communication in three ways: one and the other everyday individualities, between one 
and oneself, and between one and the truth. In these three-way communications, the 
Socratic mode of dialogue does not simply develop by one person merely arguing for one 
position and another person arguing for the diametrically opposed stance. It also 
develops when each interlocutor is allowed to display him/herself in the position of 
syncrisis - “the juxtaposition of various points of view” on an object”- and anacrisis - the 
“provocation of the word by the word” - to draw out knowledge for truth. (Bakhtin, 
1986: 110-11) Both syncrisis and anacrisis are rhetorical devices that are employed with 
inductive arguments to refute, clarify, or support a particular explanation for the point of 
demonstrating to the one who put forward the explanation that he or she does not know 
what a truth about the good life is and therefore cannot know how to live in accordance 
with it. As rhetorical devices, syncrisis and anacrisis can provide means of eliciting and 
juxtaposing ideas and engaging and testing them on issues not only of knowing about 
truth but also of living good life. In connection to this point, Vlastos classifies the 
elenchus into a philosophical one and a therapeutic one according to its double objective: 
discovering truth about the good life and testing one’s life (Vlastos, 1991: 114). 
Having argued that the elenchus is both therapeutic and philosophical method for the 
search of the good and the truth, it cannot establish propositions for the good or truth, it 
can demonstrate only what objects are not and not what they are. Thus, it creates a state 
of perplexity, that is, the state in which the interlocutor realizes that they do no know the 
valid answer to the issues at hand or are unable to describe the truth of the concept or 
issue that is under scrutiny. (Vlastos, 1991: 114) Aporia is important component of the 
elenchus. On one the hand, it is affirmative because it can lead to the sort of knowing 
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that is possible for human beings. On other hand, it is negative because it helps people to 
realize their dreadful lack of knowledge in which it allows them to realize what they do 
not know. Such states are vividly demonstrated by the Charmides. (Plato, 1987: 192-209) 
In the Charmides (153a-176d), Critias sees elenchus (166d-e) in both affirmative and 
negative ways, and he suggests that such ways of elenchus brings in a kind of self-
knowledge. He says that such self-knowledge is knowledge of what isn’t known. This idea 
introduces the final and perhaps most important part of the dialogue, which, of course, 
ends in state of perplexity. During this part of dialogue, Socrates state the position that 
knowledge of X must also be knowledge of the opposite of X, and so knowledge is 
always knowledge of opposites. By the end of the dialogue, however, such positions are 
knotted to state of perplexity; and in such state of perplexity, there is the relation of 
ambiguity with experiences of knowing with not-knowing. 
Elenchus, as the instrument in the process both knowing and not knowing places one 
argument against the other in dialectical way also contains linguistic relationships that 
connect meanings, events and possibilities, ideas and images by linking or weaving them 
together. These relationships are both cooperative and confrontational. In essence, this 
duality generates persuasive power for the continuity of dialogue. Persuasive power is 
constructed through logos. The term logos can sometimes refer to the myth itself, or to 
some unknown, hidden meaning. It presents each thing, and the world as a whole, in its 
reveals plurality while at the same time produce about an oneness based on which the 
thing can be understood in a shared way. Logos may hold both truth of things and myth 
that mislead one to the conclusion that they know something they do not. Therefore, 
elenchus may place logos against itself in the elenchus for bringing just new meanings out 
into the light. It carries a meaning when used in combination with other logos. Elenchus 
discloses myths in terms of refutation and challenge—i.e.: the dialectic. It can create new 
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revenues for new meanings and knowledge of ideas simply by arranging communicative 
relations so they complement or stimulate each other. 
Elenchus is enhanced by communicative relations of logos that consist of elucidating 
contractions in the views of participant interlocutors via recognition and by enhancement 
of reason. (Brickhouse and Smith, 1996: 121) Here, reason is about exercising a co-
operative quality or the capacity to apply thinking, interpretation for co-creating shared 
awareness, understanding, success, transformation or wholeness in a spirit of 
communicative relationship, rather than for domination. Therefore, elenchus appears not 
as communicative practice that seeks to orient dialogue towards doctrinal monism or 
universal systems for replacing one proposition with another one but instead, creates a 
situation for particular kind of understanding (i.e. aporia) in which interlocutors no longer 
firmly hold a position for beliefs and truth (Nehamas, 1999: 16) Aporia as particular 
understanding can not be individually produced nor is it to be found in the reasoning in 
an individual person. It is born between people collectively searching for truth in the 
process of their dialogic interaction. In this context, elenchus is not characterized by or 
with precise and ultimate meanings that are unalterable across contexts and contents. It 
opens up new world and it drives the comprehension of interlocutors in order that they 
may grasp new awareness or reflection in a mirror where a misconception has been 
exposed, stripped away, and where a clean terrain now exists for the reconstruction of 
new knowledge. (Vlastos, 1991: 266) 
The elenchus in Socratic dialogues contains six stages in which dialectical moments of 
succession occur:  
1. The Socratic practitioner asserts a claim about a certain issue or concept and 
elicits the view of another interlocutor. 
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2. An interlocutor’s answers are refuted by Socrates through questioning. 
3. Questioning allows Socrates to discover inconsistent points in an interlocutors 
view. 
4. Since the interlocutor cannot hold inconsistent views, the interlocutor agrees on 
counter points.  
5. Through further questioning, interlocutors suggest logically higher points from 
which to approach the issue (knowledge). 
6. The dialogue ends with ambiguity (aporia) 
 
These six moments of elenchus involve an ongoing critical attitude toward the world as one 
in which people “participants” always remain receptive to the possibility of being 
persuaded against their beliefs or dogmas by the different viewpoints they encounter. 
Thus, elenchus is inseparable from a kind of critical stance toward oneself, willingness to 
take the other’s view seriously. The term “critical stance” has different connotations but 
all would affirm that dialogue is critical when it contains expression of a meaning 
different from its apparent sense. However, there are numerous types of difference. In 
speaking of the Socratic conception of difference as a type of self-consciousness, it does 
not imply a critical stance either as a strategic way for persuading participants, or as an 
infinite unconstructiveness or self-reflexive negativity. A self-critical stance is the virtue of 
reason. It contains both positions: skeptic and prognostic. In one sense, dialogue 
develops with speech acts of reflective interlocutors who refuse to accept anything that is 
presented as truth; something held as an established opinion or belief. In another sense, 
dialogue consists of interlocutors who reach agreement and offer a modified version of 
their claims. In this sense, Socratic dialogues contain both skeptical and prognostic 
positions. These dual stances of the participants allow them to evaluate any view via 
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critical scrutinization. Participants do not suppose that knowledge is in principle 
unobtainable, nor that they should not commit themselves to beliefs they do not 
absolutely know to be true. What they do retain is the sense that their assertions beliefs 
and concepts are provisional and subject to revision.  
The skeptical and prognostic features of the Socratic dialogues are associated with critical 
stance. This situation establishes a ground for aporia and an end to the certainty of 
viewpoints. (Brickhouse and Smith, 2000: 87-88) The concept of aporia is most familiar 
from Plato’s dialogue that portrays the uniquely crafted encounter between Meno, a 
character representing a particular frame of mind, and the particular techne and logos used 
by Socrates to assist in transforming Meno’s particular view. In that dialogue, Meno poses 
a question: what is virtue and how is virtue acquired? Responding to the question at issue, 
Socrates does not directly address Meno’s role as the addressee. Instead, he takes a critical 
stance about Meno’s views concerning virtue. Socrates provocatively asserts that he never 
met anyone who knew precisely what virtue was or what it entailed. Subsequently, he 
persuades Meno to defend an account of virtue. In the course of dialogue, through a 
step-by-step line of argument (elenchus), Socrates cross-examines Meno’s responses. He 
ascertains that while Meno appears to be elucidating a response, he is actually imparting 
very little. With help of dialectical cross-examinations, he amalgamates Meno’s various 
statements and places each one side by side. In so doing, Socrates illustrates how 
statements can contradict one another even when referring to the same things, in relation 
to the same things, and in the same respect. At the end, Socrates converts the response of 
Meno into to paradoxes (that is, previously impossible or unimaginable statements that 
Meno must now accept or that he is at least incapable of rationally rejecting). The effect 
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of all this is the moment of aporia where Meno is flustered confused and perhaps 
puzzled.3  
At the moment of aporia, a misconception has been exposed, stripped away, and a clean 
terrain now exists for the reconstruction of new knowledge. The new knowledge is what 
holds dialogue together. New knowledge is not static—it is flowing meaning. (Bohm 
1996:40) It requires mutually empowering cross-examinations with the help of critical 
stance for the generation of aporia. Aporia is generated by mutually empowering cross-
examinations that constitute deconstructive places in the dialogical field through 
destruction of old views and construction new perspectives. (Brickhouse and Smith, 
1996: 125) 
Aporia is a specific dialogical experience that affects participants on many levels 
simultaneously: they experience doubt and discomfort with their belief systems. An aporia 
is a predicament of choice and of action. It is a form of exploration for new meanings 
and ideas. When participants have known nothing and do not have many choices, 
dialogue becomes an end in itself.4 In other words, in Socratic dialogues, participants 
                                                 
3 Meno’s aporia is exemplified in the following speech:  
Socrates even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are a perplexed man 
yourself and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment, I feel you are exercising magic 
and witchcraft upon me and positively laying me under your spell until I am just a mass 
of helplessness. If I may be flippant, I think that not only in outward appearance but in 
other respects as well you are exactly like the flat stingray that one meets in the sea. 
Whenever anyone comes into contact with it, it numbs him, and that is the sort of thing 
that you seem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are literally numb, and I 
have nothing to reply to you. Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times, held 
forth often on the subject in front of large audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. 
Now I cannot even say what it is. In my opinion, you are well advised not to leave 
Athens and live abroad. If you behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you 
would most likely be arrested as a wizard. (Plato 1961; Meno, 80a-b) 
4 The depiction of the idea of “end in itself” is perhaps to be found in Kant’s note to 65 0f the Critique of 
Judgement, which relates to the relationship of parts with a whole. Kant writes:   
 The first requisite of a thing considered as physical end, is that its parts, both as to 
their existence and form, are only possible by their relation to whole. For the thing is 
itself an end, and is therefore, comprehended under the conception or an idea that 
must determine a prirori all that is contained in it…. This second requisite is involved, 
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announce that they are not advancing anything forward as unequivocal truth. However, if 
others do so, they are resolved to find arguments counting against the truth claim, 
whatever it may be. Therefore, the Socratic modes of dialogue persuades or inspires 
people to question and reason, or critically disclose those very things—ideas that are 
concealed or lost in routines of everyday life. Though these ideas and meanings form the 
background of everyday life, this revelation itself cannot be the purpose of a dialogue; 
otherwise, all actions in the field of dialogue can be perceived as strategic. Socrates 
considers dialogical action as an end in itself. Dialogue inevitably engages people’s 
intentions, opinions, and knowledge but it may reveal aporia in which the new ideas and 
meanings can be formed without reference to the intentions of the participants. 
Communicating through ambiguities of the aporia, the dialogical process opens a larger 
consciousness, and reveals another kind of understanding based on the development of a 
new meaning that is constantly transforming in the process of the dialogue. Here, a 
Socratic dialogue can be seen as an unconditioned method of knowledge, but this 
unconditionality appears be at variance with the contractual character of the intentions of 
participants. Socrates’ opening part in a dialogue can hardly be described as a part of an 
intentional act. It might become so, but cannot really be considered as such at the outset. 
The only implicit intention is to be present, to listen and elicit the statements of others, 
and to speak if so moved. Thus, there is a disagreement between the implicit intention 
and a certain worldview that describes a person or event with purpose as found, 
purposeful, to be avoided. It follows, then, that Socratic dialogue consist of participants 
who do not have any direct interest in the subject, or an interest in the other participant 
present in a field of dialogue. Everybody speaks in his or her own voice. They do not 
address each other or participate in the dialogue in order to realize certain projects.  
                                                                                                                                         
namely, that parts of the thing combine of themselves into the unity of a whole by 
being reciprocally cause and effect of their from. (Kant, 1952: 556)   
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Moreover, among a broad range of political, social and philosophical points of reference, 
it is generally agreed that dialogue is seen as purposeful communicative activity. This 
implies that people do not participate in dialogue merely for the sake of participating; 
participants have certain ends in mind, which can range from communicative power, 
social status, to the improvement of living conditions. If participants have purposes as to 
why they participate in dialogue, dialogue itself becomes a means to achieve a specific 
end. Those ends can be variously conceived; i.e.:  from resolving social conflict, to 
building bases of equality and fairness for public deliberation in order to promote civic 
communication across difference. In contrast to dialogue that has an end in itself, shows 
itself in the interaction of signs, and signifying practices, end oriented dialogue 
demonstrates itself when different interests and objectives come together. In both cases, 
dialogue refers to a communicative process in which various elements such as the 
addresser, utterance, addressee, and language matrix influences communication in giving 
direction. What this suggests is that there is a distinct difference in the state of affairs in 
the process of dialogue 
At the beginning, the initial states of affairs of the dialogical process are connected—
circumstances of participation exist through which dialogue requires active listening, 
understanding and uttering. Subsequently, the state affairs of the dialogical process refers 
to respect as waiting attentively for each of the others to finish the expression of their 
respective idea(s), pausing to breathe, and pausing to reflect. At the end, the state affairs 
of dialogical process refer to an outcome as new knowledge, meaning or merely 
understanding. 
The state affairs of dialogical process, therefore, are not only fleeting, they are 
transformative and transforming. They cannot be determined by the single individual nor 
by the collectivity of interplay among those who communicate together through the 
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constant switch of positions for expressing views, paying complete attention, active 
listening, waiting attentively for others to finish their idea, pausing to breathe, and pausing 
to reflect and so on. Well-organized unity of the state affairs of the dialogical process 
constitutes the form and the rhythm of dialogue. The form and the rhythm of dialogue 
develop around actions of expression, response and understanding. These actions are 
directly linked and are mutually dependent on each other. The knowledge as new 
meaning arises in the intersection between these different actions. (Bakhtin, 1986: 141-
146) 
The actions of expressing and responding in the field of dialogue critically depend on the 
circumstances of meanings. In the system of meaning, each meaning is not objective and 
self-contained entities but it is dialogical, is constantly transformed, and flows in the 
relation between writers and readers or between speakers and listeners. Thus, all 
meanings are relational—the result of a dialogue between and among utterances. Each 
utterance consists of chains of meanings that are not isolated from each other— they 
may be considered components in an abstract system of language.5 Each is a complex 
web of dialogic interrelations with other utterances, which shape both individual meaning 
and whole meaning. For Bakhtin, dialogue is possible because every utterance creates 
meaning only by tacitly interacting with other utterances and meanings, which can and 
cannot be articulated. As Bakhtin (1997:276) points out: 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush 
up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-
ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it 
cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue.  
                                                 
5 Bakhtin considers the utterance as the basic unit of language. An utterance may consist of anything varying 
from a word or a short expression in a communication to a long passage. (Bakhtin 1986:60-61) It is 
situated within the framing context of an exchange of interlocutors. It shows direct relationship the 
extraverbal context of situation, setting, prehistory and with the utterances of other interlocutors. 
(Bakhtin 1986.73-74) 
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Considered as a dialogic interrelationship, the utterance has a number of distinctive 
qualities. First, every utterance referentially contains a semantic component (theme). 
Secondly, every utterance involves an expressive component (the interlocutors approach 
toward the theme). Thirdly, every utterance is primarily about a response to previous 
utterances of the given sphere of language communication. Therefore, each utterance is 
active in a chain of configuration while it refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon 
the other utterances. For this reason, each kind of utterance is packed with various kinds 
of responsive reactions to other utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 84, 90-91 and 95) Fourthly, 
any utterance is filled with responses and necessarily brings out those reactions in one or 
another form of understanding. In essence, the listener becomes the speaker. (Bakhtin, 
1986: 68-69) 
Utterances reside not only in the dialogical interaction of the speaker and listener. 
Therefore, dialogic relationships of utterances are reducible neither to relationships of 
reason nor to relationships of intention that are oriented semantically toward objective 
meaning. On the one hand, they are active in discourse, and through discourses, they 
become representative of positions of various subjects expressed in discourse. On the 
other hand, they involve an extra-verbal situation in which each and every utterance may 
expresses the new meaning in relation to the context. Consequently, an utterance as a 
meaningful chain is comprised of two components: (1) the part realized or actualized in 
verbal reality and (2) the extra-verbal part. (Bakhtin, 1997: 183) On this basis, the 
utterance can be associated with the double meaning of what is said and unsaid. 
(Voloshinov, 1976: 100 and Bakhtin, 1997: 185-187) These characteristics of utterances 
make dialogical communication profoundly open-ended and unpredictable. All accounts 
of understanding of meanings therefore remain incomplete and constitutively temporal 
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much of the time because the two-sided acts of utterances present more than one 
discursive verbal moment.  
Therefore, orientation of the utterance toward the listener has not only high significance 
on one’s understanding but also impacts upon and in the context in which they are 
uttered. Therefore, the meanings of an utterance entail a two-sided performance because 
they are shaped equally by the addressee and addresser. As responsive understanding, 
they are the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser 
and addressee in the communicative field of dialogue. While each and every utterance 
expresses the one in relation to the other, each participant’s view is shaped from 
another’s point of view. Utterances are connections between one and another in the field 
of dialogue. (Voloshinov, 1973: 86) This means that dialogue is both connected to 
temporality and worldliness through a communicative matrix of utterances in different 
contexts. (Bakhtin, 1986: 90-91) What one labels dialogue is the effect or function of 
those particular, historically, linguistically and contextually created worlds of utterances. 
Utterances always create something new – a dialogical world between people as they 
address that world in which they live. And, because they are contextual, the meaning of 
utterances, and thus, dialogical communication cannot be easily centered or located in a 
steady way for the pursuit of certain objectives and ends because it does not contains 
elements of mechanical and systemic communicative action. Therefore, dialogue always 
remains open-ended and never completed; it is a continuously built situation, an 
interactive space, a world between one and another. (Bakhtin, 1984: 217)  
Dialogue is also a discursive relation of difference situated against the background of 
relations or conditions involving distinct empathies, respects, characteristics, styles, 
values, assumptions, and purposes. These background conditions may or may not be 
matters of choice, and they can be produced or imposed upon the dialogical relation in 
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ways that make communication multivocal interactions. Often these backgrounds are 
expressed as both forms of empowerment or limitation because the relative positions of 
people place asymmetrical constraints on what one can utter, what can be communicated. 
On the one hand, this signifies that dialogue has a substantiality that is conditioned by 
both the facilitating and inhibiting circumstances of meanings. On the other hand, it is 
not simply a matter of the present context at hand, but also other imaginary contexts, 
including anticipated future contexts of need or use. While the situationality and 
substantiality of contexts makes dialogue finite and bound, the imaginality of contexts 
makes dialogue infinite and unbound. (Burbules, 2000: 263-264) From this standpoint, 
dialogue cannot be viewed simply as an exchange of views between people, or mere 
conversation. Rather, dialogue can be viewed as a multiplicity of relations among multiple 
forms of meanings, practices and mediating objects.  
 
I.3. Dialogue as Understanding 
Conversation is not only a matter of two (or more) people who alternately take the role 
of speaker and listener but rather that both actions of speaking and listening engage 
responsive activity of understanding. In this vision, understanding is an active not a 
passive action which requires cooperation and interpretation. In the communicative field, 
no utterance, no word, can be spoken without generating responsive understanding of 
what was said. In this sense, understanding is also both collective: two or more sides 
work together toward a common understanding between individuals: one listens to the 
other side(s) in order to understand meaning utterances. At both levels, understanding is 
mediated by selfhood, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language and context. 
These parts of communication determine the ways that understanding manifests itself in 
the field of dialogue. Selfhood refers to what characterizes people. It is the generative 
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center overflow with the representation of things (i.e. knowledge, sense experience). This 
means that selfhood is responsively intertwined in with things that are around each 
person. In being responsively intertwined with their surroundings, it has knowledge and 
sense experience prior to a reflection or an expression of something. Such knowledge and 
sense experience can initially be the element of understanding. Phonetic, grammatical, or 
lexical rules of language form the infrastructure of understanding. In order to generate 
shared understanding with words, utterances must fulfill the presumption of a shared 
language; the conformation to the, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language. 
Context is what is around addressers and addressee—the social, historical, cultural and 
political conditions, forces and structures that shape meaning of utterances. Ultimately, 
context contains everything that is representative of the surroundings related to 
communication. A different context can influence generations of understanding 
differently. 
The relationship among selfhood, phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of language and 
context governs emergence of understanding at the individual and collective levels. When 
people are aware of elements of their selfhood—phonetic, grammatical, or lexical rules of 
language and context—they are able to respond to each other adequately. As Bakhtin 
understands the concept of responsibility, it entails both a literal ability to respond that 
embodies responsiveness and answerability but it also contains a more ethically burdened 
meaning.6 In this context, dialogue appears to be the route to establish a coherent 
meaning of responsibility and answerability. As Bakhtin suggested, the point about 
dialogue is not only that people engage a depth of understanding by delving deeper into 
the insides of things (including themselves) but also that they stimulate responsiveness 
                                                 
6  Emerson suggests that the Russian word for responsibility {otvetstvennost} implies both a literal ability 
to respond, that is responsiveness, answerability, as well as a more ethically burdened meaning (Emerson 
1997: 283) 
 
 46 
for whatever is going on in the world, not only nearby but also far away.  (Bakhtin, 1986: 
68-69) In this sense, we can say that dialogue is the kind of communicative pattern that 
enhances the responsive understanding of the individual dialoguers. 
Responsive understanding requires interconnectedness and interpretation of things or 
assemblages of meanings that continually flow and change, transferring participants at 
various levels of dialogue. Therefore, dialogue is closely associated with the capacity to 
communicate as a whole, via interconnectedness, -- individually and collectively—and to 
engage with and in surroundings that are whole or as unity within diversity. While 
dialogue connects people and things, events and possibilities, ideas and images, linking or 
weaving them together, any true understanding becomes dialogic in its disposition. 
(Voloshinov, 1973: 102) The dialogicality of understanding appears to be the ways for 
establishing coherent meaning among parts that also appears as unique wholes in their 
own special qualities. In other words, dialogicality of understanding refers to response-
ability to the parts (i.e. utterances and the other) that are in unity. For this reason, we can 
say that understanding is responsive dialogical reflection through and between 
interconnectedness and relationality of utterances. (Bakhtin, 1981: 280) 
Dialogicality of understanding closely associates all interpretation of connotative and 
denotative meanings of utterances. Firstly, when utterances refer to an object, that object 
is not separated from understandings that are located in dialogical specificity. In this 
dialogical specificity, utterances are perceived by their entrance into the participants’ 
conceptual systems, filled with specific objects and emotional expressions. As an 
extension, the understanding of an utterance is thus inseparable from the participant’s 
response to it and its surroundings.  
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Every understanding participates in dialogical communication as a response to the 
utterances of the given sphere. Depending on what has been said, understandings are 
forced to reflect on the meanings of the words participants have used, on the concepts 
they have applied, on whether the reasons they have given actually lead to any type of 
conclusion, whether they rely on underlying assumptions or on alternative ways of 
approaching the problem, and so forth. Through responsive actions of understanding, 
the dialogue becomes a systemic exchange of answer or response that goes back and 
forth between one and other. (Bakhtin, 1981: 282) Such a systemic exchange creates a 
complex unity of oneself with the other. This means that understanding resides neither in 
one’s intention nor in what one utters but at a point between one’s intention and that of 
another. On the one hand, the meanings that one express is dialogical. Understanding 
becomes one’s own only when one generates it with one’s own interpretation. 
Conversely, the meanings that one expresses become reflected in turn with the 
understanding of another—for in the dialogical character of utterance, one’s 
understanding is always directed toward the active understanding of the other, which is 
itself reflected with its own understanding.  
This dialogization of understanding occurs constantly through a process of 
transformation. This process of transformation is both private and public. Understanding 
is transformative as it is passed from private language and private thought to public 
language and thought. It is not static—it is flowing and connected with circumstances of 
public and private thought within the levels of dialogue. (Issacs, 1999) At each levels of 
dialogue, understanding is transformed and tends to connect some of the meanings with 
something else. Therefore, there are different phases and planes and understanding that it 
passes through before it is reflected in words. In these areas, understanding initially 
becomes property of the private realm. Private understanding has more representational 
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and passive qualities. Secondly, understanding is also public and as such is the primary 
means of change in the understandings of interlocutors—interacting and mixing of 
various understandings co-existing within the boundaries of a dialogue. Understanding as 
a public thing refers to both the active and responsive aspects of positionality that rises 
between people.7 At each level, dialogues form a unity of public and private 
understanding. But this unity is not homogeneous; rather, it is complex and preserves 
difference. 
At the first level, dialogue means dialogue for oneself, or self-understanding. (Arendt, 
1958: 237-48) It refers to the passive kind of representational understanding, embodied in 
ontological moments of oneself or interpersonal relationships of oneself. It is an 
understanding informed by questions of who one is and what one does, what one 
thinks—the self-image one establishes from the social and material relationships. 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 111) When one is fully absorbed in what s/he is performing in the 
position of addresser and addressee, self-understanding normally recedes into the 
background; but it can be suddenly brought back into the fore if one grasps the view of 
oneself reflected in the dialogical field. The dialogical equivalent of being confronted by 
one’s own image is to be scrutinized about what one knows and expresses; instead of 
taking place smoothly, it advances forward under its own drive. Thus, the flow of 
thought is turned back on itself with the assistance of dialogue. Depending on what 
meaning has been expressed or to what words are referred, one is compelled to reflect 
upon oneself through the meanings that have been raised. In short, to understand the 
dialogical position is to understand interactively which is to understand reflectively. This 
level of understanding most completely manifests what must be transformed. The 
                                                 
7 Martin Buber makes a similar case. For him, there are three levels for I-thou relationship (i.e. dialogue) and 
two relational postures. The levels of dialogue are between man and nature, between man and man, and 
between man and God. Dialogue in the character of I-Thou relation, it also has disposition of going from 
the outside to the inside of a relation, from reflecting on objects to reflecting within relation to a subject. 
(Buber, 1958: 4-14)  
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transformation may be characterized as self-transformation or as change in “knowledge 
of what one knows and one does not know.” (Plato,  1961: 165e-167c or 1987: 192-196) 
The second level of dialogue refers to active and responsive understanding that rises in 
interactions between people, between different viewpoints. It is both active and 
responsive in the sense that understanding resides neither in one’s intended meaning nor 
in what one uttered, but in the dialogical output that does not directly go from addresser 
to addressee. It is an active stage of incompleteness that is always in the process of being 
worked out. An important characteristic of this process is how each participant exposes 
oneself to others in order to understand the intended meanings, to grasp different 
viewpoints and to convey one’s own meanings.  
In the realm of dialogue, difference is a most powerful factor for the rise of creative and 
active understanding. An understanding of a meaning only reveals its depths once it has 
been exposed and encountered to another, different meaning. Participants engage in a 
kind of dialogue, which rises above the mutuality of these particular meanings, these 
understandings. The addresser’s words may raise new spaces for inquiry into the 
addressee’s understanding, ones that it did not raise itself. The addressee, in turn, may 
seek a response to the addresser’s inquiry as well as his own inquiry in it; and the 
addresser’s understanding responds to the addressee by revealing new aspects and 
semantic depths. Such a responsive encounter of two understandings does not result in a 
merging or mixing. Each retains its own open unity, but they are mutually enriched. In 
the continuity of dialogue, understandings may appear as contextual, contingent, non-
total and shared. (Gadamer, 1975: 302-3) 
From this perspective, reaching a shared understanding in dialogue requires that the 
participants are ready to engage in that activity and that they attempt to allow for the 
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relevance of what is different and contrary to themselves. (Gadamer, 1975: 388) This 
happens on a reciprocal basis, and each participant put his or her own views and 
thoughts into play on an interactive field where they hold their own ground while 
simultaneously assessing and addressing the counterpoints. The mutual recognition with 
the interplay of understandings is manifested in the fusion of horizons wherein views and 
thoughts emanating from one conceptual world are translated into clauses relevant for 
the other.8 As a result, the understandings of each participant are not merged into 
singleness, but transformed without necessarily losing their identity in the process. 
Openness, as self-disclosure of personal feelings, knowledge or evaluative views about 
particular issues is also important for eliciting and provoking understandings. It occurs in 
the dynamic process of the possibility of revealing information about oneself while trying 
to see the world through the eyes of others. (Bakhtin, 1986: 6-7) This requires the 
distancing of oneself from oneself and from one’s private rationale, which allows for a 
knot of connection that inextricably intertwines the worlds of interlocutors with many 
social, cultural and political contexts for understanding. The rise of a knot of connection 
contributes to a sense of fluid boundaries among participants with recognition of the 
separate and non-merged voices within the chorus of them. (Ostram, 1997: 151-65) At 
this moment, the process of understanding connects self and other in an ever-changing 
joint world of dialogue.  
This notion of the joint world of dialogue refers to a reciprocal exchange relation. 
Interlocutors are dependent on each other’s wordings or actions for formation of their 
utterances, but rather interact spontaneously in response to one another and in reference 
                                                 
8 Gadamer uses the term “fusion of horizons” to describe understanding. For him “all understanding is a 
fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 1975: 302) Gadamer’s views impart the impression that understanding 
involves incorporating addressers conceptual world into addresses one. At the same time, Gadamer 
describes the event of understanding in relation “consensus” and “agreement.” He asserts that “to 
understand means to come to an understanding with each other. Understanding is primarily agreement.” 
(Gadamer, 1975: 180) 
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to the surroundings and momentous occasions, jointly giving rise to an understanding of 
views, ideas or issues that neither interlocutor had earlier considered. Such openness 
serves as a starting point for self-transformation or differentiation of the participant from 
previous positions. The emergent understandings are available as new potentials and new 
possibilities that fuse different perspectives found in one and the same participant.9 
This is a case of a rise of a mutual understanding or new understanding that involves a 
unity of what is said at the beginning and what is not uttered. This means that every 
understanding in dialogue is not only a response to preceding messages of the given 
context but also a prompter of understanding. Participants of dialogue are determinant to 
the extent that they can alter one another’s responses from their baseline levels. Each 
response refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon other responses, presupposes 
them to be known, and somehow considers them. Therefore, each kind of response is 
filled with various kinds of reactions to other messages as responsive understanding of 
the given context of the dialogical situation. In dialogue, responsive understanding of the 
meaning of a particular message not only belongs to a particular meaning of utterance as 
such but also to the context. 
To acquire understanding of context, however, is a task of peculiar difficulty. The very 
idea of context means that dialogical communication operates in relation to the 
intentional world of the addresser, to the conceptual world of the addressee and to the 
                                                 
9 A similar viewpoint is also expressed by Bakhtin’s analysis of dialogue. For Bakhtin, the key quality of 
dialogue is that it simultaneously represents unity of the participants’ perspectives as fusion of one with 
another, on the one hand, and completes divergence of views, on the other. In this context, the whole 
dialogical process can be viewed with Bakhtinian terms which underlines social process of dialogues as 
polyphonic, involving multiple voices, representing dynamic interplay between centripetal (i.e., drive of 
unity) and centrifugal (drive of difference) forces as many-sided, variegated and kaleidoscopic immediate 
conditions of particular moment. The social and political reality of these forces is produced and 
reproduced by dialogical actions of participants. Furthermore, the ongoing dialogue of voices as interplay 
of contradictory forces opens up dialogical fields to multi-vocal complexity. For this reason, the most 
important thing about the dialogue is not only what kind of different view and idea is exchanged through 
dialogue but also what kind of new views transpire through the exchange. The difference produces 
difference through dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1981: 272-273) I shall elaborate on this further in the chapters two 
and five. 
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interpretation of the immediate social situation and the broader socio-linguistic and 
historical milieu that can determine the meaning of utterances. The idea here is not to get 
on upper hand in the dialogical process, or to reach an agreement. Rather, it is to move 
actively and responsively in understanding what has passed, is present and will be. This is 
the fusion of horizons, which involves incorporation of one’s conceptual repertoire with 
the other within the process of creation. (Gadamer, 1975: 273) 
The fusion of horizons is the link between active and responsive understanding and 
dialogue.10 This connection can be seen in each and every utterance. When an utterance is 
formulated and addressed to somebody, it responds not only to previous utterances, but 
is also intended for mutual understanding. This is created in the meeting of different and 
similar voices in oneself or between self and other. The addresser and addressee are 
perceived by a reciprocal relationship in which each simultaneously takes on an active and 
passive role. Therefore, understanding is not separately created by each and every 
participant, but rather it is mutually produced and shared in a dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1997: 
292-93)  
Shared and mutual understanding is a dialogical act that is mediated through language and 
context. Bakhtin (1986: 125-126) says: 
The person who understands (including the researcher himself) becomes 
a participant in the dialogue, although on a special level (depending on 
the area of understanding or research)... The observer has no position 
                                                 
10 Bakhtin's ideas of responsive and creative understanding are crucial at this point in the discussion. For 
Bakhtin, responsive understanding is important for the continuation of dialogue because response aligned 
to interaction between what has been voiced before and to what can be voiced. Responsive 
understanding necessarily elicits dialogue in reciprocal form: the listener becomes the speaker. In 
dialogical situation, the fact is that when the listener perceives particular the meaning, one simultaneously 
takes an active, responsive position toward it. One who has either the same opinion with it or different 
from particular understanding (totally or to some extent) adopts these responsive positions for the entire 
duration of the process of listening and understanding, from the very beginning. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68) 
Even when overt responses are delayed, Bakhtin insists that understanding is actively responsive: sooner 
or later, what is heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behavior 
of the listener. Thus, all dialogical understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than 
the initial preparatory stage of a reply. 
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outside the observed world, and his observation enters as a constituent 
part into the observed object. This pertains fully to entire utterances and 
relations among them. They cannot be understood from outside. 
Understanding itself enters as a dialogic element in the dialogic system 
and somehow changes its entire sense. 
 
In this sense we can say that shared and mutual understanding depends not only on one’s 
use of language, or on one’s intentionality in formulating an utterance, but also on the 
conceptual world of the addressee by which the meaning of the utterance is understood.11 
The conceptual world of the addressee operates as a framework for interpretation. Thus, 
the meaning of an utterance arises out of the relation between the intended act and the 
attempt to understand it. This relation is both multitudinous and two-sided: 
multitudinous because meanings depend on the conceptual world of the addressee; and 
two-sided because meanings emerge out of interaction between the addresser and 
addressee. 
In dialogue, when a reply is made, it places value on the views expressed. If the reply were 
to be merely mechanical with no intention involved, it would be one that belongs 
properly to the original addresser. That is, the mechanical reply confirms or closes off 
exchange in favor of the original utterance. (Bakhtin, 1997: 110) What takes place, then, is 
monologue. Bakhtin (1997: 292-293) suggests: 
Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another 
consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with 
equal rights (thou). With a monologic approach (in its extreme pure form) 
another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and 
not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could 
change anything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is 
finalized and deaf to other’s response, does not expect it and does not 
acknowledge in it any force. Monologue manages without the other, and 
                                                 
11 Some philosophers have claimed that the meaning of dialogical act is not something that is relative to the 
interpreter; rather the meaning of a dialogical act always is in the act itself. This implies that the meaning 
of dialogical or its products derive from the intentions of its producer. For further discussion of the 
theory intentionalism through a consideration of “verstehen,” see W. Outhwaite, 1975. 
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therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to 
be the ultimate word. It closes down the represented world and represented 
persons. 
 
As Bakhtin mentions, in a monologue, the addressee remains wholly and merely an object 
of the other’s understanding, and does not embodies another autonomous 
understanding. Monologue is hearing-impaired to the other’s autonomous reply, s/he 
does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force. 
In contrast, in dialogue, the utterances become only understandable when one places 
them in a specific interpretative context. (Gadamer, 1975: 350) At the same time, one’s 
interpretation cannot privilege a particular content as a given or self-verifying part 
separate from the whole, from other contents or from the activities of the addressee. The 
meanings of utterances do not represent a property of reality but an interactive field of 
interpretation and understanding as it relates to its participants. This implies that the 
meanings of utterances and their understanding will vary as the interpretative horizons of 
addresses change over time or from one participant to another. The meanings of 
utterances can never be definitively fixed. 
What that suggests is that dialogical understanding moves in what Gadamer calls a 
“hermeneutic circle.”12 To produce meaning in a dialogue, one must always move around 
from the meaning of a particular (single utterance) to the meaning of the whole or general 
(chain of utterance), and vice versa from whole to part. (Gadamer, 1975: 190-92) The 
“whole” may represent the entire meaning of utterances that are expressed in dialogue, 
the particular message that passed to the other, and a shared linguistic space to which 
                                                 
12 For more detailed discussion of Hermeneutic Circle, See Gadamer, 1975; and Charles Taylor, 1987: 15-
57.  
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utterance belongs— a historical period, personal experiences of participants, and so on.13 
This “whole,” then, provides the horizon against which one gives significance to the 
“particular.” The meaning of the utterance itself cannot be immediately apparent, if one 
attempts to see and understand in the larger context. The contextually retained meaning 
of the utterance then changes the meaning of the whole—i.e., dialogue.  
When the hermeneutic circle is applied to the parts-whole relations in understanding the 
processes of dialogue, the understanding of each message depends on not only the 
interpretation of the whole but also on previous messages and the context in which they 
occurred. In other words, the interaction between a message and recipient is not a one-
off event of communication. New interpretations help to reconstitute the universe of 
understanding of the recipients, and the newly shaped universe of understanding allow 
recipients to reinterpret the meaning of the previous message once more. The result of 
this circularity is a constantly evolving process of dialogue in which the meaning of both 
previous message and the universe of understanding of recipients is altered. 
This implies that understanding is always already underway and never completely 
finished. For this reason, the understandings of the participants are partial and never 
complete, because their horizons are always limited and incomplete, and they exist inside 
and not outside dialogue. (Gadamer, 1975: 490-92) Incompleteness of understanding, 
however, does not drain the possibility for dialogue, because there is always a difference, 
which slips away from the comprehension of participants. Thus, incompleteness becomes 
a driving force for dialogue along with the possibilities of further interpretative efforts at 
understanding. The incompleteness and weakness of understanding also make dialogue 
                                                 
13 For example, utterances attain their meaning through the contexts of pronouncement they generate, (as 
similar words gain their meaning through the context of sentences), pronouncements through correlative 
relations of the dialogue they help to produce and vice versa. 
 56 
exist in flux. It is this state of flux that makes the interaction of participants multi-sided 
and contingent.  
 
I.4. Dialogue as Relation of Contingency and Necessitation 
Dialogue is a method of knowledge and a way of understanding and is particularly 
significant in situations when there are multiple, perhaps contradictory or clashing, points 
of view and discourses. It is an open-ended, dynamic process that takes place between 
and among people in the ongoing here-and-now, as part of their use of language. 
Through dialogue, people produce their social, cultural and political reality. In dialogue, 
two or more people join one another in mutuality, reciprocity, and co-examination. Self-
transformation takes place in moments of praxis, as people attempt to identify their 
unique experience of the world and to understand one another. The dialogue is not a 
linear or sequential process. Therefore, its course toward certain ends cannot be 
controlled. People cannot predict neither the outcome nor the beginning of process or 
even guess what the second move will be until they presume the first move through 
language. Such dynamic relations in the process of dialogue might appear to be 
unsystematic and even chaotic to those who are accustomed to highly systematic 
interactions. Therefore, liveliness, creativity, unpredictability, spontaneity, and freedom 
appear as the main characteristics of the process of dialogue. These characteristics are not 
only hallmarks of process that take place among and between people but also outputs of 
that process. They nurture the communicative process of dialogue, while their very 
conditions are cultivated by the process.14 Dialogue derives its growth from them while it 
reflects their underlying principles.  
                                                 
14 Contingency plays a central role in Rorty’s discussion of dialogue, language, self, and community. For 
Rorty, contingency signifies the demolishment of limitation on thinking. It provides the nourishment and 
impulse for rich dialogue with well-differentiated positions. (Rorty 1989: 369) 
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Through conditions of freedom, spontaneity and liveliness, people produce processes of 
dialogue. In dialogue, two or more person’s actions interact with one another in the 
context of necessitated and contingent responses. In communicative process of dialogue, 
responses and outcomes of these responses (i.e. utterances) are not free from others or 
sufficient when standing alone, rather it reflects and reacts on one another. These 
movements of connectivity between utterances and responsive understanding that reflect 
and react upon one another represent contingent and necessitated moves upon moves. 
Contingent and necessitated moves of participants make dialogue non-linear and non-
sequential complex of communicative relation. The non-linear and non-sequential 
complex relationality of dialogue can be identified as united patterns of regularity and 
unpredictability. (Ostram, 1997: 151-65) These pairs of dialogue embody ways that 
difference and unity manifest themselves in a fluid, evolving and ever-changing joint 
world to reflect and generate wholeness of communication. This is the case as these pairs 
provide options, resources and stimulation for generating conditions of open-ended fluid, 
evolving and ever-changing process because each participant meets one another in 
mutuality, reciprocity, and co-inquiry while they reflect one another in contingent and 
necessitated manners. For this reason, dialogue is best described as a multi-directional 
movement toward a state of becoming. This multi-directionality derives from pre-existing 
identities, relationships and series of structures. Yet, it invokes contingent alteration that 
does not involve some necessary, presumed state or ideal end. It encompasses non-
repeating, unexpected moves that transform sets of relationships to new configurations 
previously unimagined. 
The multi-directional or free nature of dialogue provides an arena for change, in either 
the public or the private sphere. In dialogue, one can review not only oneself and others 
but also conventions and traditions, institutions and policies. The dialogical spirit does 
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develop and affect a wider range of social and cultural behaviors. However, more 
importantly, it allows for new interpretations and understandings, for new visions of life, 
of political paradigms, of values and ideas, or the discovery of knowledge. (Tully, 1999b: 
162) The free nature of dialogue can be conceptualized as a source of an ongoing 
platform of becoming. At this point, contingency is useful concept for elucidating the 
indeterminate nature of dialogue. 
In the field of dialogue, contingency refers to indeterminateness, randomness, and 
absence of cause and predictability. It is a source of dynamic and autonomous status of 
meaning that flows among participants.15 Contingency is the very essence of dialogue that 
generates unconditioned will that makes one’s existence free not only from authoritarian 
determination, but also from all inherited or environmental influences. Free choices of 
will sometimes are merely nothing more than random meaning like unpredictable 
movements of individual electrons. If all participants’ communicative actions and 
meanings are determined by communicative order, then those actions and meanings are 
not “free” at all. If one of the participants is to be seen as responsible from one’s own 
communicative acts, then at least some of his/her expression must be ultimately free 
from the determination of the other. This conception of freedom asserts that at 
minimum in some particular important decisions it is partially undetermined and 
unconditioned. Phrased alternatively, the event of contingency is partially responsible for 
one’s immediate communicative actions, for his/her or dialogical meaning and more 
fundamentally his/her understanding. Here contingency can be conceptualized, as 
                                                 
15 Aristotle tended to include contingency as an autonomous explanatory element in the theory of universe. 
Aristotle was a thoroughgoing advocate of indeterminism and in his theory of atoms, an example of 
chance was conceptualized in the ever-swerving movement of atoms. In his view, uncaused movements 
were explained with the concept of chance. (Kirk, Raven and Schofield: 1957: 418-419) Aristotle also 
presented a concept of chance in illustrating the scenario of an accidental meeting of two friends in the 
marketplace after years of separation. In this instance, the order of movement or intention that persuaded 
each friend to go market place represents a cause, but coincidence or intention of two friends was 
uncaused or determined by indirect causation. (Aristotle, 1950: 70-76) 
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consequences of dialogical interaction but also it is a source that can contribute to an 
explanation of the development of meaning and understanding in terms of becoming. On 
these lines, the potential significance of contingency as a provoking mechanism becomes 
essential for on occasions of temporality rather than those of stability and permanence.16 
Participants of dialogue have the opportunity to adopt different but transmissible views 
on various issues. Their choices reflect the precarious compromises they make between 
self-reflexivity and self-referentiality, between freedom and necessity. The dialogical field 
does not represent absolute freedom, but it does permit participants to engage others in 
bringing their different potentials of freedom to bear upon actions.  
Freedom, in the Arendtian sense, rises from a communicative move upon move in a 
public space neither where each participant’s moves appear “autonomous” nor as a 
necessitated part of action or means in a great mechanism which produces an enormous 
force for creative change for differentiation. (Fox, 1999: 35-53) One cannot predict the 
outcome of a communicative act in an arena where everybody has equal capacity to act. 
(Arendt, 1958: 201-42) To regulate communicative acts between participants in the 
dialogical field is to regulate the outcome, and in so doing, the free position of the 
participants would be denied. Each participant is free insofar as his or her view is taken 
into account, not because he or she can freely pursue his or her own ends. Thus, the 
dialogical field serves as a means for bringing different worlds or viewpoints together in 
communicative contact for self-transformation and creativity. It is a field, for which 
continuous regulation of communicative acts can never be worked out. 
Attempts to regulate dialogue measure communicative acts in quantitative terms and set 
up a hierarchy of values according to norms or procedures. Put simply, it is a process of 
                                                 
16 Every dialogue is positioned at the boundary between just now -pronounced words and views of the 
distant past and their verbal and non-verbal expression in the present with consideration of the listeners 
or readers possible response. (Bakhtin,  1981: 84-86 and 257-258)  
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standardization, limiting the scope for thought and action. Participants of regulative 
dialogue appear qua individuals only within the situations created for them by this 
dialogical framework, which is, in function, more akin to monologue. The standardization 
of dialogue works against the spontaneous rise of differences. The dialogical field, in the 
Arendtian sense, fixes no common norm for individual thought and action. (Arendt, 
1961: 50-57) 
Arendt views totalitarianism as a regulatory organization that tries to eliminate multi-
vocality from a given space with the formation of isolation and loneliness. (Arendt, 1979: 
474) Totalitarianism, through systematic regulation, suppresses individual initiative in a 
way that renders the spontaneous nature associated with human freedom void. In so 
doing, totalitarianism leaves us as mere cogs in a great wheel, i.e.: those who do nothing 
but function according to the mechanics of the system. For Arendt, freedom is only 
possible when the dialogical field allows participants to take on different and 
unpredictable positions, when the dialogical field is dynamic. 
For self-reflexive and self-referential, moves to occur there must be what Arendt calls an 
“in-between.” (Arendt, 1958: 57) In this area, each participant has room to reach his or 
her own understanding, but not so singular that the mutuality of dialogue is lost. It is here 
that stimulation takes place, the source of creativity as well as new communicative acts. 
The idea of “in-between” does not simply refer to the capacity to choose among a set of 
possible alternatives or to the faculty of synthesis. Rather, it refers to the potentiality of a 
new beginning, the initiation of something different and the achievement of the 
unexpected. Moreover, dialogue, as a by-product of stimulation and freedom, involves an 
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element of disclosure. The free and contingent nature of dialogue reveals the deepest 
layers of each participant in his or her search for new understanding and articulation.17 
Contingency and freedom, in the dialogical process, form a mutually generative 
relationship, with freedom resulting in contingency that by extension enhances the 
dialogical reward value of freedom.18 To some extent, the contingent quality of dialogue 
allows participants to take into account unexpected requirements of the moment or 
indeterminate local circumstances, and to move from one activity or topic to another. 
The contingent qualities of time and space introduce into dialogue self-expanding 
opportunities. 
In addition, the contingent qualities of dialogue endorse the exercise of an unconditioned 
self, which is free from both monological determination and all inherited, or 
environmental influences. Dialogue is sometimes no more than random interaction. If all 
one’s communicative acts are determined by necessity or closely ordered, then one is not 
free. If one is held responsible for oneself, then some of one’s communicative acts are 
ultimately not determined by those of others. Phrased alternatively, the event of freedom 
is partially responsible for one’s immediate, contingent actions, but also for one’s moral 
conduct and more fundamentally one’s personal identity. (Arendt, 1961: 150-161) 
                                                 
17 Bakhtin expresses this view in the terms of anacrisis. Anacrisis is a way for invoking and stimulating the 
words and views of participants, compelling them to reveal their views as deepest part of their identity 
and manifest them straightway. (Bakhtin,  1997: 110-111) 
18 Agnes Heller formulates the two different types of contingency, which have an effect on the development 
of dialogue. The first type of contingency is “cosmological contingency.” This variant prevents one to 
effectuate foundations for the universal telos or truth because there is no knowledge of the contingency. 
In other words, the question of freedom can no longer be responded to in a universal form, but only with 
reference to a subject. The second type of contingency is sociohistorical contingency. She describes this type 
of contingency as “the infinitude of our initial possibilities, freedom and nothingness, that makes modern 
men and women “tremble in their boots”. With regard to social contingency, there is no `thing-in-itself'. 
One knows that one has been thrown into freedom, that one's life has no pre-set destination that one is, 
or is supposed to be, the master of one's destiny. What one does not know is precisely one's destiny.” 
(Heller, 1993: 223) 
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This brings us to the question of whether participants are bound by one another in 
producing ideas and views. From the participants’ point of view, dialogue is a means for 
action, by virtue of which the self is expressed in difference. In dialogue, one experiences 
oneself in contradistinction to others, which in turn discloses the uniqueness of one’s 
self-identity. Thus, in the contingent nature of dialogue, indeterminacy can appear as part 
of the inner feature of the dialogue between one and oneself and between one and 
others. (Richardson, Rogers and McCarroll, 1998: 496-515) 
In the dialogical process, freedom is not equated with the capacity to pursue one’s own 
ends, but with an agglomeration of possibilities, that has no necessary order: neither 
thought nor actions are destined to take one inevitable form. The actualization of 
freedom can be seen as one’s contingent capacity “to call something into being which did 
not exists before, which was not given, not even as cognition or imagination, and which 
therefore strictly speaking, could not be known. (Arendt, 1977: 151 and cited in Tully, 
1999: 164) Here, contingency means the absence of cause and predictability. It is 
significant not only as a functional element for freedom but also as an emergent new 
space where freedom is part of the reality of dialogue. To act freely means to be able to 
take new initiatives and to do the unforeseen, which all participants in dialogue are 
capable of by virtue of their participation.19  
Freedom can find its full voice in a web of dialogical relations that is both an 
indeterminate and determinate play-space, which in turn constitutes oneself in a 
contingent and necessitated manner. This means that freedom is contingent upon the 
existence of dialogical spaces wherein both indeterminacy and self-determination can be 
                                                 
19 Rorty holds that truth only exists as a metaphoric quality of language in reference to time, place and 
sentences, which are the real regulator of the truth. These descriptions and sentences are strictly our 
products and therefore truth cannot be external to us.  Thus, it would seem that truth exists in 
dependence to the human mind because if there are no sentences, there will be no truth. In essence, 
sentences are viewed as inseparable elements of historically contingent  languages which in essence, are 
human inventions. (Rorty, 1979: 157-160) 
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exercised. Freedom as indeterminacy refers to communicative processes that are not yet 
shaped or conditioned by the blueprints of rhetoric or pre-assigned objectives. Dialogue 
is rhetorically indeterminate when its form and content offer no clear characterization of 
the particular situation to which it is addressed — i.e., aporia. The meaning of the freedom 
also is reflected in the idea of communicative power. Communicative power entails one’s 
ability to frame, revise, pursue and protect their own conceptions of well-being without 
being obliged or impeded by others. It is the ability to act as an understanding and 
understandable being (i.e. self-determination). This means that freedom is not only 
contingent upon interactive space but also is developmental in the sense that “doing” or 
“deliberation” becomes a necessary condition for the realization of its meaning in public 
space. (Habermas 1996:147-149)  
In both cases, freedom does not occur in isolation from others but rather in the context 
of interaction. However, in the course of interaction, one’s determinations may obstruct 
the freedom of others, to the point that such interaction may in principle undermine 
indeterminate mode freedom. Thus, in order for freedom to be realized at both levels, a 
“dialogical space” must be formed wherein a unity is created for the exercise of both the 
contingent and self-determinative character of freedom. The constituting of a dialogue, 
which is a public space, is the act of a special kind of contract—not in a Hobbesian or 
Lockean sense wherein the people contract with a governmental authority for protecting 
their freedom, but in a positive sense of mutual initiation for recognition of free and 
equal status. In essence, I am referring to a mutual respect through which people are able 
to develop recognition of their free and equal status of one with another in the dialogical 
process for framing and pursuing one’s own meanings, as one understands it. In other 
words, the primary function of the dialogical field is to act as a framework of mutual 
respect, which empowers and facilitates the relations between people, encourages 
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cooperation among them and abates opportunities for domination. (Habermas 1996: 
418-419) Through dialogue people can organize, learn, and act with one another to 
construct the more complex democratic relationships, which are necessary for 
development of freedom to occur. The function of dialogue is not only to situate the 
communicative interaction for expression views and support them with reasons but also 
to initiate a sense of responsibility to listen a wide spectrum of views on subjects of 
concern. In other words, in the filed of dialogue, each participant has a right, as well as a 
responsibility to be addresser and addressee. This means that they have taken turns 
reciprocally for talking and listening in order to take into account each other’s views. In 
relation to this, a fair system of cooperation is developed as an awareness of 
interdependence and connection between free and equal individuals, living in a web of 
dialogical relationships people; when this web is extended to include all people, then the 
ideal community of communication is achieved. (Habermas 1990:201-202) In this sense, 
dialogue does not only represent a relationship of free and equal people who are free. It 
also implies that each individual possesses the capability to determine h/her own 
conceptions of h/herself or equal because each pursues h/her own conceptions equally. 
This idea is also consist with a sense of respect that is connected to the awareness of 
interconnection that every participant is contained within the dialogical community and 
thus deserving of equal treatment. It is this sense of the participants’ understanding of 
respect that entails cooperation, and reciprocity (which is a fundamental prerequisite for 
dialogue), which is a basis for such a sense of respect and it, provides the foundation for 
the listening and addressing each other. 
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1.5. Conceptions of Dialogue 
Dialogue, as a necessitated and contingent form of understanding, has multiple functional 
and instrumental notions with respect to both its structures and modes. (Bakhtin, 1997: 
125) Functional and instrumental notions of dialogue serve democracy through the 
reconciliation of differences, the promotion of mutual respect, the cooperative pursuit of 
ends, or as Burbules aptly suggests: “the possibility of open, emphatic, critical 
engagement from which one can learn about others, about the world, and about oneself.” 
(Burbules, 2000: 252) All these functional and instrumental notions of dialogue depend 
on the way that dialogue is structured, or the way that dialogue moves, grows, develops 
and functions. 
I will now turn my focus briefly on reviewing three conceptions of dialogue based on the 
way that dialogue is structured, or the way that dialogue moves, grows, develops and 
functions. These are regulative, truth-oriented and celebratory categories, each of which is 
informed by different structures and functions of dialogue. 20 
 
I.5.1. Regulative Dialogue 
The regulative dialogue embodies communicative action systems that are designed to 
achieve certain ends such as agreement. Therefore, it is constitutive of identities, norms 
and relations between those participated in communicative process. It has also 
coordinating character in that it builds shared regulatory norms as to communicative 
                                                 
20 There can be more than three type of dialogue if they are categorized according to the interplay 
rationalities of the participants and the goal that they are directed. For example, Walton describes eight 
type of dialogue: Critical discussion, debate, inquiry, negotiation, planning committee, pedagogical, 
quarrel and expert consultation. See Walton, 1990: 413. In fact, dialogues can be divided into more than 
eight types, if we consider different criteria for judging various aspects (participation, the use of language, 
power relations, creativity) of dialogue. In this context, we can categorize dialogues as fictional, open, 
closed, persuasive, dramatic, elitist, vernacular, verisimilitude, teaching, commentative, carnivalistic, 
expository, spontaneous, reasoned, historical, future oriented and momentous and so on.  
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relations and social practices, which then shapes the basis of communicative action. 
Therefore, it establishes operational categories that shift propositions to the context of 
regulation. It forms regulation in that produces shared understanding, common meanings 
for description of issues and acceptable appropriate responses. It has functional, 
coordinative and constitutive categories that are studied by Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 
(1984). According to Habermas, communicative action—which consists of the 
comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its propositional component, the 
correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component, authenticity of the 
speaking subject—involves a regulative model to guide communication, which is oriented 
toward the formation of a rational consensus and mutual understanding. (Habermas, 
1973: 18) That model governs the interaction of participants who are capable of speech 
and action and who can follow validity conditionality (i.e. comprehensibility, truthfulness, 
rightness and truthfulness) claims in order to connect speech acts to mutual 
understanding and agreements. (Habermas 1991: 58-59 and Bernstein, 1983: 163) This 
model of communication can be called as regulative dialogue or what Habermas calls an 
“ideal speech situation.” Ideal speech situation, in turn, point to the notion of mutually 
recognized a validity claims that are constitutive for three basic types of speech acts: a 
claim to truth raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative rightness raised in 
regulative speech acts, and a claim to truthfulness raised in expressive speech acts. The 
three aspects of validity claims, rightness of normative context, truth claim of evidential 
basis, truth claim of expression characterize different categories of a regulation embodied 
in speech acts. (Habermas 1991: 56-57) This means that regulative dialogue presupposes 
agreement about implicitly raised validity claims as background consensus because of 
common meaning of a situation. In order for any consensus to be regulative, each of the 
implicit validity claims must be acceptable by rational argumentation, open to questioning 
of assumptions, addressed by interlocutress free from inequality, coercion, and 
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domination. (Habermas, 1996c: 161). Rational argumentation is not only central to the 
legitimization but also regulative notion of dialogue. Regulation is coming to a common 
meaning of a subject or rule. 
Focusing on mutually recognized validity claims as basis of regulation in the sphere of 
dialogue creates a situation for strong idealization of agreement in the dialogical situation. 
More specifically, these validity claims reflect the regulative functions of  speech acts: (a) 
external nature: the interlocutors must make a true statement, or make correct truth 
claims (b) internal nature:  interlocutors must be truthful in expressing their beliefs, 
intentions, feelings etc. and (c) society: interlocutors must perform a speech  act that is 
“right” with respect to a given normative  context. The dialogical processes by which 
different validity claims of speech acts are brought to a satisfactory resolution appeals to 
these three levels to set regulative basis (as common values, customs, roles and 
guidelines) for what constitutes the right or appropriate kind of action. (Held, 1980: 338) 
Valid are only those norms or procedures that meet (or can meet) the goal of common 
understanding, with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants of 
dialogue. (Habermas, 1996b: 296-99)  
Regulative dialogue communication, which is oriented to achieving and sustaining, 
reviewing consensus, rests on the recognition of two conditions: equality and freedom. 
The first is equality. In this context, equality refers the equal rights of participants and 
equal respect for personal dignity. (Habermas, 1991: 200) This means that all participants 
have an equal voice in the decision-making process for equal consideration of their 
interests. All concerned agree upon whatever consensus emerges. The second condition 
concerns the freedom of all participants to accept or reject any proposal. Any proposal to 
be considered valid must meet the condition that all affected parties can freely accept the 
consequences and side effects of the consensus that is implemented. In essence, this 
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situation means that participants of dialogue should have continuous mutual reference to 
an agreed set of rules or meanings in order to strengthen the regulative quality of that 
exchange. (Habermas 1991:84-86) 
Regulative dialogue requires coherent, consistent and persuasive arguments on the part of 
its participants, who each make his/her own case. The aim here is not to assess particular 
propositions simply in terms of whether they are true or false, but to discuss critically 
various propositions in order to establish consensus. Regulative dialogue represents a 
reflective communicative rationality or a process of inference. Every reasoned case can be 
inferred (i.e., justified or refused) by another reasoned case. (Habermas, 1996c: 188-189) 
As a result, the proposal supported by the best arguments should not only prevail but can 
give rise to new ones.  
Regulative dialogue has a pragmatist notion of discursive justification. This idea refers to 
the moral and political validation of the plurality of claims and differences among 
participants. In essence, regulative dialogue does not acknowledge differences without 
approving all differences as morally and politically valid. Regulative dialogue does not 
deny our embodied and embedded differences, but aims at developing moral capabilities 
and dispositions and encouraging transformations that can yield a point of view suitable 
to all. In regulative dialogue, difference serves as a starting point for reflection and action, 
but it must be settled rationally. (Habermas, 1996c: 121) Persuasion and agreement are 
necessary conditions for this settlement. (Habermas, 1996c: 194-195) 
 
1.5.2. Truth-oriented Dialogue 
It is confrontational communication in that it exposes discrepancies, contradictions, rifts 
in meanings and understandings. It contains communicative means (i.e. rhetoric) to test 
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people and ideas, including one’s own ideas. It begins with an interlocutor’s claims. Once 
one interlocutor makes a claim, the other interlocutor tries to elicit further perspectives 
and proceeds to show that series of claim are inconsistent and contradictory. The result 
of truth-oriented dialogue, however, is not truth or definitive conclusions, but a kind of 
perplexity that allows the rise of new understanding. There fore, truth-oriented dialogue 
can be described as the joint undertaking for proposing claims, opposing claims, 
formulating arguments and putting forth counter-arguments for discovery of the truth. It 
is the union of questioning and answering, which frees one from one’s own particular 
limitations and situations through the invention, and reinvention of one’s self-
understanding. Hence, truth-oriented dialogue is a way of drawing forth latent, unformed 
understandings and facilitating the discovery of truths. 
The concept of truth-oriented dialogues is represented by Socratic dialogues. (Bakhtin, 
1997: 110) Socratic dialogues contains distinctive mode of inquiry for the truth. At the 
heart of this inquiry is questioning and this questioning is initialized with question of 
“What is it?” A Socratic question is answered by a definition or logos, an account that says 
what for example Justice, or for any property X, what X is. In relation to questioning, 
truth-oriented dialogue embodies means of dialectical for serving to justify or refute 
viewpoints. It also contains ongoing argumentation in which each participant uses reason 
or logic in order to persuade one another. Each participant puts forward his or her case, 
offering accurate or appropriate support for conclusions. This happens in the pattern of 
claim, reasoning and counter-claim, which lead toward a kind of new understanding or 
knowing. This new understanding plays a positive role in the dialogue; it forms the heart 
of and guide for the communicative process in the form of the central paradoxes of the 
dialogue. 
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Truth-oriented dialogue is preoccupied with the force of the inductive arguments. The 
better argument is the entral effect to refute, clarify, or support moral definition of truth. 
Moral truth, in the practical concerns of political life, is a question of confronting public 
failings and limitations or of reconciling and combining opposites. Truth-oriented 
dialogue is a critical scrutiny of the moral truth for demonstrating one trying to offer the 
general definition that one does not know about what justice is and therefore cannot 
justify particular actions for everybody. The inductive arguments are not deductions from 
particulars to a generalization, but deduction from one proposition or a set of coordinate 
propositions to an acceptable proposition, to another coordinate proposition, or through 
a more acceptable proposition to another coordinate proposition. In such an inductive 
argumentation, action of proposed meanings and counter-proposals would go on until a 
satisfactory response was found. 
The chief part of truth oriented dialogues are “rational accounts” which examine or 
justify beliefs or theories. Here justification is characterized as giving a rational account of 
the belief. Nevertheless, the justification of a certain belief can never be final, as it is 
always conditioned. Paradoxically, the dialogue must remain unsatisfactory (i.e., non-final) 
in order to remain dialogical (i.e., open). A final and universal justification of something is 
empirically and logically impossible in truth-oriented dialogue, because when such a 
justification is made the basis for having a dialogue no longer exists. Justification, then, is 
thought of as something that is always out of the reach of the participants. Nevertheless, 
at the same time, the participants must presuppose its possibility in order for dialogue to 
succeed. This suggests the truth should be seen as an ever-receding horizon of dialogue.  
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1.5.3. Celebratory Dialogue 
Celebratory dialogue is a concept associated with Bakhtin’s observations on the 
groundbreaking communicative vitality of the carnival. According to this scholar, to 
celebrate in the space of carnival means to participate in dialogue—to ask questions, to 
heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue, people participate wholly and 
throughout their whole way of life. (Bakhtin, 1997: 279) Carnival is the open-ended 
dialogue and by its very nature is an interactive “live event” played out at a point of 
dialogical meeting among multiple actions. In this sense, it is promotes a type of freedom. 
In promoting a sense of freedom, liberation, and creativity, carnival’s celebratory dialogue 
satirically and paradoxically undermined the formal, the abstract, the ideological, and the 
spiritual and released people temporarily from official restraints. In giving expression to 
the world turned upside down theme of celebratory dialogue, participants engaged in 
many forms of criticism in erasing old hierarchies, producing new equalities. It has been 
noted. (Bakhtin, 1984: 10) that the erase of hierarchy had especially profound effects, as it 
allowed “free and familiar contact” between people otherwise completely separated by 
social designation. 
[S]uch free, familiar contacts were deeply felt and formed an essential 
element of the life of the carnival spirit. People were, so to speak, reborn 
for new, purely human relations. These truly human relations were not 
only a fruit of imagination or abstract thought; they were experienced. 
The utopian ideal and the realistic merged in this carnival experience, 
unique of its kind.  
 
Bakhtin elucidates the significance of carnival to illuminate the celebratory dialogue not as 
dyadic, much less a binary phenomenon but as a manifold phenomenon that allows for 
unusual combinations: “the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with 
the insignificant, the wise with the stupid.” Bakhtin (1997:132) suggest: 
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Folk-carnival “debates” between life and death, darkness and light, winter 
and summer, etc., permeated with the pathos of change and the joyful 
relativity of all things, debates which did not permit thought to stop and 
congeal in a one-sided seriousness or in a stupid fetish for definition or 
singleness of meaning. 
 
In this context, celebratory dialogue represents a way of challenging hierarchies existing in 
religious, political, and moral values, norms, and prohibitions. It brings a critical sprit, 
instead of strictly maintained hierarchy of official culture. It tries to reflect absolute 
equality and means for promoting empathy and understanding among the diversity of 
voices. It is a mode of mutual examination, a therapeutic engagement of self- and other-
exploration; and a basis for shaping uncoerced social and political conditions for freeing 
human consciousness, thought, and imagination for new potentialities. (Bakhtin, 1984: 
10) It prepares the way for social political and cultural change without creating divisions 
between performers and spectators because its participants do not watch but live in it. 
(Bakhtin, 1997: 122 and 1984: 7) It creates change not with mechanical or rhetorical use 
of language but through parody and satire. Therefore, it is language free from a 
presupposed truthfulness of values. It does not distinguish between virtues and vice. Its 
discourses are comprised of contrasts—of virtues and non-virtues that are both free and 
enslaved. It does not have end but it is end in itself. It defies the sources of power by 
ridiculing truths and teasing authorities, and in such a way makes the political life closer 
and more familiar while it shakes conventions of social life.  
It has indirect, ironic language use and discourse that combines the new with the old, 
death with birth; end with beginning. (Bakhtin, 1981: 75) Its indirect discourse is double-
voiced, at least insofar as one discourse represents another’s discourse with two or more 
different response. Embracing double voiced-ness, celebratory dialogue resides in a 
system of multiplicity in which a meaning simultaneously stands two different, and 
opposite, things within a particular narration. Celebratory dialogue is a dialogized 
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heteroglossia in and of itself, but it also can qualify, or be qualified by, other forms of 
diversity of voices such as polyphony. Hence, celebratory dialogue is stripped of its 
universal elements, thereby exactly gains its deepest significances and becomes particular 
the situation of a communication in which the myriad responses one might make at any 
particular point, but any one of responses can not easily be framed in one a specific 
discourse. Celebratory dialogue is a way of communication made up of a roiling mass of 
languages, each of which has its own distinct signs. Thus, it does not participate in a 
unitary ideological voice in a multitude of discourses. Celebratory dialogue could only be 
understood as an active responsibility that calls for an active listening to each voice from 
the perspective of the others. Its rationale evolves around the test and provocation of 
ideas while it interrogates ready-made truths as the official voice of established beliefs. In 
doing so, it allows free and familiar contact between people otherwise completely 
separated by social designation. (Bakhtin 1984:10) It does not lead to definite 
conclusions; it only liberates participants from existing viewpoints, conventions and 
established truths, from all that is traditional and universally accepted. It represents the 
rise of a new spirit of ambivalence. (Bakhtin, 1997: 126) Its revitalizing spirit sanctifies 
freedom as creativity and frees people to have a new outlook on existing social and 
political relations and to experience a completely new order of things.  
Celebratory dialogue is guided by freedom from rhetoric and the reasoned and 
mechanized process of action. It refers to a means to an end but also a medium through 
which participants discover their own meanings, either by contrast or by appropriating 
the meaning of others. It represents a kind of self-governing practice, a free move in the 
game whose rules are contingent rather than necessary. It gives voice to the other as it 
exposes differences and overcomes fears. It is an open-ended, personal and public 
practice that celebrates other ways of knowing, doing and being, thereby upsetting the 
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status quo and promoting a robust and multi-vocalic communication of the independent 
and unmerged voices and consciousnesses. (Bakhtin, 1997: 124) 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
In the chapter I have argued that dialogue is not only a communicative engagement of 
two (or more) persons, but of people with understandings, languages and rules that shape 
the particular ways in which dialogue functions. This means that dialogue is active in the 
multiplicity of communicative forms that are situated in relational, material and imaginary 
circumstances. These multiplicities of communicative forms of dialogue not only refer to 
the matters of choice but also to an externality that impinges upon the dialogical relation 
in ways that may extent or empower or limit communication in the terms of freedom, 
diversity, co-existence and understanding.  
Dialogue has multiple moments within communicative process, some inevitably 
convergent toward agreement and understanding, others transgressive and dispersive. 
Indeed, once one starts thinking of dialogue in such terms, the more difficult it is to 
maintain the dyadic character of dialogue as an either/or scenario. For in any ongoing 
dialogue, all of these moments may recur, with no particular one defining dialogue as 
such. In this sense, dialogue is a thing in itself as well as an end for itself. It is not only a 
constitutive force for unity through mutual understanding but also an occasion for 
discovering differences as instances of diverse values, points of view and contingently 
emerged understandings. It is a tool or means for the achievement of the purposes that 
are valued by the participants. Dialogue helps constructs mutual points of interest that 
can be both contingently and determinedly evolved.  
 75 
The assumptions of the participants with different values/ends about the nature of 
dialogue may have determinative or contingent effects upon the form and tone of the 
dialogue itself. These assumptions may indeed lead to the institutionalization of different 
models of dialogue in a society. Once institutionalized, the determined or contingently 
emerged form and tone of the dialogue creates a context in which different judgments 
and understandings often play central roles. Concerning this, there are three major 
models of dialogue with different characteristics, reflected by their orientation to the 
communicative process. These are regulatory model, truth-oriented model and the 
celebratory model.  
The regulatory model of dialogue emphasizes the communicative mode of resolution or 
dissolution of differences, and privileges an inclusive capacity for the co-construction of a 
mutual understanding or consensus. The truth-oriented dialogue emphasizes the search 
for the truth that can be discovered between participants with different perspectives. 
Therefore, these two are purpose-oriented. Celebratory dialogue differs from these two 
by emphasizing or celebrating differences. Therefore, celebratory dialogue is not guided 
by any pre-given purpose to realize other than the dialogue itself. In this sense, it brings 
forward the critical and constitutive potentiality of differences by leaving the boundaries 
of dialogue open and creating a capacity for continuing and expanding the 
communication process through the inclusion of multiple voices and perspectives that 
allows questioning of the very terms and assumptions of the dialogue and its direction at 
any time.  
At this point it must be stressed that differences not only exist as an internal feature of 
the dialogue or as the consequence of the relationship between the self and the other, but 
also they emerge as unexplored and unrecognized possibilities, (for example, the 
possibility of tolerance may dialogically be connected to the possibility of intolerance 
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because intolerance dialogically provides normative criteria for identifying what should 
not be tolerated. In other words, by specifying what should not be tolerated, intolerance 
invokes its “opposite” as a difference that is part of its own notion or identity. (Laclau, 
1996: 50-51) Nevertheless differences may exceed dialogical categories of language and 
hence understanding, challenging the fixity of them in ways that mystify conventional 
meanings and assumptions. Furthermore, differences can also be characterized by their 
resistance to governing views and their persistent refusal to allow themselves to be 
identified with the dominant conventional points of view. (Burbules, 2000: 261))  
In each of these three means, differences pose a fundamental challenge to the purposes 
of the regulatory dialogue and the truth-oriented dialogue that are directed to achieving 
mutual understanding, agreement or consensus around the idea of reconciliation and 
truth. In its own way, each mode is a repudiation of convergent models of discourse 
generally, and each, in its own way, resists the categorical characterization of diversity. 
In this context, I have argued that instead of bringing differences under control, dialogue 
has to be open towards explorations and thereby the celebration of differences because 
not only is the self socially and historically formed but also comes into existence in and 
through dialogue. Dialogue, as a communicative relation requires engagement with the 
other voice or coming to know the self through its relation to the other voice. Therefore, 
the concept of celebration of differences is not a euphemism but a central aspect of the 
self-understanding and self-recognition. In encountering different voices and divergent 
ideas as compared to his/her own, each participant can develop new understandings and 
conceptions of the self. It is in recognition of the other that one becomes able to see 
greater possibilities within his/her self. Understanding comes through dialogical 
relationship and recognition of the other that in turn facilitate the dialogue itself. 
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CHAPTER II. LANGUAGE, DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY 
II.1. Introduction 
Conception of democracy do not refer abstract system of normative forms, its meaning is 
never fixed. The meaning of democracy is always various and open-ended. There are 
constant relations between language, thought and action. Language shapes the thought 
and bring into being through action. This means that the meaning of democracy is not 
‘out there’ to be discovered but always produced and reproduced through language and 
bring to practice through language. Language is medium to instantiate democratic 
perspectives and judgments that intimately tied various social structures, histories, 
cultures and ideologies. Therefore, meaning of democracy with use of language will vary 
in context in which it is used with different type of speech acts and put into practice in 
different speech communities. Moreover, the meanings of democracy dialogically 
constructed through communicative interactions even if dialogue with text or with in 
thought. Furthermore, language is public resource: in one’s own use of term of 
democracy, one cannot run away the usages and meanings that have been produced by it 
others. All use of language is intimately related to power because all words bear the taste 
of context in which they are used. This means that linguistic context firstly govern the 
way that concept of democracy can be grasped and interpreted because it constitutes 
symbolic systems of order and representation.  
In this context, this chapter will give basic outline theory of language, including some of 
the principal divisions around philosophy of language. It will suggest how the conception 
of democracy could be explored in linguistic context and where Bakhtin’s philosophy of 
language could provide frame for elucidating recognizable phenomenon of language. So 
first part this chapter will give brief outline of language theory. Third both consider 
Bakhtin’s and Habermas theories of language to show that how they might be 
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constructive for forming language of democracy. This discussion is two-fold. First, I 
compare Bakhtin’s theory of language with that of the structuralists. Second, I discuss 
how Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue can be considered in relation to Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. It will be argued that Bakhtin’s theory represents a more radical 
and critical paradigm of dialogue in relation to the very notion of freedom. In relation to 
this view, the final part of this chapter together major threads and suggests that direction 
for construction of language of democracy. 
 
II.2. Language, Dialogue and Democracy 
The theory of dialogical democracy is guided by a simple idea that human interaction is 
fundamentally dialogical. (Clarke and Holoquist, 1984: 6) This statement encompasses the 
inclusion of an addresser and addressee as well as the relation between the two and all is 
rooted in language. It is language that produces realities, the medium by which one 
understands phenomena and structures experience and knowledge of the world. In other 
words, existence can never be divorced from language, as linguistic representations locate 
one’s understanding or oneself in language. Language itself is produced by a particular set 
of social relations that obtains at a certain time and place. It is never neutral or 
ideologically free, but designed to convey particular kinds of knowledge to achieve certain 
effects. As linguistic and therefore dialogical beings, people cannot step outside language 
and look at the world from an objective standpoint.  
If one argues that language shapes people’s understanding of their surroundings, one can 
also argue that democracy derives and develops from the dense and interactive network 
of social representations and language systems, which are themselves impelled to 
linguistic and dialogical activity expressive of various forms of life with the reflection of 
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oneself.21 It is through the process of acquiring language that democracy is realized or 
immersed into the political culture. However, the view of language as dialogical practice 
should not conclude that democracy is nothing but language, even though our 
understanding of democracy is certainly mediated through a linguistic conceptual 
framework. Language operates as discourse and content within social contexts. In short, 
language does not represent democracy, but makes sense of it as representations. 
Democracy, then, is a linguistic and dialogical activity, a system of representation that has 
developed socially and politically to communicate individually and collectively on specific 
issues, and it functions as a context of collective decisions that form an integral part of 
the linguistic patterns people use to represent their experiences. Therefore, this 
conception regards people as communicative agents who are caught up in a combination 
of social identities, or of subject and object positions constructed in advance in language, 
functioning as reflective dimensions of being as event. (Bakhtin, 1986: 169) 
Nevertheless, linguistic action is not fixed to a single system of understandings that aims 
at a minimum level of comprehension. Instead, it is part of an ever-evolving, ever-
changing nexus of subjective truths and value judgments that represent the plural and 
dialogical quality of the self. Bakhtin sees the plurality of the self as a struggle between a 
unitary language and heteroglossia, between stasis and uniformity and between change 
and diversity. This shows that linguistic processes are intimately related to political 
relations because politics remains the site of struggle between unitary language and 
                                                 
21 Hegel holds a similar view. According to him, the world is the object of knowledge of understanding as 
well as the product of understanding. Hegel’s world is articulated in terms of three inseparable and 
organically united moments. First, he emphasizes the abstract distinction between experience-knowledge 
and object. This distinction depends upon a moment of observation that consciousness discerns as a 
thing that relates to itself. The second moment refers to a constructive aspect of the interrelationship 
between itself and the object, which is indeed the unification  - also called the consciousness of the object 
or ‘being for another’ or knowledge. Third, while consciousness engages objects in term, it is in fact only 
engaged in itself, the consciousness of itself. This is the consciousness of ‘being in itself.’ Therefore, 
consciousness encompasses both the object and itself, i.e. the spirit. Since consciousness incorporates, 
what the world is and the knowledge of this world the unification of being-for-another and being-in-itself 
as oneness is the fundamental feature amongst the moments of consciousness itself. (Hegel, 1977: 79-80)  
 80 
heteroglossia. The dominant discourse, class or ideology function as unitary forces of 
language to make society and people homogeneous; secondary views as forces of 
heteroglossia, on the other hand, strive for difference, for liberation from the dominant 
forces. 
For Bakhtin, two forces, centripetal and centrifugal, come into play whenever language is 
utilized. The centripetal force of language tends to push toward a unifying direction, 
toward a single frame of reference that every member of society employs. In contrast, the 
centrifugal force of language tends to push toward difference, decentralization and 
multiplicity. The tension between the two allows language to be both a determined and 
determining element, as historical, political and social conditions of people change, as 
social groups modify, or oppose certain meanings and ways of experience. 
The view that language is fundamentally a construction of meaning with which people 
make sense of their world is built on power relations between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. The close connection between language and power suggests that democracy is 
connected to the heteroglossia of language, which resists a unity of meanings as truth for 
everybody. For Bakhtin, the promotion of a unitary language leads to a homogenous 
society or authoritarianism, constituted by fixed identities.  
 
II.3. The Language of Democracy 
Bakhtin does not consider language an objective structure that is independent of its users. 
Rather, he considers it a dialogical and social practice active in time and space primarily 
because it is used in concrete and particular circumstances. In relation to this conception, 
Bakhtin proposes to study language as dialogical chain of utterances that are situated not 
only within the framing context of their interrelations with other utterances but also 
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within extraverbal contexts of situation, setting and history. As expressed as unit of 
speech communication and located in dialogical chain, utterances are determined by 
change of communicative agents who can be both the author (addresser) and the 
addressee from whom the author anticipate a reply. (Bakhtin 1986: 71) The addresser is 
in active position in which one directly refers semantic content of utterance. (Bakhtin 
1986: 90) In addition, both the addresser and addressee also express an understanding 
toward the semantic content of the utterance. (Bakhtin 1986: 84) The understanding of 
the utterance catches the general and specific meaning of the utterance. According to 
Bakhtin, a general sense of utterances can be caught by traditional studies of language as a 
system (such as linguistics) but a specific sense of language can only be caught in the 
context of a particular situation, setting and history, which is extralinguistic or 
metalinguistic. (Bakhtin 1986: 85-86) Therefore, for Bakhtin, utterances, distinct from 
sentences, are associated directly or extra-verbally to the contexts. In other words, they 
cannot exist in isolation from the world that they are part. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73-74)  
Central to Bakhtin’s emphasis of the utterance is the dialogical connection between 
language and personal and impersonal context. On the one hand, language does not 
directly reflect the world, but is a system of representation by which the world is 
perceived. On the other hand, language is produced by a particular set of social relations 
that obtains at a certain time and place. Dialogues with different contexts produce 
different meanings. A language comes to represent the social world by virtue of the 
context in which people use to refer to it. Put simply, language is the production of 
knowledge through context.  
Dialogue as interaction between language and context links language with the social and 
thus, it foregrounds the understanding of language as a system of meanings conditioned 
by the signifying practices of culture. All values, beliefs, assumptions and background 
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knowledge people use to understand relations in time and space dialogically shape the 
social world. As language is a determining practice of the social world, dialogues form an 
integral part of the linguistic patterns people use to represent their experience. 
Communication implies one and the other, with the potential for effect.  
Not surprisingly then, Bakhtin considers the structural theory of language problematic, 
because it describes language as a unity independent of actual use in terms of social 
relations and polyglossia as another’s speech in another’s language. 
Structuralists assert an ordered relation between the signifying practices of language and 
the production and reproduction of meaning, seeking to discover the underlying system 
or deep structures, by which meaning is manifested (or determined) in the surface 
structures of communication. As such, structuralists tend to place language outside 
context. They over-emphasize individual linguistic elements (i.e., words or sentences) at 
the expense of the multiplicity of meanings. Conversely, Bakhtin argues that language is 
dialogical and composed of social-verbal interactions. He also asserts that the interactive 
nature of language consists of social and political structures. Language is not conceived of 
as a closed and abstract system but as a dialogical system. This dialogical system, takes 
place in two ways: initially, it would take place within the people themselves as they 
contextualize through understanding their own interpretation of concrete and particular 
circumstances. Secondly, it occurs between people who use utterances for 
communication purposes. Therefore, it is internal (between an earlier and a later self), 
external (between two different people), or internal (in self or between an earlier and a 
later self). 
The basic units of this dialogical system of language are utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 71)  
Utterances represent a number of aspects: a referential aspect toward meaning or the 
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subject matter, an expressive aspect toward meaning or the subject matter and a 
responsive aspect in relation to other utterances. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73) The surrounding 
context of an utterance includes both the speaker and listener. The speaker makes an 
utterance, bearing in mind his or her listener. The listener responds accordingly. The 
specific sense of the utterances is made only in connection with the particular context of 
the exchange. 
The listener to whom the speaker addresses is also the author of other utterances 
preceding and succeeding the particular exchange. The listener is an active participant in a 
dialogical chain of utterances, for whom the utterance is assembled in expectation of a 
response, which in turn elicits a further response. (Bakhtin, 1986: 74) Therefore, each 
speaker constructs each utterance not only in response to a particular meaning or subject 
matter, expressing a position toward that meaning or subject matter, but also to 
worldviews and conceptualizations. In the process, each utterance shapes another. In the 
cases of utterances, language exists for people not as a closed, abstract system, but as 
“use”; that is a play of double voices with many meanings. This is the notion that Bakhtin 
calls heteroglossia. This term refers to a multiplicity of languages and discourses that are 
all in operation in everyday life. It contains the multiplicity of social speech, or rhetorical 
modes, dialects, idiolects, and jargons that people use in the course of their daily lives. 
(Bakhtin 1981: 324) For this reason, in Bakhtin’s conceptualization, there is no one 
abstract system of language that has representation over all the others. In essence, he 
regards language as a living complex of systems of social worlds that is constantly in 
dialogue with other social worlds, determined by and simultaneously determining them. 
Bakhtin often uses the term discourse to describe this living system of social worlds that 
is active in and through language. Discourse refers to the regular, systematic, coherent 
and historically specific ways of using language. It inscribes meanings and identities to 
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utterances from many social worlds. Utterances convey meaning by virtue of discourse. 
Contingently, discourses impose a regulative relation over the interactive use of 
utterances. Through this relation, each use of language becomes not reflexive but 
referential. (Bakhtin, 1986: 73-74) With this referential usage, language contains speech 
genres, which are normative, political, and ideological givens. Genres are common ways 
of utilizing language. They are not created by an individual speaker but instead are 
repeated subsystems of communication. They are a form of an internalized web of 
discourses, a complex system of means and memories that facilitate communication 
between one’s own and the other. It is especially important here to draw attention to 
Bakhtin differentiation of speech genres between primary (simple) and secondary 
(complex). (Bakhtin 1986: 61-65) In Bakhtin’s view, primary speech genres refer to daily 
expression or social languages that are used by an academician, a farmer or any other 
person practicing a specific profession. Secondary speech signifies highly developed and 
organized communication and it becomes visible in literary works. 
The difference between primary and secondary genres is important because interrelations 
between language and discourse is revealed and defined through functionality of both 
types. This inter-relation with the functionality of both types of speech genres is 
characterized by an organizational closure but it remains open to structural variation and 
differentiation. From this vantage point, the languages and identities of communicative 
agents are always on the interactive edge between unity and differentiation on one hand 
or the flux between connectedness and separateness on the other hand. 
 
II.4. Dialogue and Ideal Speech Situation 
Bakhtin’s language theories focus primarily on the notion of dialogism, and on the view 
that language—any form of speech or writing—is always a dialogue. This dialogical 
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notion of language is not identical to Habermas’s idea of language, although it is similar in 
that it focuses on the idea of the social and historical nature of language, and the idea of 
context as inherent within it. Bakhtin’s dialogical view of language consists of three 
elements: a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a dialogical relation that occurs within 
oneself and between the two. Language (and what language says—ideas, characters, 
forms of truth, for example) is always both external (between two different people) and 
internal (between an earlier and a later self) and is thus the product of the interactions 
between selves and between two or more people. Bakhtin contrasts that notion of the 
dialogical character of language to the idea of monologic, which is a use of language that 
comes from a single, unified source.  
Habermas was aware of Bakhtin’s study and of dialogical theories in general but he does 
not adopt nor endorse a dialogical view of language. His approach differs from the 
celebratory tradition ascribed to Bakhtin which values heteroglossia and which inherently 
reveals the complex and inevitable interaction of languages. Habermas is more concerned 
with the system and structures of languages as they are expressed in different language 
usages. He tries to define qualities and situations that are supposed to be immanent in 
speech. Habermas is particularly focused on the ideal speech situation as representative of 
ideal conditions of dialogue. The ideal speech situation is the method, or the group of 
methods and communicative processes that fundamentally enable people to engage in 
undistorted communication. This method of communication entails a rational and critical 
examination of claims and which looks forward to bring consensus about the good life 
and creation of universal.22 An ideal speech situation is a form of communicative action 
through which people can rationally assess the quality of language for rightness and 
                                                 
22 Habermas defines the situation of the ideal speech as something that is “neither an empirical 
phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition unavoidable in discourse… It is a 
fiction, which is operatively effective in communication. I would therefore prefer to speak of an 
anticipation of an ideal speech situation… It is a critical standard against which every actually realized 
consensus can be called into question and tested.” (Habermas 1975: 258 and 1996b: 56-57) 
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truthfulness (i.e. sincerity).  (Habermas, 1996c: 127-131) From this perspective, any form 
of language is part of validity claims or the effort to make language acceptable by all. 
According to Habermas, only those views that meet with the consent of all, as 
participants in a reasoned exchange can be declared valid. (Habermas, 1996: 235) In this 
context, there are three general characteristics that must exist for ideal speech situation: 
the logic, the dialectic and the rhetoric. (Habermas, 1990: 86-94) The logic of ideal speech 
situation represents the outcome of critical exchange. The dialectic represents procedures 
through which free, equal participation is guaranteed, and strategic elements that might 
guide communicative action are discouraged. The rhetoric represents the level of 
exchange at which different participants overcome their self-interests in recognition of 
their shared world.  
Similarly, Bakhtin views dialogue as the key to existence that permits a multiplicity of 
social voices and wide variety of their links and interrelationships through use of 
language. Bakhtin draws a sharp line between dialogue (which is active and expressive 
communication between a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a relation between the 
two) and monologue (which is passive and one-sided communication, expressed by single 
entity organization). He sees dialogue as operation of multiplicity of languages between 
people. Bakhtin conceives of dialogue with the collection of all the forms of languages, 
social speech, or rhetorical modes that people use in the course of communication 
between one another. He sees dialogue as value not virtue of consequences it engenders 
or to rules that it applies but to a state of affairs that it conveys. These states of affairs do 
not contain a system of norms, of one standard language, or an “official” language that 
everyone would have to speak (and which would then be enforced by various 
mechanisms but viewed as heteroglossia or a move toward a multiplicity of meanings 
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with the inclusion of a wide variety of different ways of speaking, different rhetorical 
strategies and vocabularies.  
Bakhtin emphasizes two forces in operation whenever dialogue is manifested between 
one another: centripetal force of language and centrifugal force of language. A centripetal 
force of language (tends to push toward a central point; a centrifugal force of language 
tends to push meanings away from a central point and out into all directions. In other 
words, dialogue is a communicative realm where centripetal and centrifugal forces of 
language collide. (Bakhtin 1981: 426, 428) This notion of dialogue is not the same as the 
Habermasian notion of a consensus/truth oriented view of an ideal speech situation, 
though it is similar in focusing on the idea of the social nature of communication, and the 
idea of struggle inherent within. In Bakhtin’s view, dialogue contains a more emergent or 
spontaneous image of dialogical existence, a sort of “carnivalistic” existence. In this 
situation, there is an “antitbody” residing within multiplicity of voices, a diversity of 
meanings. Its purpose is not to test one’s own position against those of others and 
persuade them to adopt it, but to express, juxtapose and negotiate the differences toward 
a better understanding of self and the other. (Gardiner, 1992: 139-140) In contrast to 
Bakhtin’s views, Habermas supposes that people are rational beings, and that their 
communications are governed above all by the principle of non-contradiction. It is easy 
today to regard the term rational as a concept that refers to a close relation between 
judgment and existence—hence as a communicative technique, where the power of 
judgment is employed. In an ideal speech situation, the affirmation of reason, and the 
evaluation of other people’s language succeed. A Bakhtinian conception of dialogue, for 
its existence and the grace of its self-reflexivity, requires authentic pluralism not 
judgment. It requires a willingness to go beyond categories of logic and concepts of 
rhetoric.  
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Moreover, in contrast to Habermas’s appeal of the functioning role logic plays for 
conformity of and for an ideal speech situation, Bakhtin appeals to dialogue itself because 
he believes that rules of conformity of any kind cancel the very value of dialogue since 
dialogue is rooted in provoking relationships of language and selves. Any type of rule and 
procedure depersonalizes dialogical interaction with its artificial and static concepts. 
Bakhtin states: “Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), 
remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts 
of judgments from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract 
consciousness—and that’s how you get dialectics.” (Bakhtin, 1986: 147)  
For Bakhtin, the plurality of different perspectives must be brought into dialogue. Each 
view expressed reflects freely and openly distinct feelings experiences and feelings. 
Therefore, Bakhtin (1986: 84-86) suggests:  
Any utterance is a link in the chain of communication. It is the active 
position of the speaker in one referentially semantic sphere or another. 
Therefore, each utterance is characterized primarily by a particular 
referentially semantic content... This is the first aspect of the utterance 
that determines its compositional stylistic and features. The second 
aspect... is the expressive aspect, that is, the speaker’s subjective emotional 
evaluation of the relation semantic content of his utterance... There can 
be no such things as an absolutely neutral utterance. The speaker’s 
evaluative attitude toward the subject of his speech (regardless of what it 
may be) also determines the choice of lexical, grammatical, and 
compositional means of the utterance... One of the means of expressing 
the speaker’s emotionally evaluative attitude toward the subject of his 
speech is expressive intonation, which resounds clearly in oral speech...  
 
Therefore, the dialogical expression of each view has specific characteristics. In this 
context, each view cannot be reduced to the purely logical (even if dialectical) or to the 
purely linguistic (compositional-syntactic). Dialogic relations of views are expressive 
relations among utterances. If expressions of sentences or utterances are placed side by 
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side on a semantic plane (not as objects and not as linguistic examples), they initiate 
expressive aspects of dialogic relations. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117) 
Another difference between Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism and Habermas’s notion of 
communicative action is the idea of argument. Bakhtin treats arguments as representative 
of speech genres, styles and modes of delivery. They are not only utterances specific to 
arguers, but also generic forms learned from others. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60) He therefore 
considers the structure of arguments, both at the level of discourse analysis and at the 
level of the individual participant’s point of view. At he both level, his analysis focuses a 
theory of language in use. Through this focus, Bakhtin sees language not abstract system 
of normative forms that needs to be discovered but constructed dialogical relations, 
utterances and selves. Thus, reference of arguments are always multiple and unlimited. 
Meaning of arguments will be various with context in which they are expressed with 
different utterances and with different participants. Further, language is open resource: in 
one’s arguments, one cannot escape language usages or speech genres that have been 
formed made by others. All arguments bear the flavor of commonness and uniqueness, 
unity and distinction and sameness and difference.  
In contrast to Bakhtin’s view, Habermas views on arguments and his comments on 
speech acts and the concept of truth are very systematic and well organized. he 
introduces the concept of validity claims as an alternative to Bakhtin’s notion of 
dialogicality conditions for  arguments. Habermas argues that each argument raises the 
three validity claims of understandability, claims to truth, normative rightness and 
expressive truthfulness. Then, he proposes classification and systematization of 
arguments depending on which is the major validity claim. (Habermas, 1991: 137; Held, 
1980: 338) He suggests that in making argument, interlocutors at least implicitly raise 
these three types of argumentation: claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or 
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truthfulness. These three types of arguments, in turn, point to the notion of an ideal 
speech situation freed from all external constraints and in which nothing but the force of 
the better argument prevails. In an ideal speech situation, any argument considered valid 
must meet the conditions of reasoned exchange (i.e. discourse ethics). Discourse ethics 
represents an attempt to formulate this counterfactual ideal as a constitutive rule of 
argument for dialogical communication: norms of communicative action are only 
legitimate if, when challenged, they could be justified in a dialogical communication and 
this dialogical provide a formal procedural model of communication in the sense that it 
lays out the conditions that disallow particularistic interests from skewing the ideal speech 
situation. In addition, instead of laying out any substantive norms, diaogical 
communication also incorporates norms and maxims, which must be met if it is to be 
valid instead. (Habermas, 1991: 196-198) The main debates about his assumptions 
structure of arguments have focused on systematization and organization of validity 
claims and discourse ethics at times forces argumentative phenomena into pre-established 
categories, which do not create big room for seeing dialogical nuances and details of 
arguments. As far as argumentation process is concerned the need to bring dialogical 
open-endedness of utterances into the picture (and, hence, the need for an adequate 
explanation of what arguments is) can hardly be challenged. In addition, his 
systematization of theories of argumentation in relation to the types of validity claims 
offers a systemic theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. 
Ideal Speech Situation is a situation of symmetrical free speech in which all participants 
have an equal chance to employ speech acts. This means communication free from 
distortion and coercion. The conditions for an ideal speech situation refer to both 
linguistic and material circumstances expressed by discourse ethics. Discourse ethics is 
expressed in a theory of universalizability, parallel to the categorical imperative of Kant, 
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which is aimed to function as a principle of rational argumentation for testing the 
rightness of contested norms. (Habermas, 1990: 65) Rational argumentation, which is 
only produced through free and open exchange, involves two lines of communication, 
communicative action and strategic action (Habermas, 1979: 209). Strategic 
Communication—is purposive-rational and end oriented. It acknowledges no equal 
respect and communication can only be indirectly conditional from indicators to 
determination. It is a sub-species of purposive-rational action or instrumental rationality 
by which participants regard each other as means for reaching particular ends 
In contrast to strategic action, communicative action constitutes an independent and 
distinct type of telos that is not directly expressed or realized by interlocutors. It involves 
reaching equal respect and mutual understanding about something in the world. Thus, 
while strategic action is teleological or goal-oriented in a broad sense, in the 
communicative action is deontological. In the character of deontology, In acting 
communicatively, individuals more or less naively accept as valid the various claims raised 
with their utterance and mutually suppose that each is prepared to provide reasons for 
them should their validity be questioned. In other words, interlocutors tied more 
specifically to moral principles theory in two senses. They assume the priority of the right 
over the good. Their basic moral principle is specified in a way that they do not 
presuppose a specific conception of the good life since that would violate the very 
teleological character of communicative action. In a further sense, the distinction between 
strategic and communication is distinction between deontological and teleological 
presumptions. This is closely related to Kant’s distinction between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives. In this regard, Habermas argues for morality (discourse ethics) 
that consists of categorical imperatives (imperatives that do not require non-reason-based 
interests or desires). In ideal speech theory in connection to the discourse ethics, 
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Habermas accounts for the obligatory character of moral norms in terms of their relation 
to communicative action: valid norms are morally binding because of their intimate 
connection with processes of reasoning (Habermas, 1983: 109; 1990: 83-85). 
Unlike Habermas, Bakhtin does not offer strong sense of deontological theory, nor does 
he delineate communicative action along reasoning. It breaks with Habermas two-action 
model (strategic/communicative) and differentiates exclusively monological 
interpretation of the moralistic version of the principle of universalizability in favour of a 
carnival. Carnival Situation—is neither a deontological phenomenon nor simply a 
construct, but a freedom unavoidable in dialogue. It is a ‘fiction’ which is operatively 
effective in communication. It is a situation of free action in which all participants have 
an equal chance to employ their independent acts. This means interaction free from 
discourse ethics in which all the participants have a rational and agreement on effective 
rule of morality. The conditions for a carnivalistic situation are not linguistic in character, 
but rather social and material conditions. Bakhtin’s carnival situation can be seen 
autonomous communication among self-directed, responsible individuals  
In contrast to Bakhtin’s understanding of language and dialogue, Habermas theory of 
communicative action implies a very sense sense of rationality. For this scholar, dialogue 
cannot develop appropriately without reference to validity claims, without consideration 
of social facts, norms, beliefs and openness, without commitment to free and equal 
participation. (Habermas, 1991:58-59) Habermas’s account of dialogue has an objective 
force since it is derived from the fundamental presuppositions of rationalism. In this 
sense, his understanding constitutes a goal for discursive communication rather than a 
description of what dialogue entails, or what Bakhtin might call the exception. Even if 
Habermas’s characterizations of reasoning are too limited to preserve social and historical 
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specificity, the objective force of his claim stands: to communicate genuinely, one must 
achieve some sense of critical distance from one’s own position. 
In defining rationalism so broadly and failing to provide a specific description of validity, 
Bakhtin is certainly open to a greater degree of freedom. If rationality refers to different 
meanings in different contexts, there is no common basis for the resolution of 
differences. In that case, two different ideas about an issue may be incommensurable with 
no decisive factor to give one proposal priority over the other. Be that as it may, 
Bakhtin’s direction of dialogue is optimistic because it emphasizes openness and freedom 
through which development may occur. Bakhtin recognizes more space for free 
movement toward creativity, whatever that conception may incorporate. He 
demonstrates that commitment to spontaneity, which Habermas argues is necessary for 
all of discursive dialogue, can continue to be meaningful if conceived of in an open way.  
 
II.5. Conclusion 
Through a comparison between Habermas’ idea of communicative action and Bakhtin’s 
view of dialogue, I have revealed that the search for consensus or final and universal 
validation of views can be unattainable within the situation of dialogue. Dialogue is 
initiated and continued because of difference among the views of participants. It is 
initiated and continued because participants may view and experience situations 
differently from others. If there is a final consensus in dialogue, there cannot be 
difference—hence there can be a dialogue. Final validation of views in this sense must 
then be thought of as something that is never reached, as something that will perennially 
escape us.  
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The outcome of a successful dialogue is supposed to be a rational consensus. In other 
words, the participants have to suppose that rational consensus as belief can be achieved, 
whereby the notion of belief expresses the idealizing conditions: if only the 
argumentation could be conducted openly enough and continued long enough. Final 
validation of views through attendance of consensus is impossible, but simultaneously, 
one must presuppose its dialogical relationality to the agreement in order for dialogue and 
interaction to succeed. The problem with Habermas’ theory of language and 
communicative action is that he over-emphasizes that the condition of reasoned dialogue 
(that is, the idea of agreement or a final validation of views) is also the limit of interaction. 
He does not strongly comprehend that there is a persistent need for difference in 
dialogue, and that dialogue is shaped by the circumstances of difference and relies for its 
condition of possibility these circumstances. While we may find some highlights which 
underpin such problems, Habermas does not regard the consequences of such a scenario, 
especially when it comes to his theory of democracy. He often transfers the idea of 
universality and finality from language theory to communicative action as a bridging 
principle of deliberative democracy. 
Habermas seeks to ground his theory of communicative action and language in 
something more universal than a given context (as varying in space and time): he does so 
by grounding communicative in rationally based understandings of immanent conditions 
of ideal speech situation. (Tully 1999b: 101) As a result of this approach, Habermas’s 
theory, while mapping out the necessary conditions of the ideal - and thereby, democratic 
- speech community, is at the same time overtly universalistic in terms of the forms of 
communication that can be counted upon to foster the requisite capacities and 
motivations for engaging in utopian and abstract dialogue 
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Unlike Habermas, for Bakhtin the point of such dialogue is not to arrive at agreement on 
final validation of the views, but instead to promote exploration of being as event in 
terms of development of views and the exercise of judgment after having taken account 
of different viewpoints. This view of dialogue enables the self to emerge as other 
viewpoints are acknowledged. The importance of dialogue in which each participant 
becomes better able to consider each other own situation without relinquishing the 
uniqueness of its own situation or suppressing each other’s context dependent situation is 
underlined. 
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CHAPTER III. CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE AND DEMOCRACY 
III.1. Introduction 
Language is the medium through which the idea and practice of democracy operates. 
Language and the idea of democracy are coextensive. The idea of democracy first finds 
itself always within language, immersed in it, unable to extricate itself from the medium. 
All ideas about democracy are involved in language and various social and historical 
forces. Language is always already connected to democracy because the heteroglossia of 
language seeks to protect and sustain itself against unitary language or—ideology and/or 
a monolithic worldview that tries to in still homogeneity between people. For this reason, 
language and politics cannot be separated from each other; they are always connected. In 
this regard, any study of politics has to have a linguistic analysis of its own. Such an 
investigation should consider the idea of democracy not only as a politically constituted 
system of acts but also a multiplicity of linguistic activities or communication which 
consists of various expression in the terms of social dialects, characteristic group 
behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of groups and classes, 
languages of the authorities, exhibited in a heteroglossia of language. In other words, 
people think and through language. Their different social reality are represented by 
heteroglossia, a multiplicity of languages, which contains the collection of all the forms of 
social reality, or rhetorical modes that people use in the course of their daily lives. The 
source of democracy is heteroglossia of language. It tries to protect the differences 
among languages (or rhetorical modes) in order to present one heteroglossia of language. 
Democracy is not single system of norms, one standard language, or an “official” 
language, a standard language that everyone would have to use (and which would be 
enforced by various mechanism). It is dialogical process, formed through interaction of 
languages.  
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This chapter aims to explore this dialogical and formative relation between the 
heteroglossia of language and democracy. It argues that the conditions of democracy are 
not only social, political and material conditions in character, but also dialogical and 
linguistic conditions. Linguistic conditions of democracy do not allow people to become 
independent from language that they utilize. It posits a connection between expression 
and action or between utterances and doing, in time and space. At this point, my 
argument rests on the supposition that the action of language and the action of selves, 
and hence democracy go hand in hand. 
Lately, there has been a burgeoning of scholarship examining the concept of democracy 
in relation to the philosophy of language. A number of philosophers such as Jurgen 
Habermas often aspire to systematic accounts of language in order to explain democracy. 
This scholar attempts to describe the ideal speech situation of language. In essence, 
language theory is important for Habermas because his theory of democracy is predicated 
on an ideal speech situation. He grounds his conception of democracy on linguistically 
based understandings of the praxis of democracy. As a result of this foundation, 
Habermas’s theory of democracy, while charting out the necessary conditions of the ideal 
speech situation and thereby, democratic community is at the same time overtly 
dependent on a theory of language. A theory that explains what is required to foster the 
capacities and motivations for engaging in dialogical democracy. 
The focus on a theory of language is characteristic of both Habermas’s theory of a 
democratic speech community and Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism. Each scholar tries to 
describe conditions of language as the central praxis oriented towards democracy. 
However, there are differences between these two theories of language. In contrast to 
Habermas’ conception, Bakhtin proposes a more material and historical explanation of 
language. A number of his views can be contrasted with those of Habermas whose theory 
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incorporates rationalized views of language that not only examines the shape (or 
structure) of language, but also regards the manners in which people use language. 
Bakhtin’s theories of language focus primarily on the concept of dialogue. His dialogical 
notion of language is not identical to the Habermasian notion of ideal speech situation, 
although it is similar because it focuses on the idea of the social and material settings of 
dialogue, and the idea of interaction (consists of three elements: a speaker, a 
listener/respondent, and a relation between the two) inherent in it. The similarity extends 
to the fact that the Habermasian theory of language uses two poles: language as a system, 
and the rationality of the individual who employs it. For Bakhtin, both poles are reflective 
of monologic language—language that seems to be derived from a single, unified source. 
Bakhtin opposes monologic theories of language and instead stresses the importance of 
heteroglossia and polyglossia. 
In this regard, Bakhtin sees language as a viewpoint for the explanation and 
understanding of the dialogue. In his explanation, he places more emphasis on the 
practical meaning of language when it is utilized. His theory underpinned the poetic and 
rhetorical, the social and historical, the pluralistic, as well as the responsive and sensuous 
aspects of language that are apparent when it is utilized. He suggests that language is not 
something simply felt or experienced in isolation. Its meaning is responsively understood, 
in terms of the dialogical relations, it creates and in the responses, its communication calls 
out in others.  
Habermas has developed a philosophy of language along the lines of grammaticism as a 
body of generative or transformational rules for the construction of sentences and 
pragmatics as situating sentences used in interaction. The structures, which govern the 
generation of sentences, can be related, in Bakhtin’s terms, to the process of signification 
prior to utilization in the specificity of the dialogical act. Similarly, the structures for 
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situating sentences in any language use significations similar to Bakhtin’s concept of 
utterance. Despite their similarity, there are also differences between the Habermasian 
theory of language and Bakhtin’s philosophy of language. First, Habermas’s theory of 
language is closely connected to ordinary language as communicating a message or 
information by references to the external, social and subjective worlds in addition to 
universal pragmatics (this concept refers to the study of the universal aspects of reason 
embedded in language). In contrast to Habermas’s conception, Bakhtin’s philosophy of 
language is connected with literary language in general or the various categories of the 
prose such as novels and poems. However, he also contends that literary language is not 
represented in the novel as unitary, completely finished-off and indisputable—it is 
represented as a living mix of varied and opposing forces, developing and renewing itself. 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 48-49) Literary language is used in a fundamentally different way than is 
ordinary language.  
Literary language foregrounds certain features, which in themselves call attention to 
language not as an abstract system—sentences as decontextualized, lexical and 
grammatical forms but language use as situated within the framing context of dialogic 
interrelations. Thus, the special quality of language use differentiates it from abstract and 
systemic forms of language. It is not the structure which distinguishes language, but the 
way those structures foreground their distinctive use of language. If lexical and 
grammatical forms of language is designed to reduce a language to some sort of systemic 
order, literary language seeks to undermine the basis upon which that order rests. Literary 
languages often challenges the notion that all forms of linguistic activity are generated 
from within a rational center, advancing the more disturbing proposition that such 
centers are themselves to be grasped only dialogically as rhetorical constructions.  
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This chapter is organized into three sections. First, I provide a detailed summary of 
Habermas’s theory of language. Then I will analyze Bakhtin’s philosophy of language in 
order to ascertain to what extent Habermas’ position corresponds or departs from that of 
Bakhtin. In my summation, I hope not only to elucidate the fact that Bakhtin and 
Habermas’ views of language have a significant number of similarities as well differences 
but also to indicate how Bakhtin’s philosophy of language is more radical and critical for 
gaining insight into the conceptualization of the language of democracy democracy. 
Following on Bakhtin’s theory of language it can be suggested that the language of 
democracy is dialogic and polyvocal in two senses:  On the one hand, the language of 
democracy is not an neutral, impersonal and abstract system of normative forms divorced 
for social context but rather it exists in people’s voices, in people’s contexts, serving 
people’s intentions; it is from there that one take the language of democracy, and make it 
their own. Therefore, it is collection of the multiple language constituting heteroglot 
conceptions of world. On the other hand, the language of democracy is a responsive 
activity that is uttered in multiple voices in response to multiple voices and in anticipation 
of polyvocal responses. It simultaneously contains centripetal, centralizing, unitary and 
centrifugal, carnivalistic, differentiating discourses.  
 
III.2. Habermas’s Conception of Language 
In a series of influential essays, Habermas produced a very systematic analysis of language 
theory along with metatheoretic reflections on the basic concepts of language and 
explanations on the methodology of the linguistics. His analysis of language embraced 
two directions: an orientation to analysis of communication and an orientation to truth 
disclosure and emancipation. On these directions, on the one hand, he attempted to 
produce a reconstructive understanding of the way in which competent language users 
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employ sentences in various types of speech acts in order to relate to three domains of 
reality (e.g., external, internal and societal). On the other hand, he pursued a systematic 
critique of scientization of politics and increase in instrumental rationality of bureaucracy. 
Through these critiques, he wanted to open new prospects for new levels of democracy 
in complex, pluralist societies (Habermas, 1991: 201-202, 1992: 25 and 1995: 42-43). 
Habermas theory of language presupposes language as a medium for a kind of reaching 
understanding, in the course of which, through relating to external, internal and societal 
state of affairs (Habermas, 1993: 23 and 1995: 9-10). Therefore, he distinguishes three 
function of language in the world: pragmatic, expressive and interpersonal. Pragmatic 
function of language enables the people to link to an external state of affairs. The 
expressive function allows the people to focus on their internal nature. Interpersonal 
function allows people to establish societal relations. This language analysis of Habermas 
is reconstructive because it tries to reconstruct the rules (that constitute the 
communicative competence/intuitions to use language. It looks at the necessary belief 
that facilitates production of successful language usage, as contrast to an empirical study 
of actual situations of language use, as in, e.g., sociolinguistics. Habermas’ interest with 
social and political theory and the analysis of communicative action offer a kind of 
framework for not only his awareness in pragmatics but also his concern in practice of 
ideals speech situation and pluralist democracy. Therefore, in his view of communication, 
he takes the type of communicative action intended at reaching mutual understanding to 
be essential to pluralistic forms of democracy and treats insincere strategic or 
manipulative communication as impediment to human freedom. (Habermas, 1993: 24)  
In his theory of language, Habermas has depended a great deal upon the linguistic work 
of Austin, Dummet, Searle, Wittgenstein and Grice. (Habermas, 1992: 64-73) There are 
two approaches within the philosophy of language—pragmatics, and generative-
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transformational grammar—that are particularly influential in the Habermasian theory of 
language. Theorists such as Wittgenstein and Austin develop the first approach. They 
considered that the way language is used in interaction is the most important base of 
meaning. (Habermas, 1991: 10-11 and 1996c: 143-145) When people interact with each 
other, when they perform action in the various realms of the world together, they utilize 
language. From that action, people generate meanings and understanding of things and 
events with the facilitation of language and thus, they represent the world through these 
the meaning of things and events. Nevertheless, this formation of meaning and 
understanding has its origin in language use and the relationships that are established with 
language. For Habermas, the way to understand the relationships between language, 
people and the world is to study the way in which language is used, in terms of the, 
external, internal and social contexts from which it derives its signification. (Habermas, 
1991: 69) Habermas elaborates these context most fully in his theory of communicative 
competence, which holds that in a successful act of communication, the interlocutors 
have tacit agreement on five validity claims: that the language usage is true, that the 
interlocutor is sincere or truthful, that the use of language reply to the appropriate values, 
that it is fitting to the relation between interlocutors, and that it is understandable. From 
these claims, Habermas develops a notion of communication competency similar to 
Chomsky’s syntactic competency. Habermas’s concept of communicative competence 
refers to both generative or transformational grammar and set of rules that interlocutors 
mutually ascribe to one another in specific forms of communicative interaction. 
Habermas integrates Austin’s speech act and Chomsky’s notion of communication 
competence for reconstructing the rules that constitute the people competence to employ 
sentences in various types of speech acts in order to relate to three domains of reality. 
(Habermas, 1996c: 170-174 and 1995: 16-20) This reconstruction of rules for 
communicative competence implies a political project that, if achieved, would extend and 
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deepen democracy in a striking way, since they imply an ideal speech situation undistorted 
by domination, asymmetry and coercion. 
This reconstructive project recognizes that more is involved in theory of language than 
the grammatical comprehensibility of a sentence. Therefore, on the one level, it explores 
language in connection to syntactic structure and categories of langue and parole. On the 
other level, it tries to grasp the social structure of speech acts. It focus on ordinary 
language as the context within which general principles for understanding occurs. It 
examines structures of ordinary language in terms of the phrases and sentences, the ways 
expressions exhibit and contribute to meaning and the practices of communication in 
which the expressions find use. The study of the organization of phrases and sentences 
has been guided by Noam Chomsky’s cognitivist approach. (Habermas, 1995: 53) 
Habermas employed Chomskyan generative and transformative grammar as the first base 
for his theory of communicative competence. Communicative competence, he embraces, 
rise from a cognitive faculty whose structure is the proper subject matter of a theory of 
language because it allows people to understand meanings in different sentences and 
generate new sentences that are comprehensible to others. (Habermas, 1995: 26-33) 
Indeed, for Habermas, every ordinary language is organized in abstract linguistic 
structures in terms of phrases and sentences. All competent speakers have an innate 
understanding of phrases and sentences in the set of grammar rules. Habermas holds that 
communicative competence issues from a dedicated understanding of abstract structures 
in a cognitive faculty whose structure is the proper topic of linguistics. For this reason, 
Habermas construes the study of sentences and grammatical rules as attempts to uncover 
cognitive structures in terms of “communicative competence.” (Habermas, 1996c: 11) 
This communicative competence refers to a basic mastery of a particular language’s 
fundamental system of rules or grammar in order to employ sentences in communication. 
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This competence is a necessary initial step for the establishment of communication 
through the employment of language. 
Habermas has combined Chomsky’s systematic explanations of syntax as construction of 
sentences with universal rules known by all communicators, with semantics as the ways 
expressions exhibit and contribute to meaning; and pragmatics as the practices of 
communication in which the language finds use in his theory of communicative 
competence. Thus, Habermas’s theory of semantics can be seen as an incorporation of a 
variety of accounts in the meaning of the sentences. Among them, the formal semantic 
(truth-conditional) (Frege and Dummet), the intentionalist approach (Grice and Searle), 
and the use theories of meaning (Wittgenstein, Austin) are the important approaches of 
what constitutes the ability to understand meaning. (Habermas 1998: 57-64)  
In the light of these various approaches, Habermas suggests that when the person uses 
language three things occur. First, the linguistic structures of language -the syntactic rules 
or grammar, second the systematic relation between structures in a language and a space 
of potential meanings and third, the universal pragmatics of language action as language is 
used in a particular context (Habermas, 1995: 29-34). In this context, Habermas’s 
philosophy of language rests on theories of language, but not linguistics in the rather 
specialized sense that is often understood. His views not primarily concerned with the 
details of particular language utterances, but with the universal issues of form, structures 
of meaning and use that are common to all languages. As a universal framework for 
outlining a philosophy of language, he adopts and extends the conventional syntax theory 
of language. What distinguishes Habermas’s syntax theory from other levels of analysis is 
that it does not directly take into account interpretation or meaning. Firstly, it talks about 
the syntactic rules (or grammar) then it moves other subdivisions of language theory: 
semantics and pragmatics. Syntax is the rules of systematic and structural relation of 
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language. It not only determines the basic elements (letters, words sentence, etc.) but also 
truth conditions of language. At this point, Habermas move syntax theory to 
reformulation of Dummet’s truth-conditional dictum Dumett (1976) noted that 
understanding the meaning of a sentence is knowing under what conditions the sentence 
is true. Therefore, understanding an assertion contains notions of knowing what reasons 
a speaker can give for the truth of the utterance (e.g., interlocutors being able to know 
what would make the utterance true “Snow is white” and it being the case that snow is 
white). (Habermas, 1998: 68) Secondly, Habermas’ philosophy incorporates an 
intentionalist approach, which is developed by P. Grice. Through intentionalist 
approaches, Habermas finds the key to understanding in one’s ability to discern the 
communicative goals of speakers and writers or more directly in one’s ability to ‘pass’ 
linguistically, without censure. (Habermas 1998: 58-59) In relation to this view, Habermas 
see language as a rational, cooperative enterprise, and a vehicle for the transformation of 
information with strong connections to the intentional acts and aims of speakers. In 
terms of the intentionalist approach, his account draws attention to a number of 
conceptions of meaning formed as central strategies and tools for achieving 
communicative purposes. Thus, he focuses on the speaker’s position by analyzing 
linguistic meaning in terms of the goals and practices of speakers, and in terms of 
relations among communities of speakers. Thirdly, Habermas’s theory of language 
focuses on the use of a theory of meaning such as the one developed by Wittgenstein. 
(Habermas 1998: 46) The focus on the theory of language pertains to the meaning as 
embedded in social practices and relationships that are established by language. 
Understanding the meaning of sentences and words that are used in the communicative 
process requires a shared form of life. In other words, people need to have a set of 
common background assumptions and shared normative orientations - what Habermas 
calls the “lifeworld” - in order to keep language working as a communicative instrument. 
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(Habermas, 1991: 135-136) Thus, the communicative process emphasizes that the 
manner in which language is used in interaction is a more important source of meaning 
than the way the words signify the objects they represent because language use consists of 
the speaker’s intentions. (Habermas 1998: 62-64) 
By looking into the pragmatic structure of communication, Habermas conceives of 
language as the medium of three interrelating worlds: First, there is the external or 
objective world—the state of affairs in reality; secondly, there is the internal or social 
world of what the speaker expresses. Thirdly, there is the subjective world of what the 
speaker feels. (Habermas, 1995: 66-68) In the objective world, language is the medium of 
communication with things in the external world of reality. (Habermas 1998: 75-76) It 
consists of references to facts. It allows people to focus on the state of affairs of the 
reality. In this world, the interlocutor treats the object of discussion as having an 
independent existence and s/he attempts to issue a true statement in relation to these 
facts. In the social world, a language consists of reference to interactions of the people in 
the forms of norms, rules, and values of society. It initiates interpersonal relationships 
between people. In the subjective world, language consists of the “totality of experiences 
to which only one individual has privileged access.” (Habermas, 1984: 100 and 1998: 95-
96)) In this world, language mediates one’s experiences, desires and feelings; it makes 
one’s subjective world known to the others. Speech acts within the three worlds of 
language embody three contents. Initially, there is the propositional content. It is the 
factual sense of the speech act. It draws a parallelism between an objective world of 
things and the truth claim. Therefore, it is categorized as a constative speech act. 
Constative speech acts are expressed in an assertoric mode. They express truths of what 
is occurring or how things exist in the objective world. (Habermas 1995: 50-55) Secondly, 
there is the illocutionary content. It builds connections between the social world and the 
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rightness of a claim. (Habermas, 1996c: 180) It is categorized as a regulative speech act. 
Regulative speech acts involve the establishment of a regulated interpersonal relationship 
between interlocutors. They reveal normative rightness through appeals to interpersonal 
relations. (Habermas, 1995: 57-58) Thirdly, there is an expressive content. It builds 
connections between the subjective world of inner states and truthfulness/sincerity. It is 
categorized as an affirmative speech act. Affirmative speech acts involve disclosure of 
one’s own wishes, feelings, and intentions in reference to one’s own subjectivity. They 
expose sincerity. (Habermas 1995:58-59) 
Moving from speech acts to issues of communication, Habermas drew a series of 
distinctions between methods in which language functions in communication. It finds 
that communication in everyday life is directed to reach an understanding. Reaching 
understanding also implies rationally motivated agreement among participants that is 
measured against criticisable claims. Rational agreement is to Habermas a formal, 
abstract, but not idealized reconstruction of assumptions implicit in ordinary 
communications. According to Habermas, when speech acts are made in the context of 
ordinary communication within the three aforementioned worlds, there are three spaces 
of meaning which come into play simultaneously. Speech acts are at once objective, social 
and intersubjective. All domains, speech actions can be either consent-oriented’ (or 
communicative) and success-oriented (or strategic) actions; within the latter  
Communicative action is a self-governing type of action. It presumes speech acts as a 
medium for reaching an agreement or mutual understanding about something in the 
objective, social and subjective worlds. The aim of communicative action is reaching 
understanding, in the course of which participants equally raise validity claims that can be 
accepted. Communicative action exemplifies the different notion rationality as giving 
reasons for or against validity claims raised, challenging, accepting or rejecting claims of 
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others based on the better argument. It denotes a communicative practice for agreement 
and a mutual understanding. It also makes the communicative actor representative of two 
things in one body: an author, who shapes situations through actions for which one is 
responsible, and a subject of the transitions surrounding oneself, of society whose unity is 
based on solidarity to which one belongs, and of processes of socialization in which one 
is reared.  
There are four types of communicative actions based on different practices of rationality: 
teleological, constantive, normatively regulated and dramaturgical. Rationality of 
teleological action attempts to subordinate participants’ individual aims and interest for 
the goal of achieving a mutually shared understanding about the world (Habermas, 1996c: 
136-137) Rationality of constantive action attempts to ground truthfullnes of the claim on 
experience or state of affairs that has existed prior to the action itself (Habermas, 1996c: 
180-181). Rationality of normatively regulated action is oriented legitimation of the claims 
in accordance to established common values and traditional roles of society. (Habermas, 
1996c: 137-139) Rationality of dramaturgical action is oriented to self-expression of one’s 
authentic subjectivity for establishment of legitimate (or valid) interpersonal relations. 
(Habermas, 1991: 58-59 and 1996c: 139-143) 
Strategic action, by contrast, is purposive-rational action. It aims at influencing others for 
achieving some end. Therefore, it is oriented to success with instrumental use of 
language. It contains systemically distorted patterns of communication. Systemically 
distorted communication is ideological deception. It involves openly and hidden elements 
of expressions for reproducing belief systems that could not be validated if subjected to 
rational discourse. This is a situation of asymmetrically manipulated actions in which all 
participants have an effective inequality to take part in the dialogue. Strategic action is a 
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way of achieving rational domination through the coercive force of the argument. 
(Habermas 1995: 117-119 and 73-84) 
Habermas’ analysis on the rational processes of action leads to a rather strong idealization 
of the communicative action. Communicative action is oriented to achieving, sustaining 
and reviewing consensus that rests on the mutual recognition of validity claims. He 
describes four different types of validity claims that explicitly or implicitly correspond to 
the different types of speech acts and communicative action in connection with the 
different worlds (e.g., the external, the internal and the social) of language. In producing 
speech acts and participating communicative action, interlocutors at least implicitly raise 
four basic types of validity-claims: a claim to understandability raised in linguistic content of 
speech acts, a claim to truth raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative rightness 
raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to sincerity raised in expressive speech acts.  
A claim for understandability refers to speech acts that contain the linguistically intelligible 
truth. (Habermas 1991: 57-61) Truth raised in constative speech acts signifies 
propositional content of true statements with objectifying facts of external world. 
(Habermas, 1991: 60-61) A claim to normative rightness encloses situation of 
conformation in light of existing societal norms and values with the establishment of 
justifiable interpersonal relations (as guidance, suggestion, requests) in a regulative way 
(Habermas 1991: 58) A claim to sincerity refers to truthful expression of feeling and full 
disclosure of intentions as opposed to creating false apprehension, confuse issues and 
concealing information, attempting to give the wrong impression about others, or 
manipulating. (Habermas, 1991: 137) 
Habermas uses validity claims identify the notion of an ideal speech situation freed from 
all situations of inequality, coercion, and domination. More specifically, validity claims 
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mirror the rationality of communicative actions. Beginning with this rationality of 
communicative actions, which are built into the very fabric of language use, Habermas 
suggested that every language use has at least three orientations— objectivating, 
conforming and expressing. Operating within the domain of the external, the social and 
the intersubjective world, language use involves the expressive attitudes of participants 
who engage in a rational discourse to give and receive meaning. (Habermas, 1984: 42) 
This means that communicative agents are never directly related to individual validity 
claims; instead, they are almost indirectly related to validity claims through certain 
discourse. Here, discourse is understood as systemic patterns of particular rational action 
or argumentation that communicate with validity claims. By engaging communication in 
discourse, communicative agents seek to convince one another with arguments. 
(Habermas, 1991:197) This means that different validity claims require different means of 
rationality by which interlocutors deliberate whether a certain claim is valid. While there 
are four types of communicative action, each of which corresponds to different validity 
claims in reference to different types of speech act, they also corresponds to four 
different types of discourse: explicative, theoretical, practical, aesthetic and therapeutic. 
Explicative discourse, which includes issues of comprehensibility, is concerned with 
issues of comprehensibility of how arguments are to be understood. Theoretical 
discourse, which is related to the truth of propositions, involves both analytic-empirical 
discourse, and cognitive-rational discourse that are oriented to describing states of affairs 
in society. Practical discourse involves with the rightness of norms of action. (Habermas 
1991: 104-109) Therapeutic discourse addresses truthfulness or sincerity as the obligation 
to demonstrate that the stated intention behind the action is the actual motive in use.  
Habermas’ conceptions of discourse models can be seen as an attempt to reconstruct the 
terms political society which addresses norms and rules and external world that addresses 
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questions of truth and to clarify and define the difference how people perceive between 
analyzing a politics and knowing how a rationality of politics operates. Habermas adds 
other categories to include what people must understand about communicative processes 
and the language that produce both models of politics and rationalities. One of these 
categories is ideal speech situation. Habermas describes ideal speech situation as a pattern 
of a reciprocal communication freed from external constraints. It is a situation of 
symmetrical free dialogue in which all participants have an equal chance to utilize 
constantive, regulative, and representative speech acts. (Habermas 1995: 56-59) This also 
means discourse free from distorted communication in which all the participants have an 
effective equality of chances to take part in the dialogue. The conditions for an ideal 
speech situation do not only refer to linguistic circumstances but also social and material 
conditions. Habermas ideal sees speech situation as practical alternative to conventional 
models of democracy, a way of achieving ideal community of communication or rational 
consensus on public issues through the non-violent force of the better argument 
(Habermas, 1991: 201-202)  
This emphasis on the ideal speech situation leads to a rather strong idealization of the 
dialogue situation whereby people have an equal opportunity freely expressing their 
viewpoints. For Habermas, dialogue refers ideal community of communication or sharing 
experience that allows mutual examination each participant’s views about phenomena. It 
is situation of ideal speech that creates more refined and clarified understanding of the 
issue in question. It is systematic and reasoned examination of viewpoints that may 
contain the inconsistencies and contradictions between subject and object. In this 
examination, on the one hand, all participants presupposes agreement about implicitly 
raised validity claims as background consensus because of common definitions of a 
situation, on the other hand all of them have the equal opportunity to use constantive 
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(e.g., asserting, reporting, explaining and contesting), regulative (e.g., requests, warnings, 
recommendations, advice), and representative speech acts (e.g., reveal, expose, admit, 
express) for advancing their view points. 
The success of ideal speech situation depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on 
the fulfillment of linguistic conditions (e.g., communicative competence) and social and 
material conditions (that refers to a situation of general symmetry in which all 
interlocutors have and equal and unrestrained opportunity to engage in communication). 
Here linguistic conditions of ideal speech situation are associated with rules of 
transformative grammar for generating sentences. The task of transformative grammar is 
to identify communicative competence and reconstruct linguistic conditions of possible 
understanding. They are based on universal rules known by all communicative agents, 
regardless of culture, and other specific situations. Social material conditions of ideal 
speech are associated with notions of freedom, equality and regulative principles that 
govern the communication between communicative agents. The idea of freedom and 
equality refer to a situation in which all participants have symmetrical and unrestrained 
opportunities to engage in communicative action. In this situation, the power of 
reasoning is the only power. Reasoning is the tool that initiates participants to replace 
their beliefs (epistemic), and strategic actions (teleological) with meaning. It signifies a 
mode of transacting with (raising and accepting) validity claims. Like reasoning, regulative 
principles which are associated with rightness of action, creates inherent obligation to 
return to the normative context from which the interlocutors justifies the action If this 
justification does not expels all doubts on the validity of the regulative principles, validity 
of regulative principles is called into question for change. If regulative principles are 
justified, they create better opportunity for the thoughtful and deliberate examination of 
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underlying assumptions, views, values, or intentions of individuals with the formation of 
a rational consensus with respect to universality.  
Central to the view of ideal speech situation is not only the communicative competence 
and social and material conditions, taken together, generate for a rational agreement and 
mutual understanding, but discourse ethics as a rule of argumentation for testing the 
rightness of contested views and claims. Habermas build up the idea of discourse (or 
communicative) ethics as an important part of his theory of communicative action. It is 
projected to function as a rule of communication and expressed in a principle of 
universalizability of contested norms. This idea is similar Kant’s idea of categorical 
imperative. The first mean of the principle of universalizability is: 
Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that all affected can accept 
the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these 
consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities). 
(Habermas 1983: 65) 
 
The second meaning of the principle of universalizability is derived from the general 
pragmatic presuppositions of communication. (Habermas, 1991: 197) It is argued that 
that a norm, to be universal, must an outcome of ideal speech situation freed from 
inequality, coercion, and domination. This means that all communicatively competent 
people must have the ability to participate in a moral-practical discourse for introducing 
assertion and questioning assertion for constructing the norms. In making assertions, 
speakers at least implicitly raise different types of validity-claims - for example, claims to 
truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or truthfulness. These validity-claims, in turn, 
point to the rule argument in moral/practical discourse. Habermas understanding of  
moral/practical discourse include notion of formalistic ethics that derives its main 
features from Kant’s theory of ethics. Similar to Kant’s idea of ethics, it does not take for 
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granted particular substantive content beyond the idea of practical reason. In connection 
to the rule of practical reason, Habermas defines a formal procedure which any norm 
must satisfy if it is to be morally acceptable if, when it contested. It also assumes an 
independent order of moral facts with the priority of the right over the good. Therefore, 
Habermas does not presuppose a specific conception of the good life since that would 
violate the deontological commitment to Universalist position. Habermas suggest that 
rational interpretation of any phenomena can only be universally validated by testing 
against counter examples in historical (and geographical) contexts - not by using 
transcendental ontological assumptions. Norms are morally binding because of their 
intimate connection to people who are potentially affected by its implementation, directly 
participate in the communicative process for the validation of norms. (Habermas, 1983: 
109) If this is the case, people can or would freely come to an understanding and grant 
consent for approving certain rules as law in the process of communicative action. 
Naturally, those processes consist of the situation of the ideal speech. This means that the 
universal acceptability of law as a categorical imperative can only be established by 
participants through the communicative rationality of an ideal speech situation, whereby 
general acceptance of any norm occurs with a general agreement of participants or 
rational consensus, which makes a judgment as valid and legitimate. (Habermas, 1991: 
202) At the end, Habermas (1991:65) develops two principles for argumentation from 
two types of universal presuppositions of these communicative actions. First is the U 
principle:  
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (an these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation). 
Second is the D principle:   
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Only norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with approval of all affected 
in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. 
U and D principles, which are identified as bases of discourse ethics, are also a part of the 
reconstruction of the Kantian type deontological system which appeals to universal 
norms for determining rightness or wrongness of action rather than the consequences of 
action. The system of deontology, with which Habermas is concerned deals with the view 
that rightness of actions do not request the consequences of actions that are good but 
instead, appeals to a conformity with certain rules of duty. Deontological systems 
coincide with rules as criterion for judging rightness or wrongness of actions. This means 
that actions are made right or wrong because of discourse ethics that forbids or enjoys 
actions.  
In political communities, the system of the discourse ethics is backed by sanctions of 
institutional rules and procedures. The existence of procedures and institutional rules 
makes generally known right type of actions, which are conducive to public interests. 
Habermas believes that norms of discourse ethics are not only necessary for the 
production of continued stability about the communication process, but also imperative 
for the production of possible results for public interest. In the book Between Facts and 
Norms, Habermas incorporates the deontological scheme of discourse ethics into the legal 
and constitutional system with support of the deliberative concept of democracy. In this 
incorporation, Habermas emphasize strong connection between will of the people 
(democracy) and basic rights (constitution). Both democracy and constitution, which is 
consent oriented (communicative), include conception of right as public agreement 
achieved in the communication community. Moreover, by stressing the procedural 
dimensions of communicative reason Habermas develops a model of deliberative 
democracy that discards the liberal vision of the political process as primarily a process of 
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competition and aggregation of private preferences and republican vision of united 
citizenry that actively pursue the common good as the goal of achieving general will 
situation through a cooperative process of rational communication (Habermas, 1996b: 
310-315). At the same time, Habermas offers a model of weak and strong public with 
institutionalization of different forms and levels of communicative action with discourse 
ethics that produces for a rational will-formation and agreement (Habermas, 1996b: 274-
275). In Habermas deliberative model, while the weak public represents civil society as 
corresponding with informally organized public sphere ranging from private associations 
to the mass media, the strong public signifies political society as containing parliamentary 
bodies and other formally organized institutions (Habermas, 1996b: 360-373). In this 
division of labour, civil society identifies, interprets and address political issues for 
institutional politics while political society as formally organized political system produces 
decisions based on consensually grounded norms and laws and derived from the general 
communications and argumentations of civil society (Habermas 1996b: 369-373). 
 
III.3. Bakhtin’s Conception of Language 
In Bakhtin’s philosophy, the issue of language is a much broader notion than that usually 
associated with the linguistic terms in contemporary social science. In general, it is 
concerned more about the ways in which language is utilized and, when expressed, comes 
into contact with another participant. Therefore, emphasizes the use of language rather 
than abstract rules that systemically define structure of language. Bakhtin’s (1981: 293) 
portrayal of language has at least two key connotations. First, it indicates that language, as 
an utterance is essentially a matter of an active use of language rather than of abstract 
system of words and sentences. As Bakhtin (1981: 293) noted:  
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…language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a 
concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the ‘taste’ of 
a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular 
person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. 
 
Second, it designates language use as the operation of two contradictory forces—
centripetal and centrifugal—that tries to pull meaning in opposite directions. The 
centripetal (centralizing) tendency drives meaning towards some unified, concrete, final 
worldview. Therefore, Bakhtin (1981: 291) sees language as the hetereglot operation of 
multi-voiced discursive acts. 
Language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence 
of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, 
between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological 
groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth.  
 
In this context, his theory does not focus upon the structural analysis of language (of 
which word and sentence are a part) without considering the actual use of language, the 
social settings and historical context of which language is a part. (Bakhtin, 1986: 80,82 
and hirschkop, 1999: 6-12 and Holquist, 1990: 14-17, 40-42) Bakhtin sees virtually all 
language use as enclosing three basic functions: to represent things in the world, to 
convey meanings, and to generate new meanings for the representation of world and 
understanding. These functions may be termed the ‘polyvocal’ and the ‘dialogic’ functions 
of language, respectively. In this respect, Bakhtin points the way to understanding the 
generation of dialogicality, a relation that can occur on the elements of language as well as 
the inter-mental plane of communicating. Bakhtin argues that when language is 
dialogically active and heavily orientated toward serving a dialogic function, it cannot be 
adequately understood in terms of a structural and systemic uniformity. This is so because 
such structural uniformity presupposes that a fixed uniform use of language conveys 
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some constant information between input (sender) and output (receiver), whereas 
Bakhtin sees the use of language as dialogical and polyvocal activity 
Bakhtin’s view of functional dialogicality and polyvocality of language focuses the 
relationship of utterances that come into contact each other in the kind of reply to 
another voice’s language, an anticipation of another’s language. (Bakhtin, 1986:82-83) 
This dialogical relationship is initially perceived in the process of self-understanding. In 
Bakhtin’s view, self-understanding is a kind of dialogical process wherein the language of 
the later self is exposed to the concrete reality (i.e. context), language of the addresser or 
confronts the language of an earlier self. Each self speaks through a voice that is active 
only through language. (Bakhtin, 1993: 4-6) With these voices, language always invokes a 
responsive understanding, and this responsive understanding shapes what the voice of 
the individual addresser can utter. (Voloshinov, 1973: 102) This process of producing 
unique responsive understanding by uttering words involves a specific kind dialogicality 
of language. 
A second way deals with the idea that language is a kind of dialogic relationship that is 
manifested when voices come into contact in a kind of interaction and it is also associated 
with a particular set of cultural, historical and institutional settings. (Bakhtin 1986: 86-91) 
It is such settings that provide the ‘diaogical overtones’ mentioned by Bakhtin. (1986: 92) 
Since language also embodies the mediational means that shape responsive understanding 
in this view, the particular uses of language are also inherently shaped by the sociocultural 
setting in which they occur. Therefore, Bakhtin labels language as a social event. This 
event expresses a specific stratum of society (professional, age group, etc.) within a given 
political system at a given time. (Holquist and Emerson 1981: 430) It contains various 
discourses that are full of behavior and value systems that invoke united forms of 
language use. These discourses produce a complex unity of languages (social, cultural, 
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democratic and national languages, languages of the authorities of various circles, 
languages that serve the specific intentions within specific chronotope) and which equally 
embody a unity of attitudes or points of view about the world. This complex unity of 
languages is not merely a unity, however, but a dialogised unity of oneself with the other. 
This is important; it signifies that language is a social event due to the fact that the 
language which one utters is partly a reflection of someone else’s utterances and it only 
becomes the individual’s own when one fills the language, adapting it to one own 
semantic and expressive intention and fills it with intention and accent. (Bakhtin, 
1981:293) This means that every use of language is reflected in the practice of one voice 
(language) taking over another voice (language). For example, single concrete voices 
(language) employ social language, but they incorporate the expressions of another voice 
(language) in such a way that the second voice (language) can be heard as well, resulting in 
a ‘multi—voiced’ language. Thus, if a particular use of language reiterates the language of 
a particular social group by producing a particular use of language with a different 
intonation or in contexts that differ from those in which the original language occurred, 
the polyvocal effect derives from the simultaneous presence of two voices. Indeed, it is 
only if one hears both voices that a polyvocal effect is produced. Therefore, language is a 
form of multivoicedness that illustrates the kind or phenomena at issue when one is 
concerned with a basic issue arising out of Bakhtin’s work of language. (Bakhtin, 1981: 
282) 
For Bakhtin, every language use is full of dialogic qualities. This dialogic quality of 
languages represents reflexive responses. (Bakhtin, 1986: 92) This means that every use of 
language provokes a reply, anticipates new language use as well as semantic structures in 
the responsive way. For this reason, in Bakhtin’s view, language does not belong to a 
stable, self-identical system that resides in the mind or soul of the author-speaker or the 
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reader-listener. It does not obtain its full characteristics unless it is delivered as part of a 
semantic set of connections, which includes responsive chains of utterances, embedded 
in a differentiating dynamic web of past, present, and future, acts. This means that the 
value and the meaning of language are relative to its context of manifestation and its 
relation to another language in time and space. Language is always advanced as the 
outcome of a distinct function of interweaving chains of utterances and as such, 
expresses an answer to one or many languages, which in turn, pave the way for a 
particular usage of language. This concurrence of language with interweaving chains of 
utterances (which represent a conception of the world with traces of past and future) 
implies that language has a dialogical quality in relation to time and space or in a relation 
between an addresser and an addressee. A dialogical quality of language is established 
between a present utterance and a past utterance since the latter is variable by time and 
space (i.e. chronotope). (Bakhtin, 1981: 282-283) Language’s dialogical quality links its 
expressive dimension to an incomplete, mutual and distinct event. Bakhtin (1981: 270 – 
27) says:  
We are taking languages not as system of abstract grammatical categories, 
but rather languages as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, 
even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual 
understanding in all spheres of ideological life. 
 
This means that every use of language is a historically located event and evolves through 
joining with difference of meaning in its relation to another utterance or context. An 
utterance is always advanced as a function of other utterances and thus expresses an 
answer to one or many utterances, which preceded it. For this reason, a meaning in a new 
use of language can only be understood in reference to previously used language. 
Understanding of the meaning in language emerges in the dialogical relationship between 
one individual consciousness and another. Therefore, the meaning in language is 
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connected not to syntax, but to dialogue in time/space with understanding of addresser 
and addressee. (Bakhtin 1986: 82) The response of language use assimilates abstract 
elements such as the sentences and words into the conceptual system of the 
understanding, which reproduce it with new elements. Because every language use is 
produced with a living response within it, response is shaped by the changes of references 
of which language embodies. (Bakhtin 1986: 91) Thus, the language continuously resides 
in a dialogical relationship between the conceptual horizons of understandings of both 
addresser/addressee and addressee. Every instance of language use places the meaning in 
a hermeneutical relationship with the conceptual horizons of the addressee, whose 
expected response, in turn, anticipates a new response in the addresser. (Bakhtin, 1981: 
278-279) 
In Bakhtin’s view, the language is dialogical because the meaning that is embodied is in 
dialogue with the meaning of the other language that corresponds to it and which 
includes different discourses that operate in different times and spaces and in different 
social settings. Therefore, the same words and sentences of utterances can have divergent 
meanings when expressed in different situations of time and space to different 
addressees. (Bakhtin 1986: 170) No usage of language, which consists of utterances, can 
ever be repeated because it expresses a point of view in a certain context to a certain 
addressee. It is always only one of a kind of use in certain time and space. (Bakhtin, 1986: 
108) The use of language, which may contain the same words and sentences inevitably, 
becomes part of a different language use when moved from one context of use to 
another. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60) In other words, language is inherently material, historically 
located, and constructive. View points, expressed in language through utterances, are 
situated and positioned as outcomes of social and historical development. As an 
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interactive part of ongoing historical and social development, every use of language is 
exposed to different milieu of transformation and alteration dialogue. 
Bakhtin’s dialogical treatment of language suggests that they have particularly obvious or 
regularly overt markers attached to them. Often, there is a form, such as an utterance 
repeated a distinct dialect or vocabulary or the use of unique tense and aspect forms, that 
connects one form of language use to the other form. In considering elements of the 
same type of language use, Bakhtin posits relatively stabilized forms of language use. This 
position is elucidated in detail when he discusses his ideas about “speech genres.” 
(Bakhtin 1986: 79-81) 
Speech genres are portrayed primarily in terms of their representation to typical situations 
of speech communications. They are generic forms of language that typically correspond 
to expressions or rhetoric. (Bakhtin 1986: 87) They are also self-regulating social systems 
of language. Therefore, they represent potentiality of language to be unitary—that is, to 
contain expression from the same registers, dialects, or discourses. It represents 
centripetal forces, which pull towards centralization and unification—the kind of pull that 
is exerted by any strongly consolidated ideological system. This way it promotes common 
criteria for promoting particular modes of understanding and interpretation for individual 
judgment and evaluation. In other words, interpretation and understanding, which are a 
part of the language usage, are strongly shaped by speech genres that emerged as part of a 
specific historical moment in a unique social setting. One will understand and reply with 
various utterances according to the individuality of speech genres and individuality also 
with changes in time and space. 
Bakhtin’s theory of language makes the two phenomena (i.e. individual and society) and 
the two sets of criteria (i.e. difference and unity) analytically separate. These analytical 
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separations also emphasize how two distinct phenomena are thoroughly intertwined in 
the use of language. On the one hand, every use of language is marked by uniqueness of 
the event. This means that language is not to be regarded as a universal system of signs 
that relates to objects in a common or universal way, but languages should be envisioned 
as living systems that represent a world in distinct ways in every use because utterances 
which are involved in interaction or play between themselves or between themselves and 
subject, represent same object in a different way. On the other hand, language as a living 
system is marked by a unity of event. This is a unity of language that contains ideology, 
generic languages of social strata, and groups or the entire society as a whole. Therefore, 
all language use is involved in the centripetal, centralizing, and unitary with centrifugal, 
anarchic and differentiating. Unitary characteristics of language endorse a maximum of 
understanding between people who share ideologies and class background. It promotes a 
unity of society with cultural, social, and political centralization. The differentiating 
elements language supports pluralism and recognition of identities with intrusions of 
distinctive tastes, styles, and individuality into interplay of utterances. Therefore, it 
supports the individual with cultural, social and political decentralization. Language 
cannot, therefore, seen as s single abstract system of forms, as if it were exhibiting 
meanings in a self-identical way, but rather part of a dialogical and polyvocal activities 
none of which can be abstracted into a single system. These polyvocal and dialogical 
activities of language consists not only of the “taste of a profession, tendency, a party, a 
particular work, a particular person, a generation,” but also of “the contexts in which it 
has lived its socially charged life.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 293) This way Bakhtin’s grounds 
language in particular historical, social and cultural context of utterance. Unlike the 
structuralist notion of parole, Utterance refers to the idea of language used by people, in a 
specific circumstance, embedded in a context. That is to say, language is assemblage of 
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utterances that are uttered in multiple voices in response to multiple voices and in 
anticipation of polyvocal responses rather than abstract systems of forms. 
Bakhtin thought of language as composed of tastes expressive of various forms of life, 
exhibited in a multiplicity of forces. This conceptualization includes forces through which 
the language regimes are imposed at the same time that the interaction of utterances 
proceeds. Therefore, Bakhtin seek to distinguish a generic use of language. Regimes of 
language refer to rule-regulated activities of language as expressive of generic uses of 
languages. Bakhtin describes generic languages through patterns of speech genres. He 
makes a distinction between speech genres at two levels. Firstly, he describes primary 
genres that the social languages or jargons used by professionals or members of a social 
group in everyday conversation. Next, he describes secondary genres in terms of literary, 
legal, scientific, journalistic language and rhetoric. Through secondary genres, he primarily 
elaborates literary genres in terms of novel, parody, prose, drama and poetry. Bakhtin 
finds these genres in the fictional worlds of a narration. Among various genres, he 
discloses the polyphonic novel.  
A polyphonic novel is characterized by a new dialogical author’s position. That author is 
dialogically positioned alongside the characters in order to emphasize that no single point 
of view is privileged, restricted and/or finalized. It contains a particular form of dialogue 
among “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses” 
representing a variety of viewpoints. (Bakhtin 1981: 6) The author of the polyphonic 
novel, the characters, and the reader participate in the dialogue as equals, and each holds 
h/her ideological position in open contestation with no single position regarded as either 
privileged or viewed as representative of the truth. (Bakhtin, 1981: 315-316) Polyphony 
can also be seen as the free play of multiple languages wherein centripetal and centrifugal 
forces collide. (Bakhtin 1981: 486)  
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In contrast to dialogical characteristics of polyphonic novels, Bakhtin describes poetry as 
a secondary genre that accomplishes the task of cultural, national and political 
centralization with its employment of centripetal forces of language. It is meant to 
persuade, not to produce a dialogical effect because of its endowment of singular (i.e. 
monologic) language that only objectifies itself. According to Bakhtin, poetry operates in 
a closed system that is centered on the word that is fully infused with author’s intentions. 
Centripetal forces inherent in this language wipe away individuality of utterances. Rhythm 
itself interrupts the dialogical structure of language. It serves to strengthen and 
concentrate even further the unity and closed quality of the language and it does not enter 
into dialogue with different languages. Bakhtin also suggests that the language of the 
prose is the opposite of poetry. It is representative of centrifugal forces of language. 
As language makes the world dialogical, Bakhtin observes different forms of social 
speech, or rhetorical modes, that people use in the course of their daily lives. Language, in 
this sense, can be seen as an indistinctive socially shared activity; something is formed 
beyond any individual and forming particular social relationship within a historically 
determined situation. It is also material, filled with specific content, which is shaped by 
the addresser. The materiality of language contains a distinctive system of signs, tones, 
accents and jargons that carry out communication with generation of certain normative, 
political and ideological discourses or unique understandings of people. Existence 
between indistinctiveness and distinctiveness makes language not as a unique product of 
a producer but rather as mixture, which is given to a speaker. Therefore, Bakhtin argues 
that the object of the philosophy of language is not syntax with sentences and words but 
pragmatics, which provides detailed explanations of practical attitudes towards concrete 
situations. For this reason, Bakhtin’s theory of language emphasizes the intimate 
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connection between practical situations (i.e. social and historical context) and the use of 
language, which are defined as utterances. 
This pragmatic aspect of language theory has been developed into sophisticated theories 
about language and practice. Therefore, Bakhtin regards literary language as the 
explanatory tool for the use of language in connection to practical situations. Literary 
language, for him is the perfect place to represent the dialogical character of language in 
an interrelation of voices. The dialogical quality of literary language enables him to 
perceive language not an as abstract system of normative forms but rather as a concrete 
and complex mixture and as a worldview. This complex mixture of languages and 
worldviews is labeled a dialogized heteroglossia. (Bakhtin 1981: 295-96) 
Dialogized heteroglossia is “another’s speech in another’s language.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 324) 
It represents a view of each language from the perspective of another. It is expressed by 
not the authoritative voices but by the persuasive voices, which is half ours and half 
someone else’s. (Bakhtin 1981: 293) It suggests that individuals absorb languages through 
their own conceptual systems, which are themselves filled with specific objects and 
emotional expressions. Absorption of languages creates complex unities between one 
individual and another. Bakhtin (1981 293-294) says:  
 Language ... lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The 
word in language is half someone else’s ... the word does not exist in a 
neutral or impersonal language ... but rather it exists in other people’s 
mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions. 
 
This means that the language people use is already “half someone else’s.” At the 
beginning, it is in possession of particular person because it is filled with that person’s 
own intentions, meanings and understanding. (Bakhtin 1981: 294) However, when that 
person uses language for communication purposes, language immediately becomes filled 
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with the intention, meanings and understandings of an addressee. This means that a 
language resides neither in a particular person’s intention nor in what he/she expresses 
but at a point between that person’s intention and that of another.  
This dialogization of languages, dialogized heteroglossia, also occurs in a process of 
hybridization. Hybridization is “a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a 
single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different 
linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social 
differentiation or by some other factor.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 358) In Bakhtin’s specific 
heteroglot conception of the language, hybridization appears as dialogical devices to 
foster an expanded shared space between one another in the sense of negotiation, 
expression and juxtaposition. 
Bakhtin’s emphasis on heteroglossia and hybridization also represents the notion that 
language is not a closed form in abstraction, severed from any social or historical 
specificity, but instead it is a contextual, ideological and relational form that carries 
meaning only in relation to another language. It is always dialogical. It always includes the 
real or potential position of the addresser and addressee, the horizon (the meaning and 
values) and social and historical materiality. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117) Language, which is 
always in dialogue, sets a dual mode relationship between the addresser and the 
addressee. It contains the operation of both centripetal forces and centrifugal forces. To 
recap, centripetal force tends to push things toward a central point; centrifugal force 
tends to push things away from a central point and out in all directions. Centripetal 
forces, which are forces of regulation and discipline, operate with monologic. It makes 
language as something that comes from itself and refers to itself. It supports the 
hegemony and the dominant ideology as it forces languages in all of their various 
rhetorical modes (the cultural, the political, the economic) into one single system, 
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procedure of form, coming from one central position centralize to unify the language. 
(Bakhtin 1986: 270) It is represented by poetic language. And naturally, the centrifugal 
forces operate in the opposite direction. It is in dialogic form. It stimulates multiplicity 
with the inclusion of different styles, rhetorical strategies and vocabularies. It paves the 
way for non-hierarchic heteroglossia. It undermines all those discourses and genres 
whose power supports ideological uniformity and a forced respect for the established 
orders. It is represented by the novel, satire and prose. At the end, Bakhtin argues, every 
language use is marked by centrifugal (dialogic and heteroglotic, politically differentiating) 
as well as centripetal (monologic, politically unifying) forces. 
Moreover, by stressing the dialogical dimensions of language Bakhtin offers a model of 
dialogical politics that revolve among the alternatives of deliberative, liberal and 
republican. In particular, with the republican model, it rejects the vision of the political 
process as primarily a process of competition and aggregation of private preferences. The 
success dialogical politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry or on the 
institutionalization of the corresponding procedures or institutionalized deliberative 
processes with informally constituted public opinions but to the language which is 
dialogical and polyvocal explicitly recognize and support express multiple voices and 
perspectives. People can take part in the development of this language of democracy if 
they feel that their language and views are being represented, typically through a dialogical 
process. People are more likely to be able to question and correct the unified language of 
political community through a dialogical process that solicits and values the diverse voices 
of all of its interested parties. In this view, the processes of creation and negotiation of 
language of democracy become a means to an end, as well as an end in itself. Dialogism 
in language of democracy is thus paired with a complex mixture of language forces that 
moves language toward both unity and multiplicity. 
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III.4. A Contrast Between Conceptions of Language  
The most obvious difference between Habermas’s theory of language and Bakhtin’s 
philosophy of language is that the former wants to identify a regulative and universal 
conception of language while the latter takes language as a dialogical being that 
simultaneously assures unity and difference. Habermas captures an ideal speech situation 
in the context of what is rational, universal, norm-governed, consent-oriented and 
continual in instances of communicative action. Unlike Habermas, Bakhtin sees the 
dialogical quality of language as an active thing that may not necessarily be norm-
governed or consent-oriented. Bakhtin’s view of dialogical language deviates from 
Habermas’ view of communicative action in that the former theorists approach 
encapsulates the idea that participants take steps argumentatively in order to reach an 
understanding about something in the world. If Habermas’s validity claims are taken as a 
basis of communication, the dialogical quality of language cannot be effectively described.  
Habermas tries to develop an abstract, systemic, rational and consistent language theory 
that tries to oversee, predict, control, and govern every territory of language. While his 
theories of language and communicative action integrate various propositions into a 
single coherent system, he produces universalistic propositions such as discourse ethics 
from self-evident explanations, beliefs and suppositions. His propositions are predicated 
on the belief that the rationality and consistency of propositions corresponds to the 
validity of universalistic moral principles. While systematicity, rationality and consistency 
become primary values of Habermas’s theory of language and communicative actions, 
they also become important features of the monologism that the logic of his theories 
implies. In other words, there is a strong emphasis on the rationality, consistency and 
systematicity on structures of language and communicative action, which generates 
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monological constructions of language that is both the product of a single voice of 
rationalism and of being cast in terms of one coherent and self-validating reason. This is 
the case because firstly, rationality suspends multi voicedness to a single voice of reason, a 
reason that is assumed common to all people (universality). Secondly, rationality in 
Habermas’s theory of language is also about the coordination of propositions into a 
single coherent logic or structure that is free from practical concerns and contradictions. 
It does not provide options among which the components of a system (characters in 
novel) may become independent and choose their conceptions. In other words, it leaves 
no spaces for the polyphonic constituents of language systems. This also restricts 
dialogical accounts of a language’s narrow range. At both levels, Bakhtin’s theory of 
language deviates from Habermas theories of language because the former’s explanations 
challenge rational, abstract and structural theorizing. The Bakhtinian conception of 
language centers on the fact that words are actions and that languaging accomplishes 
things beyond describing them because all the conceptions are dialogical and multivoiced. 
Habermas’s theory of language is a more narrow philosophy of language since it attempts 
to integrate various propositions into a single, rational, consistent universalistic logic that 
supports abstract practices of power (such as eurocentrism); the urge to control, and 
govern ever-growing territories social, political and cultural life. (Tully 1999a: 107) In 
other words, in Habermas’s conceptualization, the logic of propositions corresponds to 
the logic of a certain world that may easily become independent from all concrete life 
situations. All concrete life situations are always larger than the logic of world that is 
described and theorized. At this point, Habermas’s theory is not open-ended and 
incomplete; therefore, it makes no room for the inclusion of difference. It does not 
provide options for differences, which certain members of a society may independently 
decide on their different conceptions of life. Because his theory is incorporates a formed 
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and strong idea of consent, he does not encourage difference and as such, leaves feasible 
spaces for the different members of cultural and political societies to live with the 
awareness of each other’s differences without surrendering their cultural worlds with 
different conceptions.  
In a dialogical field of social and cultural life, consensus cannot be expected nor 
demanded. Conceptual diversity and conflicts, even struggles over different interpretation 
life are constitutive of the multiple and ever emerging new realities of life, precisely 
because these conceptions subsist in dialogical processes. In order have consensus, 
different members of society have genuinely paying attention to each other’s views, 
values, and strong will to modify or alter their preconceived notions. If there is no strong 
will for change, then it can be difficult to convince people to follow procedures of 
communicative rationality and to agree with the consensus of the group. This means that 
consensuses can never be achieved because the participants can never fully transcend the 
presuppositions and preconditioning that they bring to the ideal speech situation of 
communicative action. For example, besides a will to overcome cultures with personal 
opinions and desires, there has to be a shared narrative or social reality. Ideal speech 
situations cannot be produced, transmitted, or understood without reference to that 
underlying shared reality. This includes both the mutual recognition as it enters the 
communicative action as well as the compatibility of languages and truth claims based on 
different social contexts of languages or epistemological paradigms. If there is an absence 
of mutual recognition and compatibility of languages, agreement as universality of an 
ideal speech situation can be difficult to achieve. In order to reach such universality in 
terms of agreement, ideal speech situations have to abstract communicative process away 
from the embedded, contingent, and predetermined aspects of human beings. If this is 
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case, then, Habermas’s ideal speech is in the position of losing contact with life 
altogether. This can lead to the denouncement of variety and richness of human diversity.  
In this context, the other the most obvious difference between Habermas’s Ideal Speech 
Situation and Bakhtin’s dialogue is that Habermas wants to describe a regulative model of 
the communicative situation. Thus, Habermas thinks it possible to detain what is 
universal, rule-governed, and repeat-able in instances of ideal communication. Unlike 
Habermas, Bakhtin has no such plea. As differently from Habermas identification of 
language with three general types of validity claims: a claim to truth raised in constative 
speech acts, a claim to normative rightness raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to 
truthfulness raised in expressive speech acts, Bakhtin takes language as a dialogical being, 
even as a becoming, simultaneously insuring a unity and difference. Bakhtin sees language 
as a living totality and not as an isolated abstraction; and he offers a dialogical 
understanding of language that has a practical and historical orientation. (Bakhtin, 1981: 
181-182) According to him, each speech act is situated within its unique, concrete 
context. Hence, it is phenomenological event.23 For Bakhtin, each speech act cannot be 
represented by abstract or idealized concepts, because as a performed act it holds a 
unique dialogical place within the architectonic whole, as a once-occurring event. 
(Bakhtin, 1993: 32) According to Bakhtin, a dialogic relationship of language is 
interpenetrated inside every utterance, even inside the individual word. In this particular 
conceptualization, as he often does, Bakhtin localizes his observations about the 
dialogical character of language to the literary language, which he sees is the perfect place 
to represent this dialogical interrelation of utterances and voices. In the realm of literary 
language, languages interact with each other in a variety of ways (involving dialogical lines 
with age, class, and family groups and socio-ideological parts of the past). Bakhtin (1981: 
                                                 
23 Michael Bernard-Donals has pointed out that the language theory of Bakhtin is decidedly shaped not only 
by the neo-Kantian milieu but also by phenomenology and Marxism (Bernard-Donals 1995) 
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291-292) stresses that languages intersect with each other in many different ways.” Each 
one of these languages represents “specific points of view on the world, forms for 
conceptualizing the life in language, specific world views, each differentiate by its 
meanings and values” – each encounters each other in a world of multiplicity. Therefore, 
while Habermas’ theory of language is oriented centripetal, centralizing, and universalistic 
understanding, Bakhtin’s philosophy of language is oriented toward centrifugal, 
carnivalistic, differentiating and polyvocal understanding. This difference between 
Habermas theory language and Bakhtin’s philosophy of language should be viewed as the 
clashing centers of meaning, contradictions, and complexities working within a decentred 
understanding of the world. This also involves a fine-tuning of distinction between 
language that is oriented toward systematic unity (consisting of instrumental and strategic 
action) and language, which is oriented toward dialogical action. 
From this point of view, Bakhtin not only posits as dialogical and polyvocal a dialogic 
understanding of language but also describes the condition of language in which such 
dialogical activity takes place. For Bakhtin, dialogism is the stimulating flow that brings 
heteroglossia to life. This view of language is itself centrifugal and decentralizing in its 
aspect. This decentralization is accomplished by heteroglossia, which is never perfectly in 
line with the intentionality of the communicative process. In order to make further 
provision for the dialogic nature of language alongside the centrifugal forces, Bakhtin’s 
philosophy of language also emphasize the centripetal forces (i.e., discourse and genre) 
that carry on their uninterrupted work for verbal-ideological centralization and 
unification. Bakhtin’s theory of language acknowledges the ineradicability of the play of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. Bakhtin supposes that neither truth nor understanding 
can ever be expressed in isolation. Bakhtin understands that every expression of 
viewpoints requires an alternative position to be articulated against, indeed contains 
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within itself this opposition. Therefore, he sees not only both centripetal and centrifugal 
forces of language are necessary for dialogue to function but also an understanding that 
requires liberating power of centrifugal forces to reach outside social constraints and 
negotiate entirely new bases. This way, Bakhtin endorse more strongly differentiating role 
centrifugal forces while Habermas support the role of centripetal forces (e.g. reason) for 
orienting communicative process toward reaching an agreement or mutual 
understanding. Generally, Bakhtin theory of language is dialogic, whereas Habermas 
theory of language is not because Habermas system of language tends move 
communicative elements towards the universal, the non-specific, decontextualization 
while Bakhtin’s view of language actually encourage dialogical activity in the terms 
heteroglossia  
In Bakhtin’s view, heteroglossia is the condition of dialogical activity, which encourages 
the mingling of languages. Heteroglossia, as organized in clashes of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, is not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the centralizing tendencies in the 
life of language, but is a heteroglossia deliberately opposed to truth claims as victory of 
centripetal forces of language. Bakhtin (1981: 272) suggests that  
Every utterance participates in the ‘unitary language’ (in its centripetal 
forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and 
historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces . . ..  The 
authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives 
and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as 
language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and 
accented as an individual utterance. 
 
It is mulitvoiceness, and aimed sharply against the centralized verbal and ideological life. 
It is heteroglossia that has also been dialogized. Dialogized heteroglossia is incorporated 
into the multiplicity of language, verbal-ideological belief systems, history and accidental 
and intentional use of multiple voices. Dialogized heteroglossia is active in incorporating 
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a double voicedness, diversity and multiplicity between one person or group and another 
in communicative process. In contrast to Habermas’s ideal speech situation, Bakhtin’s 
dialogical approach cannot be seen as an attempt to fix and unite meaning for universality 
but it can be more accurately viewed as a both locus or meeting point of differing 
meanings and differing points of view as well as the rise of multiplicity and difference. 
In contrast to Habermas’s analysis of cognitive and ordinary language and its emphasis 
on communicative competence, the primary source of Bakhtin’s analysis of language is 
literary language. Analysis of language through this source is important for Bakhtin 
because he wants to express the dialogical in the rhetorical triangle, which consists of 
addresser/author, addressee/reader, and hero. The influences between the three elements 
result in a complex dialogical interaction that is firstly, not characterized by charges of 
absolutism. Secondly, the interaction does not attempt to cement an unchanging meaning 
and hierarchy of values. In other words, Bakhtin does not want to insert particular 
language as the sole verbal and semantic center of the understanding of the world. By 
literary language, he means language in use or as a concrete act. Literary language takes on 
meaning at some specific historical moment in a social setting where it engages in an 
ongoing socially dialogic manner with a host of other languages. So literary language, 
which is a specific use of language, is dialogical and a continuation of the dialogues which 
preceded it, and of which it can also constitute a part.  
According to Bakhtin, the kaleidoscopic nature of literary language enables us to perceive 
in language that which escapes the systematicity of linguistics of communication and that, 
which concentrates, on the sphere of the unity and stability in terms of a grammar, or 
logic. Literary language operates in a sense in an open system, turning on meaning on 
multiple ways, the decentralizing image, which inserts specificity and dialogue; utterance 
itself forms the normal dialogical structure and serves to strengthen and concentrate even 
 136 
further on the dialogical communication. Therefore, literary language does not stand for a 
unitary, complete and incontestable structure; rather it is the play of forces; much as past 
and present or hero, reader and author. (Bakhtin, 1981: 49) Through the play of forces, 
literary language becomes the language of dialogical. It is the language of dialogical 
because, there is no authority to embrace objectivity.  
Literary language represents the multiple notion of dialogical in various ways. It 
represents dialogical not only as an exchange of voices of a hero, reader and author or a 
reciprocal relationship (having addresser and addressee, real or imagined) but also a 
relationship of utterances that are alive in context. This point brings us to the main theme 
flowing through Bakhtin’s philosophy of language. While Habermas, as we saw earlier, 
concentrated more on the rational form of language as an abstract system of expression 
in relation to norms, feelings and purposes, Bakhtin more so focuses on the social 
dynamics of utterances as they are uttered in a social and historical setting. He takes the 
specific concrete historical utterance as locus for understanding the dynamic and creative 
forces of the life of language. Seeing language as the interaction of the utterances from a 
social interaction perspective enables him to conceptualize language as akin to a living 
social act.  
When language is described as living acts, then meaning does not directly belong to 
language as either a stable or systemic element of communication. Nor does it reside in 
the comprehension of the addresser and addressee. Moreover, it goes beyond obtaining 
meaning—for in semiotics it is only in virtue of its position in a web of differential signs. 
Rather it belongs to an utterance in its position between speakers and is realized only in 
the process of active and responsive understanding. Every utterance in a way has its own 
multiple meanings, which has build up a certain amount of semantic and connotative 
information. Meaning is the effect of the interaction of utterances that are voiced 
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between addresser and addressee. So meaning that is expressed and represented by 
language is not something that is already given but rather is produced in the context of a 
specific, space-time communicative event of language. When uttering, an addresser uses 
words in a concrete narrow meaning but bears in mind everything this word possesses (at 
least everything the speaker knows about this word). Likewise, the addressee perceiving 
the word with its entire ‘belongings’, tries to ascertain the meaning the speaker implied, to 
decipher it with the help of the communicative context. Therefore, the interlocutors must 
install the dialogical connections with all the elements of the context in order to be 
understood and to understand each other. Still, of course, the most important thing is the 
dialogue between the interlocutors. Each utterance is somehow the product of mutual 
efforts of the participants of the conversation to establish understanding, to reach the 
productive communality of their verbal actions.  
 
III.5. Conclusion 
The theories of language of Habermas and Bakhtin offer different accounts of the 
content and characteristics of meaningful social action in and through language use. 
Different routes that these authors take lead them and their audiences to different 
viewpoints. In the case of the ideal speech situation, Habermas tries to develop a 
common unitary language within the system of linguistic and moralistic norms. On one 
hand, these norms constitute an abstract imperative. On the other hand, they appear to 
be the generative force of social and moralistic life, forces that struggle to overcome 
heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize viewpoints in terms of a search 
for consensus. What Habermas has in mind is an abstract linguistic and moralistic 
minimum of a common language, in the sense of a system of elementary forms 
guaranteeing a minimum level of comprehension in practical communication. Thus, on 
 138 
one hand, he regards languages as systems of abstract grammatical categories; on the 
other hand, he considers them as ideologically saturated worldviews. In contrast to 
Habermas’s logical, rule based, centered theory of language, Bakhtin’s theory of language 
emphasizes the decentring notion of the dialogue in order to grasp the complexity and 
multivoicedness of the language in the state of heteroglossia that is more or less alive. It 
gives more attention not to structural investigation of language (of which word and 
sentence are constituent parts) but to the use of languages that are dialogical as to-and-fro 
movement. This motion reflects a continual shifting between unity and difference in 
order to release various aspects of the language.  
Bakhtin also sees language as a transparent medium, which carries the addresser’s 
meaning to the addressee. Habermas views language as the medium of rationality of 
communication used by the participants to create mutual understanding. It mediates 
between the surface of the communicative action and its deep below-the-surface 
structures of communicative action. Therefore, the language theory of Jurgen Habermas 
has more of the centralizing tendencies of abstraction, systematicity and analytical rule 
making. In contrast to Habermas, Bakhtin’s theory of language is couched in dialogical 
relationship. This relationship determines and is determined by social and historical 
formations; in essence, it is a material production of a particular time and place and it has 
the world-view and understanding of addressee and addresser embedded within. In 
relation to this, he sees language as two-sided social and historical acts with the addresser 
on one side and addressee on the other. From this outlook meaning does not belong to 
any systematic of language, rather it belongs to use of language in relation to the positions 
between speakers 
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CHAPTER IV. SELF-GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY 
IV.1. Introduction 
An agreement on the conceptualization of democracy is a remote possibility, “first 
because of its very nature and, second, because for a long time it has been the stake in 
political debates and struggles.” (Castoriadis, 1997: 340) A direct translation from its 
original Greek connotation (i.e., demos and kratos, meaning, the power of the people) is 
not sufficiently helpful as this also calls into play a set of issues regarding the parameters 
and essence of power and how individuals living in a certain time and space can be 
conceptualized as people. Nevertheless, one who aims to discover the very notion 
democracy within the context of a concrete dialogical formation cannot avoid engaging 
conceptualizations of “power” and “people.” Common to almost all conceptions of 
power is the view of some kind of capacity to make choices towards determining one’s 
conditions in given situations. From this affirmative viewpoint, power is connected to the 
idea of freedom that one is supposed to have in attaining his/her desired ends. From a 
negative point of view, power is associated with conditions of limitations and types of 
imperative control. (Weber, 1947: 324-325) Weber defined the imperative control as “the 
probability that certain specific commands . . . from a given source will be obeyed by a 
given group of persons.” (Weber, 1948: 214) In introducing the concept of imperative 
control, Weber underlined the importance of the role of legitimate authority in the 
formation and pursuit of ends. Encountering these commonly held views on the notions 
of  “power” one can basically define self-government as limitation or power practice 
which makes citizens free to choose and to pursue their own ends and which are also 
subject to legitimate authority. (Castoriadis, 1997: 251) 
The practice of power can be classified within two analytical categories of politics: micro 
and macro. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe these as the micro (i.e. 
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molecular) and macro (i.e. molar) categories of politics. As these authors conceptualize 
the terms, one side of the coin is inextricably linked to the other. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987) Macropolitics results in a specific micropolitcal structure, while the micropolitical 
power in turn influences the structure of macropolitics. Macropolitics refers to the 
cohesive realm of ideology, parties, institutions, constitutions, and other formal 
arrangements that impose rules on everyday life. In contrast to macropolitics, 
micropolitics is the cohesive realm of the discourse that operates and evolves through 
linguistic and semiotic practices of communication. It is concentrated and widely 
operated. Similarly, up to this point in my discussion in the previous chapters, I have tried 
to conjecture the concept of dialogical democracy at two levels. The first is the micro 
level at which self-government is affected by particular modes of human social 
interaction, communication and language (i.e. a reciprocal relationship among voices). 
The second is the macro level where self-government exists in relation to the particular 
framework of structures and organizations, which empower and facilitate people, 
encourage relations of mutual respect and cooperation among them, and abate 
opportunities for domination.  
I maintain that at both the macro and micro levels of abstraction, the concept of self-
government not only fulfills the conditions of dialogical democracy but also provides a 
viewpoint regarding an overall understanding of the dialogical notion of democracy. 
Moreover, the concept of self-government helps one to ascertain how micropolitics is 
linked to macropolitics. Whether in micro or in macropolitics, democracy can be said to 
exist in so far as people are the authors of their own actions and the source of their own 
power and law. For democracy to characterize the essential moments of politics, people 
must be the object of their actions and the subject of their laws at each level. This means 
that they must possess a capacity for self-government. Two conditions warrant the 
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materialization of self-government at both the individual and collective levels. First, 
persons must be free from any influence that may drive them to give up their inherent 
authority. Second, officials and institutions that are authorized to use political power in 
order to reach collective decisions in the name of the people must be continually held 
responsible for their actions. The second condition follows through the proviso that in a 
state of self-government, people are not only the authors of political power but also the 
subjects of their own power because they, in one way or another, authorize the use of 
power over themselves. In doing so, they give their consent to the conduct of self-
governance as parts of an individual and collective source and structure of political 
power. 
In this chapter, first, I will elaborate on the accounts of self-government put forward by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. These conceptions will help us to 
understand the requirements of democracy at the macropolitics level. Rousseau and Kant 
made significant contributions to political theory as they clarified some of the central 
tenets of self-government and their relation to democracy. Rousseau showed how people 
have gained a new form of freedom by participating in the social contract viewed as the 
negative image of the state of nature. The form of freedom that is by the social contract is 
characterized by rationality and the ability to be the author of laws that one is subject to. 
According to Rousseau, this freedom can only be gained by being a member of a body 
politic, becoming a part of the sovereign, and obeying the government that executes the 
general will as expressed in abstract laws. If people break the law or refuse to comply with 
the authority of the state, they destroy the very institution of self-government that has 
made their freedom possible in the first place. By forcing people to comply with the 
authority of the state and the law, the state would only be forcing people to hold on to 
their own true will: hence, there exists civil freedom. In contrast to Rousseau, Kant 
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defines freedom as the will and rational ability to form one’s own laws. He states that 
people are not free if they follow the demands of their inclinations, if external forces 
determine their will or if they make deliberate calculations about the probable 
consequences of their action. He suggests that freedom is possible only in the following 
instances; if people follow categorical imperatives, if they choose maxims that can be 
accepted as universal laws, if they are living in a “state of autonomy”—that is, a will that 
constitute laws for themselves by the use of reason. Thus, according to Kant, people are 
in a state of self-government only if they are the subjects and authors of categorical 
imperatives. Sure enough, this account of self-government makes sense only within 
Kant’s system of concepts. Therefore, a basic overview of Kant’s philosophical system is 
inevitable. 
In the second part of this chapter, I shall scrutinize the very notion of self-government 
with respect to the realm of micro flows of meaning residing in a continuous stream of 
heteroglottic dialogue. I shall reflect on dialogue as a process of negotiations within an 
ever-widening circle of human self-identifications and self-determinations. In this 
context, first, I shall explore the meaning of the self as conceived by Bakhtin. Penetrating 
the meaning inherent in Bakthin’s concept of the self, I aim to develop a broad picture of 
the individual who participates in the dialogical process; and, based on this exploration, I 
will offer a particular formulation of self-government. In essence, it will be advanced as a 
reciprocal relationship between “I” and “me,” addresser and addressee, and between ruler 
and ruled. It will be apparent that this clarification of self-government at the micro 
interaction level can provide valuable insights into the notions of self-government 
suggested by Rousseau and Kant for a political system to have democracy as its central 
axis.  
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IV.2. Rousseau’s Conception of Self-Government 
Rousseau’s view of self-government flows with an interchangeable use of terms: people, 
citizens, subjects, power, state and sovereign. His emphasis on the different connotations of 
otherwise interchangeably usable terms (as noted previously all refer to the republic or to the 
body politic) are extremely important for understanding the self-governing characteristic of 
dialogical democracy. As noted previously, even for a minimum definition of both self-
government and democracy, one must elaborate on the meanings of people and power. 
This follows from the assertion that democracy is a regime of self-government by virtue 
of which people are empowered to make decisions to the effect of materializing their very 
interests. Thus, it can be argued that in order for a political regime to contain the main 
character of self-government, the problems of collective choice and social choice must be 
resolved. The problem of collective choice is about “by whom the decision is taken”; and 
to tackle this problem, the concepts of people, citizens and subjects must be “precisely” 
distinguished from each other. The problem of social choice is about “whose interest the 
decision serves”; and to cope with this problem; the concepts of power, state and sovereign 
must be differentiated from each other. At this point, I will briefly expand upon 
Rousseau’s suggestions regarding the precise meanings of these terms and also the 
relationship among them in order to construct a general framework for determining the 
democratic potentials and limitations of a political regime.         
To begin, we must note that the social contract refers to the renouncement of some 
“natural liberties” individuals have in order to constitute a political authority to which 
they subject themselves. (Rousseau, 1988: 94-96) This may also refer to a departure of 
people from a State of Nature to form an association and the body politic for securing 
peaceful coexistence. (Rousseau, 1988: 92-93) Rousseau describes the State of Nature as a 
 144 
situation of free will (absolute freedom) and as an absence of any civil authority. 
(Rousseau, 1988: 15-16) This means that people are born free and hence are unbounded 
to do whatever they want without any kind of restraints; their actions are only guided by 
instant instincts, impulses and desires. They are little different from animals because their 
actions are not determined by an ability to be rational and moral. For this reason, 
Rousseau suggests that in the State of Nature, people may appear to be free but they 
remain a greater slave to their own instincts and impulses. This means that in the State of 
Nature, people enjoy absolute freedom, as there is no will to govern them. However, 
because they are moved by instincts and impulses, they may be the subject of oppression 
and the practice of violence. In essence, there exists no authority that can protect them 
and ensure their freedom. Given the conditions of absolute freedom, where one person’s 
action is not restrained and he or she is free to do whatever he or she wants, the security 
and well-being of the people cannot be ensured. The security and well-being of 
individuals depends upon the conduct of their actions. In other words, personal security, 
arguably, requires authoritatively imposed constraints on absolute freedom. If there are 
no constraints on absolute freedom, then one’s security and well-being cannot be 
ensured, hence, one is not free and one lies in chains everywhere. (Rousseau, 1988: 85) 
If one is to be secure and free, absolute freedom must be restrained; and, again arguably, 
the constraints will not be effective unless they are imposed by an agency that is 
recognized as authoritative. Nevertheless, if such constraints are necessary, how could 
one associate in a way that accommodates concerns rooted in self-government? How 
could individuals combine for security, while obeying only himself/herself and so 
remaining as free as before? How is it possible to combine authority, which provides 
protection, with freedom, which consists in giving the law to one’s self. The state of 
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nature is exemplified by certain characteristics that necessitate the political authority of 
individuals.  
Rousseau believes that the State of Nature is characterized by problems of absolute 
freedom. This condition motivates people to pull themselves out of insecurity by agreeing 
among themselves to form a social contract. By putting forward a social contract, people 
hope to secure the freedom that should accompany a cooperative life in society. This 
freedom is tempered by an agreement not to harm one’s associates, but this restraint 
leads people to self-government and to be good and rational. With the contract comes a 
new type of freedom called civic freedom. By agreeing to live together and look out for 
one another, a person is not only born free but also learns to be free, and tempers his/her 
brute instincts. Thus, Rousseau’s idea of “man is born free” has special significance, 
because it reflects freedom as the faculty (i.e. rationality) that constitutes the specific 
difference between man and other animals. (Rousseau, 1988: 85) Rationality is the quality 
of being a free agent. In the natural world, every animal is governed by instincts. For 
animals, the need to survive and to live well is realized and built through the order of 
nature. In contrast to animals, people encounter the same impression, but they realize 
themselves as free to resist the order of nature in terms of instincts. The specific 
difference between people and other animals are their rational capacity to live free. For 
Rousseau, individuals can truly be free and live well if they do not act on instincts, desires 
and passions. Freedom, like the faculty of rationality, is part of their nature, even when 
they alienate their liberty and make themselves subject to authority. (Rousseau, 1988: 88) 
Freedom that belongs to the people has a special moral significance for Rousseau. In 
enjoying freedom, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities through rights and 
obligations. For him, “to renounce liberty is to renounce one’s humanity, the rights of 
humanity and even its duties.” (Rousseau, 1988: 89)  
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For this reason, Rousseau clearly sees the necessity for protecting freedom. This means 
that if a person begins in a natural state in which one is entirely free, yet because one’s 
freedom has no protector, one’s freedom can be subjected to brute force. Thus, if one’s 
freedom is not protected, then there is no availability of freedom to anyone. The only 
way to protect freedom and secure one’s well-being is to create a force that cannot be 
overpowered. This force can arise only where several persons come together. This force 
is created by a social contract, which is an act of association to form an artificial body, the 
political society with body politic. (Rousseau, 1988: 44-46) Parties to the social contract 
come to an agreement to relinquish their freedom to constitute a sovereign with the right 
to exercise power with the intention of establishing s system of imperative control. 
(Rousseau, 1988: 103)  
Nevertheless, the exercise of power cannot derive its legitimacy from any private person -
however magnificent this person might be- or from any tradition -however cherished it 
might be by a person or group- it can only rest on a formal rational basis. In this very 
sense, the body politic is an entity beyond the sphere of society because the latter is the 
realm of “private” institutions such as family, professional associations, political parties, 
classes, ethnic and religious communities and associations. The recognition of this very 
principle appears to be the precondition of the social contract and, hence, it can be called 
the tacit element in the contract. In other words, it exist as a tacit solidarity among the 
parties, imagined or real, as to the supremacy of the general will that gains formal public 
authority with the contract. (Rousseau, 1988: 93) This amounts to saying that the general 
will, in order for being the unifying building block of the body politic, must be recognized 
at all times. Only given this condition, the body politic can act as the sovereign when it is 
creating laws, and, hence, exercising the general will. The sovereignty of body politic is 
important because the legislative power is granted to the sovereign, which is consisted of 
 147 
all contracting parties. In other words, sovereign is the ultimate authority to legislate, 
whose execution of the general will gives direction to the executive organ, i.e. the 
government. In this sense, the sovereignty of body politic has utmost significance in 
providing a base of self-government to the state because in the absence of a sovereign 
body politic the state cannot gain legitimacy characterized by the rule of law. (Rousseau, 
1988: 98)  
In this manner Rousseau conceived self-government as body politic not only as result of the 
agreement of all “private” bodies that recognize “the supreme control of the general will” 
over them but also as a means of uniting separate powers of people in a sum of forces 
strong enough to overcome resistance and uniting people enough so that their powers are 
directed by a single motive and act. It is body politic to which people totally and voluntarily 
alienate themselves for the purpose of using this sum of forces for the protection of each 
member, including oneself. (Rousseau 1988: 92) Rousseau (1988: 93) says:  
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the 
supreme control of the general will, and, as a body, we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole. 
 
For Rousseau, the very idea of self-government refers not only to a departure from the 
state of absolute freedom but also to the power of a people to give unto itself law. 
Without body politics, any concept of self-government is useless because it would exist 
solely at the will of those in power. (Arendt, 1977:165) Rousseau suggest that the goal of 
the body politic is to set up a form of established order (i.e. state) that protects the freedom 
of each citizen without significantly depriving the freedom one has enjoyed in the natural 
state. In other words, the body politic essentially attempts to reconcile an individual’s 
freedom with the existence of the state, and in particular with the state’s authority to 
create and enforce laws. Rousseau (1988: 92) sets out this issue as to “find a form of 
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association that defends and protects the person and passions of each associate with all 
common strength, and by means of each person, joining forces with all, nevertheless 
obeys only himself and remains as free as before.” This is Rousseau’s description of self-
government, which is initiated by the social contract, formed by the body politic and 
implemented by the rule of general will. (e.g., sovereign) 
The body politic, which is composed of every individual who agrees to the contract, is the 
unifying force behind self-government. Body politic unites the separate wills of people in 
such way that a public person emerges as a single motive and acts together (i.e. general 
will). Hence it seeks the general will and enables it to rise. Thus, when one person enters 
into a body politic, one participates in the creation of the general will and supports its 
longevity. In return, the body politic provides protection without subordination to any 
particular will because it is representative of the sovereign. Gaining its being wholly from 
the social contract, the body politic can never alienate any part of itself, or submit itself to 
another sovereign other than the people. It only binds itself to the original consent of the 
people. The body politic cannot represent any will that is contrary to the will of the people 
(i.e. general will) because it is united with the one body of people who created it. 
Accordingly, body politic as sovereign power cannot hurt any of its subjects, because it is 
impossible for the body to have the aspiration to hurt all of its creators. Thus, Rousseau 
believes that the body politic expressed through the exercise of the general will have two 
forms: the sovereign and the state. The body politic is acting as a sovereign when it authors 
laws. It is acting as a state when it is under the rule of law. More specifically, Rousseau 
(1988: 93) describes:  
In place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of 
association at once produces a collective and artificial body, composed of 
as many members as the assembly has votes, which receives from this 
same act its unity, its collective self, its life and its will. This public 
person, which is thus formed by the union of all the other persons, 
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formerly took the name of city and now takes that of republic or body politic, 
and its members called it a state when it is passive, as sovereign when it is 
active, and a power when comparing it to others of its kind. As for the 
associates, they collectively take the name of people, and individually, they 
are called citizens when they participate in the sovereign authority, and 
subjects when they are subject to the laws of the State. But these terms are 
often confused and taken one for another; it is enough to know how to 
distinguish them when they are used with absolute precision. 
 
This description demonstrates that the act of political association consist of actions 
between the public and individuals in the sphere of the body politic, and that each 
individual, in agreeing with oneself, is constrained in a threefold authority; as agreeing 
with oneself, one is bound to oneself, as an associate of the people (i.e. sovereign), one is 
bound to other associates, and as a constituent of the general will to the sovereign (i.e. the 
state). In this description, the sovereign is the body politic where people act collectively. It 
cannot be represented, divided, or broken up in any way: only when all the people act 
collectively can there be a sovereign. The sovereign authors laws as an abstract reflection 
of the general will and then orders the state to enforce these laws. To clarify, the body is 
composed of the state and sovereign — it is just acting in different functions. 
Furthermore, the exercise of the body politic and consequently any act of sovereign and 
state is an exercise of the general will. Rousseau sees that the general will not be an 
aggregate of particular wills or the sum total of individual desires, but a will of all or the 
unity of the numerous wills of all persons who live in a society. (Rousseau, 1988: 100-
101) It is a universal category and, hence, it appeals not to personal interests but to the 
common interests of the people as a whole.  
In Rousseau’s view, the sovereign is not a legislature of elected representatives as we see 
today, but rather an assembly composed of each citizen of the body politic. Rousseau does 
not believe that freedom could exist in a representative legislature, as the result would be 
the alienation of sovereignty. For Rousseau, sovereignty is inalienable because, by its very 
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identity, it is derived from the will of all, hence, general will. (Rousseau, 1988: 94-95) 
Additionally, sovereignty, in order to be applied to all, must be derived from all. Thus, 
any exercise of the sovereign will cannot emerge from a detachment of association 
(namely, elected representatives or government). If it detaches itself from the collective 
action of the people, it not only makes the body politic become unlawful, it denies freedom 
for the people because freedom is the capability of the citizenry to give itself law. Without 
the ability to give itself law, any notion of freedom is worthless because it would exist 
exclusively at the will of those in power.  
Another of Rousseau’s understandings of self-government deals with a reconciliation of 
individual freedom with the unity of people as it appears in the relationship between the 
subject and the republic. Rousseau defines the republic as a state ruled by the law. 
(Rousseau 1998: 107) The subject is an individual who complies with the orders of the 
state. The orders of the state are laws that are authored by the sovereign. (Rousseau, 
1988: 93) A subject is also a citizen who is a participant in the body politic that is taking part 
in the activities of the sovereign. Rousseau calls the collective grouping of all citizens the 
“sovereign,” and claims that it should be considered in many ways to be like an sovereign 
power of individual person (Rousseau, 1988: 103).  
A self-governing republic is an ideal state in which the general will is equal to the will of 
all. Not only does this mean that everyone in association recognizes the common interest 
of the body politic, it also means that everyone pursues the general will in exactly the 
same way. This means that a subject, who acts upon laws, is obeying himself. Thus, by 
acting upon laws and, hence, obeying the government, the subject is obeying the 
sovereign, which means that the subject is upholding the general will. In an ideal state, 
each subject’s will is definitively the general will, and the subject becomes sovereign. In 
particular, under Rousseau’s republic, what each person accepts as sovereign is not the 
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will of any individual or collections of individuals, but the general will that represent the 
will of all. The sovereign is a collective being constituted by a collection of persons who 
share an understanding of the common good and accept the authority of that general will 
in matters of collective decision-making. So, the general will is such not simply in that it 
comes from all, but in that it is by its character heading for the interests of all: its 
substance is universal. Thus, if an ideal republic is governed by a general will, each person 
governs him/herself.  
In the ideal republic, all persons equally play a part in the creation of laws to which all will 
equally be subject. In other words, individual freedom is reconciled with the unity of 
society by a form of direct, participatory democracy. For him, individuals are citizens 
insofar as they participate in the making of laws and their own state, based on their 
ascertaining of the general will, and they are subjects insofar as they must give obedience 
to that same law and authority of the identical state. For Rousseau, freedom and 
subjection to authority go together thus, but in a way, that makes it a concept of self-
government.   
In a republic, the general will find its clearest expression in the general and abstract laws 
of the state. (Rousseau, 1988: 105-107) All laws ensure liberty and equality: beyond that, 
they may vary depending on local circumstances. While the sovereign exercises legislative 
power by means of the laws, states also need a government to exercise executive power. 
The act of government is the execution of the law, which also is the execution of the 
General Will by the government. The government is not distinct from the sovereign, and 
the two are almost always in unity. (Rousseau, 1988: 121) This unity is instructed by the 
unity of all the people (eg. general will). The people exercise their sovereignty by meeting 
in regular, periodic assemblies. It is important to attend these assemblies, because 
attendance is essential to give rise to the general will. When citizens elect representatives, 
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the general will cannot appear. When voting in assemblies, people should not vote for 
their personal interests, but for what they believe is the common good. In a republic, the 
results of these votes should move toward elements of unanimous consent. (Rousseau, 
1988: 151) In such a situation, Rousseau presupposes that all people have agreed to the 
rule of the majority, as there would be no disagreement if all laws were approved by 
unanimous consent. In order to be legitimate, the use of the rule of the majority itself 
must be agreed to unanimously. He believes that majority rule is a way to treat people as 
equals and free because it represents a fair system of collective choice. Furthermore, 
majority rule is the best way of settling disagreements about what the laws, as abstract 
expressions of the general will, should be. (Rousseau, 1988: 153)  
Rousseau suggests that if there are long discussions and disagreements, this may engender 
the superiority of particular interests and the decline of the public. However, if more 
dialogue happens, that is, the nearer opinion approaches unanimity, the greater is the 
dominance of the general will. (Rousseau, 1988: 152) Nevertheless, at this point, 
Rousseau reveals the problem of those who vote differently from the majority. In other 
words, if one is sovereign only when one authors laws, what happens when laws are 
passed by a majority which one voted against, or how can persons can be both free and 
forced to conform to a set of wills that are not of their own making? How are the 
opponents at once free and subject to laws to which they have not agreed?  
Rousseau’s answer to the problem is complex. Rousseau believes that the citizens of the 
republic give their consent to all the laws, including those, which are passed in spite of 
their agreement, and even those, which restrain one when one has refused to comply with 
them. The continuous will of all the subjects of the state is the general will; by virtue of it, 
they are self-governing and they are free. When in the assembly of a republic, a law or 
policy proposal is anticipated. What is requested from the people is not exactly whether 
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they confirm or reject the proposed law or policy, but that they ponder its merits to 
ascertain whether it is in agreement with the general will, which is their will. Each 
participant in the body politic, or assembly, taking part in a ballot, expresses his or her view 
on that proposed law or issue; and the general will comes into force by the mere counting 
of votes. He suggests that if people vote differently from the majority, if their private will 
wins through, they are mistaken. (Rousseau, 1988: 101 and 118-122) They are not the 
winning side, either they pursued their self-interests rather than the common good or 
they have done something other than what they wanted. They are simply in error with 
respect to their notion of the general will, which is universal. It is then that they would 
not have been free. To restate the point, they would have done what they were not 
willing to do and would thus not be in a state of self-government. In fact, he meant that 
what one really wants, by participating in a political body, is the common good. If one 
votes against the majority, then one was simply mistaken about what the general will 
actually entailed or embodied. 
In the rule of the majority, Rousseau tries to reconcile the value of freedom, hence self-
government with political community, rather than submit one to the other. For this 
reason, no one can be removed from the political community and subjected to the 
political power of another without their individual consent. The only way whereby 
anyone separates freedom from oneself, hence self-government is by agreeing with other 
people to join and unite into a community for their collective comfort, safety, and 
peaceful living in a secure environment that will then assist them in the enjoyment of 
their property. Any number of people may pursue this avenue, as it injures not the 
freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the freedom of the state of nature. When 
any number of people has so agreed to make one political community, they are thereby 
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presently “built-in,” and make one body politic, which combines the wills of individuals into 
a “general will” all acts of sovereignty through majority vote. (Rousseau, 1988: 92)   
Through majority rule, Rousseau establishes a complex conception of democracy. He 
proposes to institutionalize and sustain the majority’s supremacy through a system of 
egalitarian-democratic institutions, a direct democracy in which equal citizens regularly 
gather together to reaffirm their social bonds and decide on the fundamental laws that 
will best advance their common good, and in which limits on social-economic inequality 
help to sustain such institutions. Rousseau’s idea of democracy aims both to reconcile full 
self-government with the authority required for security, and full self-government with 
freedom. In democracy, freedom and self-government are inextricably linked; each 
sustains and gives life to the other. Self-government arises from the freedom of the 
people both as individuals and as members of a whole. One is free because he or she is 
governed by one’s own will, obeying no other will but their own, although in concert with 
others who are doing the same. This means that freedom is the source of self-
government, which is internal to the individual: it is not the product of external forces, 
compulsions, etc. The requirements of freedom, in short, do not stand as limits on 
democracy, but instead are both ingredients of and preconditions for such a democracy 
wherein one is simultaneously sovereign and subject.  
 
IV.3. Kant’s Conception of Self-Government 
Kant’s understanding of self-government is similar to the Rousseauian position as both 
are based on the idea of freedom. Kant has discussed the concept of freedom in multiple 
forms. (Rosen, 1993: 6-39) Firstly, he sees freedom as a purely transcendental idea 
because it cannot be revealed by experience. This means that the concept is based on the 
a priori principles of reason. (Kant, 1952: 42) A priori principles are concepts that occur to 
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people before they have any experience of the world rather than being extrapolated from 
their experiences. If the concept of freedom is drawn from experience, then it could not 
be guaranteed universal validity, for it would be based only on the limited set of events 
that individuals have experienced. The concept of freedom can be universally valid, Kant 
argues, only if it is based on the intrinsic validity of a priori principles. It is prior to and 
independent of any particular experience or circumstance. It occurs in the action of 
thinking. Thus, freedom is an a priori principle, just like causality that involves the concept 
of laws.  
Freedom cannot be based on an analysis of actions one experiences or observes. 
Whenever one looks at people’s actions, one can see circumstantial motivations. Just as 
no confirmation can be initiated for freedom, so it is difficult to confirm the pure 
concept of freedom. Nevertheless, this does not mean that pure freedom does not exist. 
It is the property of all rational beings and hence it exists only as an a priori principle. 
(Kant, 1952: 280)  
As an a priori concept, Kant has described freedom as the will to do or causality as well as 
a rule of reason that is inherent to all individuals. (Kant, 1952: 279) Will is the faculty that 
enables people to pursue a course of actions and influence events in the world. Reason is 
the capacity for logical analysis, deliberation and argument. Thus, freedom simultaneously 
consists of the will as the physical necessity or capacity for making and pursuing choices 
independently of foreign cause and, it is based on logical analysis. This is called positive 
freedom.24 (Kant, 1952: 279) Positive freedom consists of determination in a rational 
process that precedes action. Determining differences, weighing up options and having 
the power to exert decisions without coercion or restrain are the basis of positive 
freedom. The concept of freedom is one that is lawful in both the positive and negative 
                                                 
24 Rosen calls positive freedom as inner freedom (Rosen 1993:41-43) 
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senses in that through the understanding of free will one comprehends and can 
appreciate a certain independence of choice for making decisions. (Rosen, 1993: 42) For 
Kant, both aspect of freedom (i.e. positive and negative) are contained in the single 
concept of autonomy. An autonomous will is a will that is not determined by “foreign 
causes,” which includes not only external influences, such as physical coercion, but also 
internal influences, such as untoward desires. As Kant (1952: 279-280) notes: 
The Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they 
are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it 
can be efficient, independently of foreign causes determining it, just as 
natural necessity is the property of causality of all irrational beings to be 
determined to activity by the influence of alien causes…. What, else then, 
can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, property of the will’s 
property to be a law to itself? But the proposition: “The will is in every 
act on a law to itself,” only express the principle: “to act on no other 
maxim that which can also have as an object itself universal law.”  
 
Thus, Kant’s view that grasps self-government as unity of self-determination and 
independence, finds its expression in the single concept of autonomy, “the will’s property 
of being a law to its self.” Positive freedom, for Kant, is simply the exercise of capacity 
(both natural and political) for self-government. This means that along with this positive 
freedom, one becomes responsible for one’s decisions as well as actions. Self-government 
is, therefore, double-sided; on the one hand is positive freedom or freedom of choice, the 
unconstrained deliberation one makes without any interference from any other agent and 
is made when a possibility of a choice exists. On the other hand, it is responsibility as a 
capability to recognize and respond to the laws that are generated by one’s self. From 
here, Kant theorizes the idea of freedom with respect to the terms “duty” and 
“inclination.” For him, these two forces within the individual guide one’s actions. 
Inclinations emerge from desires. According to Kant, in order to make ourselves we have 
to detach ourselves from our inclinations and empirical interests because inclinations are 
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representative of natural states of being. (Kant, 1952: 281) Kant believes that “every 
rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of the freedom and acts under 
entirely this idea.” (Kant, 1952: 280) For such rational beings, it is a duty to act freely. 
Freedom derives its obligations from the rationality of people. In other words, the 
rationality of citizens is based on laws that obligate citizens to act according only to a 
priori reason. It is the specific responsibility of a free will. This responsibility is to act out 
of respect for the universal law. (Kant, 1952: 270) After describing inner forces of the 
individual, Kant suggests that freedom consists of doing actions not from inclination but 
from duty. In other words, Kant implies that whenever people pursue the demands of 
their inclinations, they receive their motivation from something other than themselves, 
and they are not free. Freedom is possible only in a condition of duty—that is, by 
depending only on reason for their motives and principles.  
In this sense, according to Kant, we can suggest that actions consist of free will when 
they are undertaken for the sake of duty alone. This means that if people have a duty to 
love others, duty dictates their actions. However, many people may love others not out of 
a sense of duty, but rather because it gives them pleasure to spread happiness to other 
people. A clearer example of duty would be a person who feels no humanitarian 
inclination towards others, but who nonetheless respect others because one rationally 
recognizes that it is a duty to do so. Secondly, actions consist of free will not according to 
the goal they are meant to achieve, but rather by the law that serves as their motivation. 
When someone is free to act with no other motivation other than a sense of duty, they 
are doing so because they have rationally recognized a principle that is valid a priori. 
Thirdly, freedom consists of a respect of the law that one has authored. Animals can act 
out of instinct. Accidental events could convey positive results. Only a people who have 
the capacity for reasoning can author a general law and act out of respect for it. This 
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means that people are free if they are simultaneously the authors and the subjects of the 
laws they respectfully execute through their free will. 
In relation to these three points, if we paraphrase Kant’s concept of freedom, one is free 
if and only if one’s action is good (i.e. free) in itself. (Kant, 1952: 265) This view has two 
main implications. First, free will cannot have motivations based on inclinations; 
otherwise, the action would be based on inclinations, and not on the intrinsic goodness 
of the action. Secondly, free will cannot be based on considerations of possible 
outcomes. Otherwise, the action would not be free (i.e. good) in itself, but would instead 
be free in that it achieved a particular outcome (contingency). Kant develops the concept 
of freedom neither in relation to motivating circumstances nor in relation to intended 
outcomes, but with regards principles possessing universal validity—a principle that is 
valid no matter what issue one is considering. The only principles that fit this criterion are 
the practical reason that one has to follow if actions are to make sense in terms of a 
freedom that is controlled by universal laws. 
One of the primary a priori principles of reason is the principle of non-contradiction: 
actions do not make sense in terms of freedom if they are controlled by universal laws 
that contradict themselves. Kant’s universal laws are based on this principle of non-
contradiction. (Kant, 1952: 284) In order for one action to be good (i.e. free), it must be 
good in itself. In order for it be good in itself, it must make sense under the pure 
conditions of reason. In order for it to make sense, it must not contradict itself. If one lies 
but expects other people to believe one’s self, one contradicts one’s self. A will lacking 
pure conditions of reason and universal validity is therefore deficient in transcendental 
freedom. It is controlled by causation. From here, I can state that, for Kant, pure 
conditions of reason are conditions that are necessary for the realization of freedom. This 
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means that freedom, as an ability to choose and pursue is the condition of the law as well 
as the notion that the law is the only condition under which freedom can be realized.  
For Kant, the concept of freedom and universal practical laws are reciprocally conditional 
for each other. At the beginning, freedom as a state of being totally unconstrained by any 
external forces is the condition of the possibility of the laws. At the same time, laws are 
the only condition under which freedom is known and recognized because they are the 
principles that lie distinctly before and in reason as the guiding rule of one’s action. Kant 
defines the demands of the law for recognition of freedom as categorical imperatives.25 
Categorical imperatives are maxims that are intrinsically valid; they are good in and of 
themselves; they must be obeyed in all situations and circumstances if our behavior is to 
conform to the moral law. Again, Kant points out that we cannot base our understanding 
of these imperatives on observations of specific decisions and actions. Categorical 
imperatives must be grasped a priori. (Kant, 1952: 268) 
Categorical imperatives are universal laws that one gives to oneself. However, they must 
also be applicable and internalized by everyone else, i.e., each person acknowledging these 
laws as universal and applicable. They are principles that are inherently authenticated; 
they are good in and of themselves; they are unconditional and hence they must be 
obeyed in all situations and circumstances if one’s actions are to conform to the situation 
wherein freedom is considered an intrinsic good. This leads to a vision of a kingdom of 
ends that is a community in which all rational beings are free if they are at once the 
authors and subjects of all laws. This reasoning is apparent in Kant’s categorical 
imperative, “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.” (Kant, 1952: 268) Laws as categorical imperatives in 
                                                 
25 In contrast to categorical imperatives, Kant defines Hypothetical imperatives as rules that a particular 
action is necessary as a means to some purpose, such as the attainment of personal happiness. (Kant 
1952: 265-266) 
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inquiry are not those of the phenomenal world — i.e. ones that hold in respect of things 
as they appear to people, and which one uses in causal explanation. Rather, they are 
imperatives that ought to inform the conduct of all rational beings, and which they 
should follow absolutely (even against their inclinations). Their character is formal (i.e. 
general and abstract) — if it were substantive, it would re-introduce dependence. In 
practical terms, it involves three distinct interrelated elements: First, they consist of 
universality (act such that your maxim could become universal law). Second, they are 
ends in themselves (act such that all rational beings are respected as ends in themselves). 
Third, they contain a complete social system (act such that your maxim could be law in 
the kingdom of ends). 
If laws are ends in themselves, and not means to some other end, then the will of a 
rational being is thought of as the maker of universal law. Otherwise, their actions would 
be governed by some interest and they would function as mere means to some purpose. 
When rational beings will something for the sake of duty alone, they must renounce all 
interests and motivations other than duty. Thus, their obedience to the law cannot be 
based on any specific interest. Rather, they must understand themselves to be subjects as 
well as authors of the law, and recognize that the law requires unconditional obedience. 
This notion of rational beings as simultaneous authors and subjects of universal law leads 
Kant to the idea of a perfect community in which all people make the laws to which they 
are in turn subject. Such a community must be poised as an ideal to provide an adequate 
incentive to follow the objective laws of reason and treat their fellows not merely as 
means to ends but also as ends in themselves. This ideal community is called the 
“kingdom of ends,” meaning a kingdom composed of ends in themselves, which respects 
all its members as ends in themselves. In this kingdom of ends, people are acting as 
members of the sovereign when they create universal laws in the realm of reason. They 
 161 
are acting as the subject when they are under the rule of universal law. Kant suggests that 
when people are obeying the rules of universal laws, they are obeying their own will and 
not the will of any other. Thus, they are free. (Kant, 1952: 274)  
In this sense, a person’s freedom consists in adopting only those maxims and motives 
that are consistent with the establishment of a kingdom of ends where they are both 
subject and sovereign. This means that no individual is free unless he or she has the 
reasoning power to make decisions on future generations of laws. Similarly, no society is 
free unless it consists of free individuals who make decisions for themselves, because 
without them there is no kingdom of ends. When one’s free reasoning is suppressed to 
the margins, society’s autonomous situation is also suppressed. Further, such freedom is 
inseparable from that of others. Freedom is hardly meaningful unless it is embedded in a 
shared, obliging and cooperative environment. A free individual acknowledges the ends 
of others as something inviolable and absolute. This leads to the recognition of equality 
among people. Once freedom is equally respected and endorsed as the condition for 
making independent decisions, one’s decisions do become one’s own. 
In Kant’s view, the governmental authority is nothing but the united will of all rational beings 
and because this will of all rational beings is universal — each decides the same thing for 
all and all for each — no one may claim to be wronged by the ruler. Moreover, since all 
justifications proceed from the universal, governmental authority cannot do anyone 
wrong because of its law. However, when someone makes provisions about another 
without reference to the general principles of reason, it is always possible for one to do 
upon the other an immoral thing; but one can never be morally wrong when one acts 
upon universal principles of reason. Therefore, only the united will of all, insofar as each 
decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the universal united will of the people 
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can be the only justifiable act which is embodied in the governmental sense over the will 
of all. (Kant, 1952: 280)  
This universalizing character of the will of all each decides the same thing for all and all for each 
finds its genuine illustration in Kant’s conception of morality where every rational being, 
insofar as one’s maxims can have universal law-making force, is the will of the individual 
and an end in oneself. 26 What one should respect is the humanity present in oneself and 
others. Respecting one’s self and others is called dignity of the person. It has an intrinsic 
and absolute value because when people see their free wills not as means but as ends, 
they will naturally accept that others have the same capacity to govern their lives. (Kant, 
1952: 274) It constitutes people as ends in themselves. It rests upon their capacity to 
formulate objective maxims that are valid as universal laws for all people. For Kant, if 
people are to be free, people must try to act in such a way that they always treat humanity, 
whether in their own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always as an end.27 If they treat other humanity as mere means, they contradict the fact 
that people are ends in themselves. In this case, their principles could not be universal 
laws, and they would violate the categorical imperative. In this sense, dignity requires that 
people themselves must be the authors of the law. Dignity is the criterion for people to 
serve as lawmakers in the kingdom of ends. (Kant, 1952: 274) When people follow the 
categorical imperative and chose maxims that could be universal laws, they are subject to 
universal laws. Hence, they are in a state of autonomy because they use reason to 
                                                 
26 Kant (1952: 272) says the following about the people:  
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, have nevertheless, if 
they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called 
things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature 
points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which not be used merely 
as means, and so far therefore freedom of action (and is object of respect).  
27 This is second categorical Imperative of Kant. “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (Kant, 
1952: 272) 
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determine their own law for themselves. (Kant, 1952: 282) In other words, people who 
author laws and individuals who are subject to laws are one and the same. Through this 
categorical imperative, we ascertain that one is bound to the law by one’s duty; thus one is 
subject only to those laws given by the one’s self. This means that the people are bound 
only to act in conformity with their own will. People become free when they act based on 
the will as informed by reason, and not that of desires and the incitements of the senses. 
People are free because the laws they choose to impose on themselves are based on their 
own reason and they do not depend on some previous cause (i.e. natural necessity). They 
are ends in themselves and the end is a will giving universal law. 
This view of Kant is very similar to Rousseau’s views on self-government. As noted 
above, for Rousseau, self-government is nothing but the general will, because this will 
equals to the will of all  — each one’s will the same thing for all and all for each — no 
one may claim to be mistreated by the sovereign because sovereignty is nothing less than 
the exercise of the general will. Hence, if acts of the sovereign are the executions of the 
general will, by obeying the sovereign, each citizen is not only upholding the general will 
but also obeying one’s own will, thus they are self-governing. Similarly, Kant (1952: 274) 
says that:  
A rational being belongs as member to the kingdom of ends when, 
although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these 
laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when while giving laws; he is not 
subject to the will of any other.  
For both Kant and Rousseau, self-government as democracy is explained by the united 
will of the people (i.e. general will). For, freedom or choice or to act to proceed from it, it 
cannot do anyone harm by its dictates. Now, when someone makes provisions about 
another, it is always possible for one to abuse the freedom of the other; but one can 
never abuse what one decides with regard to one’s self. Therefore, though the general 
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united will of the people as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, people become 
self-governing. 
 
IV.4. Self-Government as Dialogical Text Creation and Policy Formation 
Up until this point, I have been arguing that we should consider self-government as 
freedom—that means the ability to govern oneself, and to be the author of the laws of 
one’s own action or capacity for having self-imposed or self-legislated laws, or “being a 
law to oneself.” To be free means that one cannot be forced to obey the authority or laws 
made by others. People are free only if they obey their own will. The space between 
freedom and obedience to one’s own will depends on the system of social interaction 
wherein everyone is an end in him/herself, but at the same time is fully dependent on 
others because of the deep reciprocity involved in attaining the state of self-government. 
Here, the system of social interaction means the use of language and this is the means 
through which people become both the subject and object of their own action, as in the 
case of the subject and author of their own laws. Language is the universal medium 
through which self-government is realized. All notions of self-government are conveyed 
through interpretation and understanding, and all interpretation and understanding takes 
place in the medium of language.  
At this point, it may be useful to re-configure self-government within the communicative 
process as a dialogical process of text and policy formation. The body politic exists and is 
reproduced within a communicative process. The individual and the collectivity are 
integrated by use of language, and each is necessary for the other. In the body politic, 
people deliberate and act on textual structures called laws. Other texts, such as executive 
authority, guide the implementation, or non-implementation, of laws. Government 
attempts to have all actions conform to the law or the text. Courts interpret texts. 
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Citizens are informed of this activity via texts and are asked to vote on their 
representatives using text. If democracies are based on self-government as in the creation 
(i.e. authoring) and interpretation (reading) of those textual structures that guide 
governance, we may approach self-government as a dialogical activity of text creation and 
interpretation. Therefore, in this part of the chapter, I will reconsider the notion of self-
government in terms of the subject/object or author/reader relationship as these dyads 
meet in texts. In other words, I will attempt to ground the notion of self-government in 
the dialogical triangle that may be variously represented as author-text-reader, subject-
language-object, addresser-dialogue-addressee, and sovereign-laws-citizens.  
The categories of text, author and reader are dialogical functions of language. 
Traditionally, the categories of author, text, and reader are held as self-evident and 
disconnected things. In these categories, the term author is the unique individual person 
who is expressing one’s own will for producing text by using language. Will is the source 
and origin of some imaginative power, which may be unique to one’s self, but stemming 
from that source, there is a creation of something new. In the use of language, an author 
organizes words, signs, and symbols for purposes of transferring one’s own meaning to 
the other (i.e. reader) for communication. The words, signs, and symbols through which 
meaning is transferred remain essentially separate from the author and reader. From this 
perspective, text becomes a unity of words, signs, and symbols via which meaning is 
transferred, and through which one’s meaning is made public. At this point, the act of 
reading appears as a discovery of meanings presented to the reader. In other words, the 
reader tries to generate a story from the meaning that is supposed to be the manifestation 
of the intention of an author. In accordance with the previous two assumptions, meaning 
from the view of narrative individualism is believed ultimately residing in the mind of the 
individual author. 
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Poststructuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes, argued against the 
author’s position as the sole creator of a textual meaning that is to be uncovered by the 
reader. This view is called as “The Death of the Author.” According to this view, authors 
do not possess any privilege over the text that is produced by their writing. For this 
reason, they have tried to replace the understanding of relations between author, text, and 
reader by an understanding of the relations between language and subject positions that 
inhabit the structure of discourse. They suggest that after a text is created, the author has 
no function in the formation of meaning; the text stands on its own. Once the author is 
detached from the text, the assertion for interpretation of the text according to author’s 
intention becomes quite pointless. To present a text, an author is to impose a border on 
that text, to provide it with a final signification to close the writing. (Barthes, 1977: 147-
150)  
At this point, Barthes distinguishes between two types of texts: the “readerly” and the 
“writerly.” On the one hand, the readerly text is identified as a closed text that guides the 
reader to an intended meaning. It creates fixed interpretation. On the other hand, the 
writerly text is acknowledged as an open text that encouragesr to act as an author, to fill 
in gaps within the narrative, and to create meanings.28 By rejecting the notion of the 
dominance of authorial intent, Barthes privileges the text and reader over the author. He 
recognizes the freedom of a reader to create textual meaning, regardless of the intentions 
of the author or any pretensions to objective content. Therefore, we can argue that 
Barthes’ intention is not to transcribe the monologue that the author (subject) carries 
                                                 
28 Similarly Umberto Eco distinguishes between two types of texts: the closed and the open. Open text 
requires the reader to make truthful interpretations that consist of a single, definite, and intended 
meaning. In other words, for a closed text, the reader's task is to decipher or uncover the intended 
meaning of the author. There is no place for the reader to firstly, discover a plurality of meaning involved 
in a text, secondly, to perceive experiences that reflect such plurality, and finally, to interact with it in 
order to play with the meaning. Open text encourages infinite readings without allowing any possible 
reading as final. This makes it impossible to say definitively what the best reading of a text might embody. 
Open texts frequently say more than their authors intended to say but less than what many incontinent 
readers would like them to say. (Eco, 1990: 148) 
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through the text, but to establish a dialogue with the text (object) itself insofar as the text 
(object) is nothing more than what addresses the reader in reply to one’s enquiry. The 
position of the subject who is responsible for the reply can, therefore, be conceived of as 
an empty space, a place constructed by an exchange between the text (object) and the 
reader. 
Bakhtin believes the word is never just a reflection or an expression of representation or 
meaning that is given, final, and already existing and outside it. Again, to reiterate, it is a 
two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is intended. 
For Bakhtin, the word is the outcome of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and 
listener, addresser and addressee. Bakhtin (1986: 121-122) says:  
A word (or in general any sign) is interindividual. Everything that is said, 
expressed, is located outside the ‘soul’ of the speaker and does not 
belong only to him [or her]. The word cannot be assigned to a single 
speaker. The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, 
but the listener has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the 
word before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, 
there are no words that belong to no one). The word is a drama in which 
three characters participate (it is not a duet, but a trio). It is performed 
outside the author, and it cannot be interjected into the author. 
 
As Bakhtin suggests, a word is a dialogical relationship that is established between an 
addresser and an addressee. Therefore, he believes that the word does not carry a neutral 
representation, but rather it does embody one’s own semantic and expressive intention. 
After this moment of installation of one’s own semantic and expressive intention, the 
word becomes a part of a personal language. At the event of the utterance of the word, 
the word becomes a part of another language. It is determined equally by a speaker’s 
expressive and semantic intentions and the perceptions of addressee. As word, it is 
precisely the product of the dialogical relationship between speaker and listener, addresser 
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and addressee. Each and every word expresses the one’s meanings in relation to the other 
meanings. (Bakhtin 1981: 293-294)  
For this reason, Bakhtin sees text as a dialogical field that is activated by the intention of 
the author, readers’ perception, and context. He says: “The event of the life of the text, 
that is, its true essence, always develops on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two 
subjects.” (Bakhtin 1996:16) In his essay, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” Bakhtin 
lays out the main aspects of the dialogical content of the text as a relationship between 
author, hero, reader and text. He approaches the relationship of the author, hero, and 
reader as the participants of dialogue. For Bakhtin, texts have dynamism for meaning, 
which is realized only in the dialogue between author, hero, and reader. In other words, 
he does not see authors or readers as positions completely determining the meaning of 
the text; instead, whatever meaning is achieved is a unique dialogical interaction of what 
author, hero and reader bring to the text. Dialogic interactions of the author, hero and 
reader are open-ended and indeterminate; they prevent a fixing of the meaning in the text 
itself. The meaning of the text lies neither in the text itself per se, nor in the intention of 
the author, nor in the text recalled by the reader. The meaning of the text lies in the 
dialogical relationality between all three. 
In this relationship, the meanings of the author are active and they act with/among the 
other meanings. These meanings are embodied in different characters. In a fully dialogic 
text, the author does not take sides with one or another character/meaning. Meanings 
consist of ideas portrayed from a distance. They are neither confirmed nor renounced 
directly by the author. Other ideas/characters may, and do, confront them, but they are 
still all placed in the text without being absolutely accepted or rejected. This 
confrontation, however, is important as it makes possible different views to come out. In 
other words, the text is a dialogical place of communication between views and characters 
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and voices. In contrast to dialogical text, in monological text, the ideas and characters of 
the author are actively apparent and they are in the sense of rejecting or accepting certain 
ideas. (Bakhtin, 1997: 82) In a monologic work, standards consist of absolute values and 
truths. Only the authorial consciousness knows what the truth is, and this version of the 
truth is dictated to another’s consciousnesses (i.e. reader and hero). Therefore, genuine 
interaction through the text becomes impossible, and thus genuine dialogue is impossible 
as well. In this model of the text, the flow of ideas tends to move unilaterally, from top to 
bottom, from author to hero, from hero to other characters, from the writer to the 
reader. There is no interactive dialogical relationship between the consciousnesses of the 
author or the reader. Only powerful and dominant ideas in the system of binary 
opposition working as either/or (i.e. either good or bad) are dictated. There is no third 
party that can see the events from another point of view. In this one-way relationship, the 
hero only takes a passive role as the ideas come from a source above him/her: the author. 
Hence, the hero cannot question the author or his/her ideas, thus one cannot choose but 
to act according to the rules of the author. 
In a dialogical text, all views or characters are in a constant process of communication, so 
that no view or character can find a possibility for domination over the others. Dialogical 
text has the relativity of truth as its starting point. There are no absolute truths working in 
dialogical text. In contrast to monological text, neither good nor bad is clearly described. 
All truth exists in relation to each other and, hence, is relative. At this point, Bakhtin 
suggests that there is no objective reading method above, beyond, and removed from 
working texts. All reading methods are within the texts or, more clearly, within the 
dialogical relationship between all three, that is, author, hero and reader. 
The ongoing dialogues that are carried out in the course of writing and reading 
characterize the self in the reality of author and reader. Bakhtin has made clear that the 
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self develops through dialogue with the social world and with other human beings, which 
are mediated by language. Dialogical activity mediated by social and linguistic relations is 
fundamental to the configuration of the self. 
For Bakhtin, to be a “self” is not to be a certain kind of being, but to be in a dialogical 
event between one and other. The self is an on-going dialogical event between multiple 
and contingent voices, between “both/and”, between “I,” “you,” and “he/she/it.” 
(Taylor, 1989: 35; 1991: 304-14) For this reason, for Bakhtin, the self can never achieve a 
full and complete identity, since it is always being shaped by experience, responding to 
social, cultural and natural surroundings. The procession of these responses is what 
makes up a person’s identity. Moreover, the uniqueness of each response is an 
affirmation of “I,” which forms the basis of one’s life being at once something actual as 
well as something yet to be achieved. (Bakhtin, 1999: 41-42) This is to say, “I” has no alibi 
in life. If one is shaped by experience, then “I” exists in a relation of “answerability” to 
the world at large, in the sense that the world enfolds one in a unique relation to one’s 
ends. In other words, I experience the world differently than others and, therefore, I can 
accept full responsibility for my actions and thoughts. But this I is a part of the dialogue 
the agent, as self, organizes the actions of others, selects objects on which the individual 
will act, and chooses or commits itself to a response. 
Bakhtin’s concept of answerability can be loosely translated to mean responsibility, 
because one’s life is unique and non-recurrent. No other shares one’s life, and no other 
can accept responsibility on behalf of another. This notion of answerability prevents one 
from validating or legitimizing one’s actions in universal terms, since that would provide 
an alibi for evading one’s responsibility. When an action is justified on universal grounds, 
it is no longer an answerable deed but rather a technical or instrumental one. When one 
acts purely out of obligation to universal rules or abstractions, one becomes an invented 
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creature and relinquishes responsibility. In the Bakhtinian view, an ethical life is one that 
cannot be prescribed or formulated, but is wholly bound to the life of individual actors.  
The self is also always involved in social relationships from the moment one is born free 
and as such; it remains a part of a network of other selves. In such a view, society and the 
individual, or self, and the other are not two separate entities – rather, they are two sides 
of the same coin. The most important element about the dialogical self is not what is 
contained within itself, but what becomes known between one and other. The dialogical 
self develops through seeing its form in the attitudes others take towards it. It consists of 
those attitudes of others that have been incorporated into the self. 
Constantly the dialogical self has to adapt to the activities of others. There is a continual 
process of construction and reconstruction. One constantly tries to take meaning from 
other’s communicative actions, and in the process, become conscious of oneself. In 
communicating, one learns to assume the position of others and monitor one’s actions 
accordingly. Self-consciousness and individuality are, thus, understood as developing in 
dialogue with the other (i.e. society). The self is dialogical, for the other is continuously 
defining it. Put simply, the self is contingent on the other if one is to understand or 
pursue who one is. Bakhtin (1997: 287) states:  
To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A 
person has no internal sovereign territory; he is wholly and always on the 
boundary, looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the 
eyes of another. 
 
For Bakhtin, the self as a source of what one expresses or how one acts exists as multiple 
characteristics, and is developed through dialogical relations between the “I” and “other” 
and between the individual and the community. (Bakhtin, 1990: 52-60) Neither of these 
can exist without the other. He argues that one develops in response to the utterance of 
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others—one takes in or incorporates certain aspects of others’ utterances towards 
oneself.  
On the one hand, the self consists of a unique personality that exists outside of inter-
subjectivity; on other hand, it represents a situated communal being where the “I lives in 
and for the other.” According to Bakhtin (1990: 121): 
I experience, strive, and speak herein the chorus of the others. But in 
chorus I do not sing for myself; I am active only in relation to the other 
and I am passive in other’s relation to me; I exchange gifts, but I do so 
disinterestedly; I feel in myself the body and the soul of another… Not 
my own nature but the human nature in me can be beautiful, and not my 
own soul but the human soul can be harmonious. 
 
The self lives on the boundary between one and other. As such, the self has no internal, 
independent terrain or any authoritative control over a sense or action conceived in 
advance and/or in isolation from the other. When one communicates with others, one 
can hear several different streams of expression, often developing in divergent directions 
and employing a number of separate, distinct languages. (Bakhtin, 1997: 202-3) Each of 
these different voices also has its own way of structuring and perceiving the world. These 
different voices, as users of language, are in the subject position. The self can only be 
truly individual by virtue of the inter-subjectively created and maintained by language (i.e. 
object). Thus, we cannot conceive of the self as equivalent to any one of the voices in 
terms of subject or object but only as an ongoing dialogue between them. 
Bakhtin seeks to ground his understanding of the self in something universal than 
contextuality. He proposes a kind of reference to the generalized other (i.e. truth or 
common sense) that is presumed either metaphysically, scientifically or historically in the 
field of dialogue. This is called the “superaddressee.” Bakhtin (1986: 126) says: 
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Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying 
degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth). This is the 
second party (again not in an arithmetical sense). But in addition to this 
addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with greater or 
lesser awareness, presupposes a higher superaddressee (third), whose 
absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some 
metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole 
addressee).  
For Bakhtin, the superaddressee is the higher authority that a self addresses beyond an 
immediate context. It is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant 
historical time” (the loophole addressee). Superaddressee is the “third party” that is 
invisibly present beyond the immediate communicative situation of oneself or two parties 
within dialogue. It is a true active understanding that grasps the self better than anyone at 
hand can, even better than one can oneself. This third party is a kind of responsive 
understanding that is beyond the immediacy of situation. It is hypothetical addressee that 
understands the addresser perfectly. It is constitutive aspect of a “common sense” in 
reference to “the God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the 
people, the court of history, [or] science. (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) Superaddressee stems from 
the dialogic nature of self that seeks responsive understanding. Bakhtin (1986: 126-127) 
claim that  
Each dialogue takes place as if against a background of the responsive 
understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the 
participants in the dialogue (partners)... The aforementioned third party is 
not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain 
understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such) - he is a 
constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, 
can be revealed in it. 
 
Here, the term “dialogical partners” refers to a dialogue between the party of the first part 
as “I,” the party of the second part as “the other,” and the party of the third part as the 
rhetorical, social and transcendental being. This third party in oneself simply refers to our 
individual responsive selves that draws that self out and dialogize it in relation to a distant 
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context and time. It is an element of generality for overcoming one’s specificity. It is also 
a component of common language or logos, which one already shares with others. 
Nevertheless, it is neither one nor the others. It therefore supersedes the subjective 
opinions of the participants of dialogues that even the one always remains uninformed. 
The superaddressee enabled by dialogue between one and the other thus “always involves 
rising to a higher generality that overcomes not only one’s own particularity but also that 
of the other.” (Bakhtin, 1986: 127) This ceaseless overcoming is a unifying process of 
dialogue, which is not something isolated individuals “do”, but is rather more like 
something done with individuals; one “falls into” dialogue and is “swept away” by 
something with an existence of its own. 
The superaddressee appears through the agency of an “author-reader” who stands 
outside the characters’ purview. Bakhtin refers to this aspect of the self as outsidedness in 
aesthetic activity. Aesthetic activity is a specific form of social interaction between author 
and hero characterized by reciprocal relationships. (Bakhtin, 1990: 4-256) In aesthetic 
activity, the hero does not simply refer to finished or static things or the intention of the 
authors; rather, the hero presents itself to the author as an autonomous entity that stands 
on its own as distinctively objective qualities and viewpoints. In the novel, the author 
constantly tries to establish a stable character for his or her hero. Nevertheless, the efforts 
of authors become a source of struggle with their own self. (Bakhtin, 1990: 7) At the 
same time, these efforts reveal an open-ended self-awareness of oneself, the other, and 
the other’s opinions of oneself. As Bakhtin (1997: 51-52) writes: 
The hero becomes relatively free and independent, because everything in 
the author’s design that had defined him and, as it were, sentenced him, 
everything that had qualified him to be once and for all a completed 
image of reality, now no longer functions as a form for finalizing him, 
but the material of his self-consciousness.  
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When the hero behaves as his author does, they coincide, when they find themselves 
standing either next to one another in the face of a value they share as same or against 
one another in opposition, the aesthetic activity dissolves and an ethical activity is 
embarked upon. For Bakhtin, aesthetic activity is the dialogical interaction of distinct 
voices and actions (behavior). It is not only a set of common ideologies forming an 
endorsement of the common good shared between the author and hero that damage the 
dialogical quality of aesthetic activity, but traces of the author’s self within his hero to the 
extent that the hero responds dialogically in his world as does the author in his individual 
sphere. Theoretically speaking, the author and hero are one here, but Bakhtin describes 
the ways in which the reader fulfills the aesthetisizing role that is filled by the author in 
writings such as a novel. Here we should remark that the roles could be seen as probes 
that help order the “turn taking” within the dialogical process. 
It should be emphasized that the “turn taking” system is a crucial condition and outcome 
of a dialogical situation. In the dialogical situation of “turn taking,” the expression of one 
party conditioned by the expression of others constitutes a turn, with “turn taking” being 
the process through which the party as addresser or addressee of the moment is changed. 
The turn system’s main function is to manage the sequential nature of communication. It 
organizes the information exchange between two (or more) communicating parties and 
ensures an efficient transmission between them. This “turn taking” system is also 
described as a set of reciprocal relationships that mean a mutuality of experience, whether 
being addressed or addressing participants are simultaneously engaged in the same 
activity at the same moment at different places.  
This scenario exactly maps out the reciprocal relationship between author, hero and 
reader. In the first model, authors and heroes change their roles constantly, then readers 
become authors, and authors need to view their own production as readers. The unique 
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perspective of each subject allows the objectification of others except oneself, which is 
objectified by others. In this reciprocal relationship, one gains an awareness of one’s own 
place within the whole through dialogue, which helps to bestow awareness on others at 
the same time. Through this reciprocal relationship, the author’s capacity to 
independently impose a structure or meaning on a text is continuously undermined. The 
process of reading becomes the active making of a connection between intersections of 
text in the same way that authoring does. Hence, the reader does not try to uncover a 
meaning embedded in the text since the text itself consists of dialogical elements. What 
happens is that readers generate dialogues with the text and then the text becomes 
meaningful. Thus, readers do not try to understand the text; what they understand—what 
serves as the basis for meaning—are their dialogical relations with the text, rather than 
the text itself. Through their dialogical relationship with the text, what they understand is 
not only what the text addresses to them, but also their own preparation of responses to 
the text, which may take the form of a new textual understanding. Bakhtin calls this 
interaction responsive understanding.  
Bakhtin sees text or artwork as a special kind of dialogical interrelationship that is realized 
in the object text or body of an artwork. The meaning of the work lies neither in the body 
per se, nor in the mind of the creator, nor in the text evoked by the body in the 
consciousness of the reader. This means that understanding a text is not generating new 
text, including everything recalled by the reader, although one may do this to come to 
grips with the text’s meaning, as part of a dialogue of what the text is regarding, and its 
connotation etc. The role of the reader is not primarily in this process of generating a 
new text.29 Rather, the text has already been produced for a reader (with a reader in 
                                                 
29 In “Author Hero Aesthetic in Activity,” Bakhtin talk about the “confession as self-accounting,” which is 
a form of text in which the author writes about himself, to himself, for himself. In this case, the author 
and hero remains as one or difference in unity.  However, Bakhtin explains the ways in which the reader 
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thought). In other words, the role of the reader is already put together in the text itself. 
Through the understanding as interpreting, the meaning of the text is an attempt to 
regenerate that dialogical relationship between author, hero and reader. From this point 
of view, to understand a text, or to appreciate an artwork, does not mean one must 
interpret the artistic work or text suggested by the original work, but to grasp or to feel in 
(through), the very body of the text or artwork, viewer or reader being addressed about 
something, and to grasp that voice or sense which it addresses. The text is rather like an 
artistic work in the dialogical realm. A text is objectivity, a product of an objective 
dialogical interrelation that takes the form of an irreducible depth. To understand it 
involves absorbing it with one’s senses and imaginatively reproducing its form, which is 
the very form of this interrelation itself. Where is meaning, then? The same place as its 
dialogical content: It is in the text itself, where a specific reciprocal relationship between 
writer, reader and hero has been formed.  
Bakhtin’s insights into the dialogical relationship between author and readers are 
illuminating in the context of the theory of self-government. Through Bakhtin’s theory, 
we can see people as authors and readers for their realities. Texts are the dialogues they 
create with each other as authors and readers. People communicate with each other as 
authors and readers in an ongoing process of reality and meaning creation. 
Communication is the process of creating participation, of making shared what had been 
isolated and singular. 
Here we are moving into the ground of generative interplay. One must understand 
oneself as not being outside the relations that constitute the other; one’s own existence is 
dependent on being in relations with the other. The author alone cannot be the generator 
                                                                                                                                         
carries out the aestheticizing role that is filled by the author in generating such as a text. (Bakhtin, 1990: 
143-149) 
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of text, just as most machines cannot switch themselves on or off. A text and its 
authorship and readership are in a relationship of mutual activation and formation—each 
switching and forming the other as each seeks to interpret the other into its own 
language. Through text, the author tries to force (on its readers) its own system of codes, 
and readers respond in the same way. In other words, one must understand oneself as 
not being outside the relations that constitute the other; one’s own existence is dependent 
on being in relation to the other. Positions between author versus reader and sovereign 
versus citizens constantly change in the space of the text or self-government 
 
IV.5. Conclusion 
The understanding of self-government has two points: the active object status through 
the expression of free will and the passive subject status of individuals in relation to the 
production of policies and text as a reply to the expression of their free will. In the first 
case, self-government implies authorship through the direct expression of intentions and 
interests, desires and feelings by the people themselves. The active object status of people 
can be realized only through dialogue, which serves as an end as well as a means for the 
self-governing process of individuals. Dialogue allows people to engage in the body 
politic, to reflect and act on their reflections, and thus to become aware of themselves.  
Moreover, self-government implies a readership as passive dimensions through which 
one gives oneself to one’s authority. In other words, individuals are not only the subject 
of policies and laws but they are also readers of texts concerning laws and policies.30 As 
long as individuals live in a society, they are both citizens subject to governance and 
readers that judge and conceptualize the terrain of associational life.  
                                                 
30 Kant says the following about the author of the law, as it is identical to the subjects to the law. “The will 
is not simply subject to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law and, on this 
ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).” (Kant, 1952: 273)  
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The emphasis here is not only placed on the conditions for authorship, but also on the 
participation that incorporates a type of readership, that reflectively establishes dialogue 
for the authorship of its being. Self-government, in other words, is intended to be 
dialogical through which participants become both authors and readers.  
This author/reader model in relation to the dialogical self as described by Bakhtin can be 
seen as a reciprocal principle within a democratic society and as a model of relations in 
self-government. In Bakhtin’s dialogical model, participants in dialogue are sincere and 
truthful and respect the right of each other to speak. They change their roles constantly as 
addresser or addressee. This is the “turn taking” system of self-government where the 
participant addresses as ruler and is addressed as ruled. 
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CHAPTER V. NORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
V.1. Introduction 
Up to this point, I have compared Bakhtin’s understanding of dialogism with Habermas’s 
concept of ideal speech to address the very notion of dialogue. In this chapter, I will 
argue that democracy is not an absolute state that ontologically preexists. It is founded on 
normative conceptions of the concept of democracy. Thus, democracy cannot rest on the 
sameness of objects, but on belonging to different understanding and explanations. First, 
I will survey several conceptions of democracy: republican, liberal, deliberative, agonistic, 
and Bakhtinian. I discuss the different theoretical underpinnings of these models and 
how they might apply in various political contexts to clarify the relationship between self-
governance, democracy and dialogue. This conception-based approach to the notion of 
democracy requires the establishment of ideal types, which can serve as interpretive tools 
in determining convergences and divergences in the ways scholars conceptualize 
democracy.31 My aim here is not to advocate one conception over another, but to offer 
new understandings of democracy in relation to dialogue. 
The first part focuses on schools of philosophy that provide the source of contemporary 
normative conceptions of democracy. Classic debates on the meaning and significance of 
democracy reflect the divide found between two broad schools of thought namely, 
republican and liberal. The republican school proposes a unitary conception of 
                                                 
31The ideal type methodology is closely associated with the conceptual tools of Max Weber. Weber has 
developed the methodology of the ideal type by exaggerating one side of phenomena, or selecting 
multiple aspects of phenomena and synthesizing them into a unified analytical construct. (Weber, 1949: 
90-91) Weber frequently used ideal types for correlations and causal imputations as to the connections 
between the emergence of Protestantism and that of capitalism or between social organizations founded 
on patrimonial, bureaucratic, and charismatic authority. Weber’s methodological tool of ideal type can 
offer us a modeling picture of different understandings of democracy. This conceptual pattern brings 
together certain relationships of democracy into a complex model, which is conceived as an internally 
consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like an abstraction, which has been arrived at by 
the investigative emphasis of certain elements of understanding. Its relationship to the phenomena 
consists solely in the fact that where relationships of the type of democracy are referred to by the abstract 
construct formed or suspected to exist in phenomena to some extent, one can make the characteristic 
features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal-type. 
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democracy, as defined by the common good. The common good is seen as a corollary of 
the wider notion of active citizenry. Both are realized through civic virtue. Civic virtue 
constitutes public deliberation, the coming together of citizens who collectively decide on 
the content and parameters of the common good. The very ability of citizens to decide 
what the common good entails depends on their ability to take part in a public dialogue. 
That is the republican model of democracy. 
In contrast, the liberal school of philosophy offers a particularistic conception of 
democracy centered on individual liberty. Individual liberty is defined as freedom of 
choice, and the maintenance of that condition is construed as the cornerstone of 
democracy. Hence, democracy, in liberal thought, is seen merely as an instrument for the 
exercise of individual autonomy. Democracy functions as a sort of catalyst for generating 
a political equilibrium for the multitude individual preferences. This political equilibrium 
is a procedural one, with a constant translation of different individual preferences into an 
aggregate one. 
The second part of this chapter concentrates on contemporary conceptions of 
democracy; that is to say, the deliberative and the agonistic models of democracy, which 
represent not only major trends in political philosophy but also a well-composed mixture 
of republican and liberal conceptions. The difference between the deliberative and the 
agonistic models pertains mainly to the notion of dialogue. The deliberative model 
emphasizes the resolution of conflicts that could hamper the realization of the public 
good. The agonistic model points to difference and disagreement as the very condition of 
dialogue. 
The third part deals with how Bakhtin’s understanding of dialogism can be viewed as a 
normative conception of democracy. Here I consider Bakhtinian dialogism as a basis for 
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overcoming problems of representation found in the republican emphasis on the 
common good, the liberal stress on self-interest, the deliberative focus on agreement, and 
lastly, the agonistic orientation towards disagreement.32 For Bakhtin, the dialogical 
process is a unity of conflicting dispositions. What we understand from Bakhtin is that 
widely held views of dialogue rest on the false assumption that agreement excludes 
conflict and vice versa. In other words, there is no dialogue without agreement and 
disagreement, since one conditions the other. Thus, we can say that the “good” of 
democracy entails not only individuality and collectivity but also agreement and conflict. 
 
V.2. Normative Conceptions of Democracy 
To have a clearer understanding of the dialogical concept of democracy, it is necessary to 
focus on different conceptions of democracy from a normative point of view.33 
Normative views are theoretical ideals. A normative view sets out a theory of how 
democracy would be if it were an ideal type. Therefore, it describes conditions under 
which the democratic quality of political system are produced. Normative views of the 
democracy are important because they set out different criteria against which to assess the 
                                                 
32 Bakhtin’s discussion of dialogue does not directly address any political concern with respect to a well-
defined design for the materialization of democratic politics because his views are not systematic in the 
sense of efficiently organizing and directing any means to attain a particular goal such as democracy. His 
conceptions provide a kind of a framework, which potentially maximizes the likelihood that participants 
can attain their own chosen ends – insofar as those ends are harmonious with the self-organized 
regulations of dialogue, which generate the democratic system itself. Having said this, I must 
acknowledge that Bakhtin himself has not concluded that dialogue represents an example of a political 
model of democracy. However, Bakhtin’s conception of dialogism is crucial in understanding the 
meaning and significance of dialogical democracy. 
33 Sartiori (1962:4) suggests: 
 What democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy should be. A 
democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring it into being. No doubt, any 
political system is sustained by imperatives and value goals. But perhaps a democracy 
needs them more than any other. For in a democracy the tension between fact and 
value reaches the highest point, since no other ideal is farther from the reality in which 
it has to operate. And this is why we need the name democracy. 
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Bakhtinian viewpoint. These different criteria function as yardsticks to tell us just how 
appropriate the Bakhtinian views is in relation to those interpretations.  
Normative conceptions of democracy are not supposed to be practical, nor a method to 
describe politics in such way that it might actually achieve a particular outcome. They are 
part of political imagination that can be presently beyond reach. However, they are useful 
because they establish different theoretical and practical understandings of what 
democracy is and how it dialogically functions. This different theoretical understanding 
allows us to generate new political imaginations for dialogical democracy or to establish 
new ideals, values and ends to work towards. 
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V.2.1. The Classical Republican Conception of Democracy 
Citizenship is central to the republican perception of democracy. Citizenship emanates 
from the membership status of individuals belonging to a political community. (Aristotle, 
Politics: 1275a22 or 1998: 169) The republican idea of citizenship embodies the 
establishment of self-government through a bilateral relationship between the individual 
and the political community. (Held, 1996: 48-50) Citizenship gives free and equal power 
to individuals to participate in the community’s political life. It is empowerment to the 
extent that the act acknowledges in every citizen the same free capacity to act in politics 
for the common good. Thus, the sole purpose of democracy is the empowerment of 
citizens as an active citizenry. The empowerment of citizens to take part in politics 
assumes citizens to be virtuous beings who can make virtuous decisions not only for 
what is best for oneself but for also what is best for political society (i.e. the common 
good).  
To clarify the previous statements made, let us now turn some of the theorists whose 
works inform the republican perception of democracy: most notably Aristotle, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Nicola Machiavelli and, in more recent times, Hannah Arendt. 
Machiavelli offers a delicate vision of active citizenship. He connects the exercise of self-
government with individual liberty. For Machiavelli, if citizens want to maximize their 
personal liberty, they themselves must take charge of public affairs (Buttle, 2001: 2). 
Simply put, participation in politics is the best route to individual liberty. Be that as it 
may, Machiavelli also saw individual liberty as part of a collective liberty in the sense that 
the individual good is part of the common good. Therefore, the good can only be had, be 
it individual or collective, when liberty for all is protected. 
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In a similar vein, Aristotle, Rousseau and Arendt also emphasize the intrinsic value of 
active citizenship. (Arendt, 1961: 143-151) Active citizenship, for them, is necessary 
because not only does it serve as a means for protecting and accommodating the 
common good, but because it also fosters civic virtue and communal ties—the qualities 
of a successful body politics. (Rousseau, 1988: 61, 93)34 The objective of democracy, then, 
lies not in the protection of individual liberty, but in its capacity to develop individual 
potentialities for active participation in politics that lead to the unleashing of the common 
good.  
Republicans, more specifically, do not equate individual freedom to the pursuit of self-
interest. In fact, they are critical of the pursuit of self-interest. For classical republicans, 
the absolute freedom to pursue self-interest, with its accompanying atomization, 
inequality in wealth, vanity and distortions, produces suffering. They believe that freedom 
is not a personal but a public affair, and that it can only be realized through interaction 
between people. (Arendt, 1968: 148) It is only through such interaction that the common 
good can come into being. 
Connected to the republican notion of the common good is civic virtue. As Rousseau 
argues, civic virtue refers to the collection of qualities and attitudes held by the citizenry 
that are often thought to promote a moral, valuable unity of the people. (Rousseau, 1988: 
67-72) A sense of belonging, tolerance, self-respect, public-spiritedness, a willingness to 
subordinate one’s self-interest to the common good are traits that constitute civic virtue. 
These traits develop attachments, form identities, confer dignity, and create the “good 
citizen” who is oriented toward the common good of the political community. 
                                                 
34 In this view, the intrinsic value of people corresponds with the qualities of mind and character that are 
exercised not only in the pursuit of the good or human excellence, but also realized in the achievement of 
the good. See Aristotle Politics 1260a1-25, 1276b15-1278b5 or, 1992: 94,176-188 and Nicomachean Ethics 
1102a5-26 1996:22-23). 
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Contemporary proponents of the republican model of democracy describe the good 
citizen as someone who not only participates eagerly and competently in political affairs 
that are central to realization of the common good but also possesses qualities and 
attitudes that are often thought to promote the common good. Conceptualizing the 
“good citizen” means, that he/she embodies civic virtue. On the one hand, civic virtue, 
which has its roots in the political philosophy of Aristotle, refers to the qualities of mind, 
characters and responsibilities of citizens for political life. (Aristotle, 1992: 176-182 or 
1276b16-1277b32 and) On the other hand, virtue is about the empowerment of citizens 
because it demands that they be both active and responsible participants in the political 
process. Virtue seems just as necessary to the successful functioning of self-government 
in democratic process.  
Civic virtue is exercised both in the individual pursuit of excellence and in the 
achievement of the common good. It determines one’s ability to live the good life and to 
make decisions for the mutual advantage of people who live in the political community. 
According to republicans, the purpose of every democracy is to help its citizens live the 
good life, which requires the citizens to be virtuous because in a democracy citizens are 
both ruler and ruled and are not divided into rulers and ruled. Therefore, each citizens 
required same sorts of common character in order to execute their responsibility of self-
government. (Aristotle, 1992: 176-177). Democracy thus persuaded individuals to 
broaden their common understanding, to attain civic virtue from both point of view both 
ruler and ruled. (Aristotle, Politics 1277a25-1277b16 and 1332b12-1133a or 1992: 18-182 
and 431-433) Thus democracy, with its support of active participation, is in the 
Aristotelian way of cultivating the character of the citizens and leading them toward the 
good life. This also corresponds with virtuosity and the good life of citizens who are both 
rulers and ruled not separated as rulers and ruled.  
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Republicans argue that civic virtue does not arise from a pre-existing consensus that only 
needs to be discovered, nor can one take hold of civic virtue through some form of 
abstract calculation. Citizens must learn values and moral character as a virtue in order to 
strengthen their attachment to the political community. They also suggest that democratic 
government has a duty to teach its people how to be virtuous because virtue does not 
have inherent value in itself. They hold that the participatory process for democracy is 
valuable for not only the substantive quality of the decisions produced by that process 
but also for virtue because it produces morally valuable effects on the character of 
participants. This means that republican believes the very fact of participation that 
operates to educate and improve the character of citizens, to inculcate the right values 
and a sense of the common good. Citizens learn civic virtue through the act of public 
participation and in common action. For this reason, the republican approach is not 
neutral toward the moral character of its citizens or the ends they pursue. It involves 
moral discourse concerned with goods, values, and identities of citizens. For republicans, 
moral discourse of democracy requires that one choose one’s specific purposes in life in 
accordance with common good. Besides the participatory process the republican thinks 
that the governing authority has a duty to teach its citizens how to be virtuous. 
These republican commitments to civic virtue and the common good can be classified 
into two, mutually reinforcing types: formative and participatory. By formative, Aristotle 
meant that civic virtue is something acquired, as part of character development or 
qualities of the mind that that are exercised for the pursuit of the common good. 
Aristotle believed that people were born with virtue but they learned how to use virtue 
for the achievement of the good. For this reason, he wished to educate people in the 
virtues that are required for achievement of the common good and the virtuous life. In 
other words, he would inform and reform the character of citizens thus enabling them to 
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make wise choices.35 (Aristotle, Politics: 1260a36, 1277a12-1277b7, 1332b12-1334a10 or 
1992: 97, 180-182 and 430-436) Participatory refers to the specific commitment for full 
involvement or engagement in political life for the common good as defined by 
conditions of taking turns in ruling and being ruled. Thus, for republicans, it is the duty 
of the body politic to create institutional organizations that not only to empower citizens 
to enter the community’s political life but also to cultivate qualities in citizens that good 
politics requires (i.e. democracy). (Rousseau, 1988: 61-162) 
The republican theorists have constructed different frameworks that would be most 
conducive to the development and maintenance of civic virtue. Some have proposed the 
dialogical sphere, in which citizens constitute both the addresser and addressee and as 
such, theorists have afforded the ideal arena for civic virtue. Some have advanced the 
political realm, in which all citizens are actively involved in their own governance, as the 
most favorable setting for civic virtue. Still others have viewed the realm of community, 
in which citizens freely engage in social relations, as the setting best suited for the 
production and protection of civic virtue. 
Republican understanding of democracy is established with a view toward the common 
good. Nevertheless, the republican understanding of the common good also varies. In 
general, the republican approach considers the common good as an appeal to the good of 
every citizen who engages in self-government, taking turns in ruling and being ruled by 
their equals. It is a good that transcends and surpasses individuals’ interests. (Rousseau, 
1988: 101-102; Held, 1996: 17) It consists of a commonality with respect to its initiator, 
which is the entire body politic, or rule of the people, rather than to a mere party or 
faction. The common good can also refer to commonality with respect to its form—i.e., 
                                                 
35 Likewise, in Plato’s dialogue, Socrates maintained that virtue is knowledge or understanding of good and 
evil and in reference to the degree of goodness and evil, it can only be learned with dialogue of the other. 
(Weingartner, 1973: 55-67)  
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its egalitarian character, which applies to all citizens’ impartially. Further, the common 
good can stand for commonality with respect to its aim, which is the common interest 
that may involve economic, social and moral appeals. 
At the same time, however, republican theorists concur that the common good should 
not be seen as a mere aggregation of individual preferences. For them, the common good 
is always subject to the will of the citizens who actively define it by their participation in 
politics. It is through this participatory process that citizens create public values and 
transcend their narrower self-interests. 
Yet, a number of citizens can come together to argue and make the case for promoting 
their personal interests, thereby orientating the political situation toward the good of the 
few. For this reason, republican theorists see factions, which Rousseau calls “factions, 
partial associations,” as major threats to general will hence the self-governing character of 
republican democracy. (Rousseau, 1988: 101) 
To prevent factionalism, some republican theorists emphasize the institution of dialogue 
in the public realm, which would allow each citizen to exchange views with one another 
on what they think is best for the community. Others emphasize a strong constitution 
that would be authored by and is responsive to all citizens.36 What is noteworthy here is 
the imposition of an institution or constitution that would, in effect, supersede the 
authority of citizens. In that case, as republican theorists argue, it is paramount that such 
an institution or constitution represents the will of the citizens as the foundation of the 
political community. 
                                                 
36 In contrast to contemporary republicans, Rousseau believes that when factions arise, and partial 
groupings arise at the expense of the common good, dialogue becomes more problematic because it may 
accelerate splits. Thus, the will of each group may become general in relation to its members, while it 
remains particular in relation to the political community. It is therefore essential; if the common good is 
to be able to express itself, that there should be no dialogue that allows rise of factionalism within the 
political community. (Rousseau 1988: 62 and 101) 
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According to the republican approach, the purpose of every democracy is to help its 
citizens achieve the good life. But this means that the good life and hence, democracy is 
limited to those who feel and share effective public spirit which motivates political action 
toward the common good.  
 
V.2.2. The Classical Liberal Conception of Democracy 
Liberalism as a model of democracy involves a kind of discourse that is generally 
characterized by emphasis on the intrinsic quality of individual. For liberals, the intrinsic 
quality of an individual refers to those, which one has in and of oneself such as human 
reason. The individual’s extrinsic features refer to the persona, which one has only in its 
relation to something else. Thus, for example, an individual is intrinsically a free human 
being, but only extrinsically made a free and equal citizen. In this perspective, democracy 
is viewed primarily as a means toward the end of realizing individual as a free human 
being that has end in and for itself. (Held, 1996: 101-102)  
The main proponents of classical liberal democracy were Jeremy Bentham and James 
Mill. A key concern of these theorists was the protection of the individual in order to 
make the individual live as one chooses without conditions of interference that might 
block an individual for realizing his/her happiness. (Sayre-McCord, 2001: 333-335) These 
scholars emphasizes that individuals have (or should have) inalienable rights or freedom 
which should not be transgressed by any other individuals, groups, or, most importantly, 
the state even in pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number. They argued for 
the instrumental value of democracy in protecting individual freedom and rights. For 
them, the freedoms and rights of individuals are seen as precious entities that are essential 
for making one’s own life happy. (Held, 1996: 98)  
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The liberal sense of individual liberty involves more than merely an absence of coercion 
or negative liberty. For liberals, to be free is to be able to act without interference. Isaiah 
Berlin describes negative liberty as the absence of a deliberate intention of an individual, 
state, or society to interfere in the personal affairs, of another individual. (Berlin, 1991: 
34) Bentham thought that each individual’s liberty consists of a living without being 
subjugated. (Bentham, 1988: 98) Thus, liberal liberty in this sense entails a space where 
one is immune from the coercive interference of others. (Rosen 1982: 515) However, this 
space to one’s self is contingent upon keeping political authority under the control. This 
means that liberty requires a protection or security against oppression by others. This 
protection is based on the control of power and is secured by regulation of actions. This 
protection entails security against both tyranny and subjugation by others. To be a free 
individual does not mean the ability to engage in any action one wishes to undertake. If 
everyone had such freedom to do whatever he or she wanted, a condition of pure 
anarchy would ensue. To have a freedom in any meaningful sense entails that others 
cannot legitimately interfere with one’s personal space, and this implies that freedom 
must be amenable to enforcement measures. Such restriction is the regulative province of 
the self-government. In other words, given conditions of living together, where one 
person’s freedom depends on the regulation of the free action of others, personal 
freedom possibly requires authority to impose constraints on the free actions of others. 
This means that liberty of the individual consists in obedience to the law one has 
prescribed for oneself. Individuals may have an innate capacity to pursue a free life, but 
they must equally recognize their capacity, before they can hope to be free. In essence, 
the free individual is someone who acts with others, and this scenario requires the person 
to rise above given features of his or her identity to impose a ruling to one’s own 
actions,but this ruling has to be internal to oneself. Recognizing this, a free person 
becomes familiar with certain conditions such as laws that grant one the condition to be 
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free and which confer the ability and environment to allow one to lead a free life. 
Democracy, in this sense, refers to a system of procedures that not only guarantees 
resources and opportunities for each individual’s pursuit of the well-being but also to 
protect the individual’s immune zones from intervention. 
The liberal emphasis on individuality has been linked to the intrinsic quality of individual 
preferences. By virtue of this intrinsic quality, preferences are aggregated in a collective 
choice where procedures do not have independent effects on outcomes, but only 
function as a sort of means producing a balance. Like Bentham, most liberal theorists 
advocate that the main aim of democracy should be to ensure both the individual’s 
happiness and the public interests of society as a whole. This aim is manifested not in an 
appeal to the unity of the political community in the terms of common good but to the 
greatest good (i.e. happiness) for the greatest number of individual. (James, 1993: 594-
598) In other words, liberals reject the validity of all established principles or values that 
are external to the individual. For them, the republican idea of a common good such as 
on Rousseau’s ideas of the general will, is an artificial construct. (Held, 1996: 58) Personal 
rationality is the supreme authority to judge goodness. Only that to which an individual 
gave his/her free consent is binding on their will. This means that the will of each 
individual, unrestricted and unguided by anything except their own deeply felt conception 
of freedom, is the foundation of political community. Thus for the republican, the 
constant will of all the individuals of the political community is the will of all; by virtue of 
it, they are citizens and free. Liberals have the same view with this Rousseau’s idea of the 
will of all. Will of all simply refers common interests as the aggregate of the particular 
wills of each individual. (James, 1993: 595 and Rousseau, 1988: 100-101)   
In contrast to republican idea of common good, Jeremy Bentham suggested that society 
had no part in describing the good of a human person. Bentham believed that in the idea 
 193 
that “the community is a fictitious body” which is defined as the “sum of the interests of 
the several members who compose it”  (James, 1993: 594-595) In this vision, the public 
interest of the democratic process or the greatest happiness of the greatest number is 
identical to the mechanical summation of individual preferences. (James, 1993: 595) In 
other words, what is the good of the liberal approach is an aggregate good— what gives 
the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number of individuals.  
Embodied in liberal democracy is a vision of the political process as primarily an 
aggregation of private preferences and a process of competition. (Held, 1996: 206-207) 
For liberals, competition among the individual preferences is necessary in order to arrive 
at the best policy. According to classical liberal theory, individual preferences should 
compete with each other until the better ones become apparent. If one individual truly 
believes in the validity of his/her preference, then subjecting it to the test of the 
competition of preferences in the political process should not be feared. Any desire for 
being represented at the government level should respect that competition is the most 
productive way for utilizing individual freedom as presenting and defending propositions. 
The competitive process of democracy, furthermore, is not conceived of as closed or 
having an end. It is always considered as open process where particular wills of 
individuals engage in a competition with preferences over the determination of public 
policies. 
Liberal democracy based on the competition between the particular wills of individuals 
emerges in the place of state neutrality. According to the liberal approach, state neutrality 
is the sole driving condition of the democracy. It is identified with relationships of non-
interference and the protection of competition between individuals. For liberals, any kind 
of incursion on individual choices is regarded as problematic because it reduces the 
intrinsic quality of individual freedom. The liberal idea of neutrality is also closely 
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connected with idea of impartial criteria derived through procedures that reflect “fair 
play” or basic ideas of fairness for each individual for having equal footing in the 
democratic process. (Habermas, 1996b: 26) 
For liberalism, the good of the democratic system is measured by the extent to which the 
individual is free to pursue self-interest. Because liberalism perceives individual freedom 
as good in itself, there is no substantive societal conception of the good. There is, 
however, a substantive conception of the good of democracy, which is individual in 
character. The good of democracy is whatever individuals seek in their self-interest. To 
achieve that, liberalism aims for the establishment of principles and enactment of 
procedures that protect and foster substantial space for individual freedom, based on the 
exclusion of arbitrary power and the limitation of state power. 
In this perspective, procedures are based upon the consent of individuals who have 
agreed with one another to protect their individual rights. Thus, these procedures should 
be limited to the protections of these fundamental rights. Bentham maintained that by 
guaranteeing those rights, a regulative function of the procedures have to be conducted 
according to “the greatest good for the greatest number” on the supposition that each 
person is to be protected from the possible violation by other individuals, or the state as 
equally important. (James, 1993: 594-595) On this perception, the aim of liberalism is 
understood as the aggregation of individual private interests in order ensures the 
maximum degree of satisfaction, or alternatively to minimize the degree of suffering 
experienced by people. Therefore within these utilitarian foundations, liberalism does not 
endorse any specific role for morality for the liberal discourse of proceduralism since it is 
impossible to choose standards of universal criteria or to identify the best set of beliefs 
and values. (Schoemean, 1993: 738-739) 
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While withdrawing moralistic terms from democratic theory, classical liberal philosophy 
attempts to judge political actions strictly in terms of their consequences, in particular 
their effects on individual good. Therefore, a classical liberal philosophy of democracy 
typically contains criteria by which right from wrong are to be distinguished. According 
to utilitarian liberalism, the right thing to do, in any situation, is to maximize the utility for 
the individuals. For example, for Bentham, the utility of a political act can be 
characterized as the total sum of happiness created by the political action with subtraction 
of the total sum of unhappiness created by the political action. (Peardon, 1993: 623)  
This view of Bentham has implications for the nature of procedures and institutions and 
what their roles in democracy should entail and prescribe. In general, utilitarian liberals 
believe that the most important function of procedures and institutions is to create a 
secure setting in which individuals could pursue their own interests. (James, 1993: 594-
498) At this point, the precedence liberalism gives to individual rights posits democracy 
as a utilitarian process within which the utility of different preferences is maximized for 
the interests of all in regulated competitive processes that promote the freedom of the 
individual. 
The utilitarian tradition of liberal philosophy places strong emphases on the freedoms 
and rights of individuals. The central idea is that all individuals are equal, autonomous of 
any circumstance, and are the holders of inalienable rights that cannot be cancelled by any 
organization. While the liberal approach emphasizes the rights of individuals and their 
protection from the arbitrary use of power, they distinguish between two types of rights 
in a democracy, hinging on whether they are viewed from the perspective of the 
individual or from the perspective of the institutions and procedures with which the 
individual interacts. From the perspective of the individual, rights are an entitlement to be 
free, to act in one’s best interest. From the perspective of the institutions and procedures 
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with which the individual interacts, rights necessitate obligations upon individuals. These 
obligations, which may be called duty, cannot be used to breach the rights of others.37 
 
V.2.3. The Deliberative Conception of Democracy 
The deliberative model of democracy is most often associated with the thought of Jürgen 
Habermas, James Bohman and Seyla Benhabib. These scholars have employed an eclectic 
approach to the concept of democracy and therefore, they have borrowed from some of 
their main arguments different philosophical traditions including Marxism, critical theory, 
hermeneutics, Freudian psychoanalysis, and language philosophy. 
The deliberative model firstly considers democracy as a form of communicative action 
that is defined as melted in the independent forms of an intersubjectively fixed discourse 
ethics that govern the flow of deliberations in such way that rational notions and will 
formations can take the place. This means that democracy is a free, open and ongoing 
process aimed at reaching rational consensus concerning the public interest. (Benhabib, 
1996: 70-71)) Secondly, the deliberative model draw attention to the institutional bodies 
and procedures that generates conduct for a communicative discourse of democracy. 
Thirdly, they give emphasis to practical rationality as it is embodied at the core of political 
rule.   
                                                 
37 There have been two distinctively liberal approaches to the issue of rights in close connection with 
Immanuel Kant’s concept self-respect and duty. In the first case, the liberal idea of rights is closely tied to 
Kant’s categorical imperative: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. Kant’s imperative prescribes 
respect toward individuals, as equals and holders of the same rights. In that case, the most fundamental 
right of individuals is precisely to exercise their individual nature as autonomous rational beings—that is, 
as beings able to give freely the law of reason to themselves. This exercise is the goal of the democracy. 
In the second case, the liberal idea of rights is linked with the Kantian idea of duty. Duty is what is one 
“ought” to do. Kant makes three general statements about duty. First, actions are genuinely good when 
they are undertaken for the sake of duty alone. Second, actions are judged not according to the purpose 
they were meant to bring about, but rather by the “maxim” that served as their motivation. Third, duties 
should be undertaken out of “reverence” for the [universal] law. For Kant, actions are rightful when they 
are in accordance with duty. The one formal condition, common to all rightful actions, is the motive of 
conformity to universal law. (Kant, 1952: 383-94) 
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Deliberative theorists criticize both the republican view, which considers civic virtue and 
common good as an end of democracy, and the liberal view that reflects upon competing 
interest of the individuals with an emphasis on the negative freedom. (Habermas 1996: 
22-26) As an alternative to the liberal and republican views, in their descriptive or 
evaluative use, the deliberative version of the good reflects two aspects of democracy as a 
multi-voiced communicative body: persuasive argumentation and consensus or 
agreement. (Benhabib, 1996: 82-83) They claim therefore, that if democracy as a 
communicative action of politics is to conform to democracy as a communicative form 
of politics, it must promote communicative exchange with one another and encourage 
not only the production of new ideas or discourses but also an agreement between the 
dual aspects. In affirming the persuasive communication without surrendering the 
audibility of any voices (as opposed to the mere plurality thereof), democracy becomes 
the reflection and intensification of society’s transforming multi-voiced body in which 
each voice consists of qualities that can be simultaneously classified as the unique and 
same. 
The objective of deliberative theorists is to generate procedural conditions for free and 
equal discursive participation to the communicative action which takes place not only in 
formal institutions and but also in public affairs as an informal opinion-formation. On 
the one hand, discursive participation is directly associated with decision and action. 
(Benhabib, 1996: 73-74) On the other, it is connected as a free and equal participative, yet 
inclusive network of people in public space. In both spheres, discursive participation 
consists of a “communicative power” or an argumentative process that can lead to 
mutual understanding and consensus. (Habermas, 1991: 298)  
According to the deliberative model of democracy, communicative power exists in 
reasoned communication or persuasive communicative exchange. For deliberative 
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theorists, reasoned communication or persuasive communicative exchange is important 
in three ways. First, reasoned public deliberation establishes a process for reaching 
decisions or compromises in the absence of unanimity. (Christiano, 1996: 51-53) Second, 
it is central to the operation of the decision-making process itself, as it allows every 
member of the community to be involved. (Bohman, 1996: 23-71) Third, reasoned 
deliberation is a vehicle for individuals to claim one’s own interests. Moreover, the 
communicative character of public deliberation is potentially transformative, with the 
establishment of a set of connections between participants for reasoned considerations, 
compromises and discourses of self-understanding. 
Deliberative theorists believe that societies consist of clearly defined and historically 
differentiated individuals and cultural groups. If there are no effective consensus and 
agreement among differences, then society can hardly survive, without, on the one hand, 
major transformative processes like secession, civil-war, genocide, or, on the other hand, 
imposition of some kind of authoritarian rule. For this reason, they point to the fact that 
democracy has to assure popular consent among members of society with conditions of 
free expression and public association. That is to say, the deliberative approach aims to 
construct a discourse of democracy toward a rationally motivated agreement by finding a 
rationale that is persuasive to all parties for creating the prospect of coordinating and 
reconstructing preferences. (Bohman, 1996: 34-37) To this end, the deliberative approach 
attempts to develop an institutionalization of communicative procedures, for not only 
enabling consensus among different views and preferences to reach understanding and 
agreement but also for translating fixed individual preferences into an aggregate that 
produces particular political outcomes. (Habermas, 1996a: 21-31) 
This procedural communicative deliberation refers to a free and equal process in which 
participants are constrained only by the result of their reasoned decisions and by the 
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regulative preconditions for those reasoned decisions (Bohman, 1996: 37) For 
communicative deliberation to be meaningful and to ensure consensus and agreement on 
the public quality of the deliberative good, participants must be equally positioned to 
perceive and express their interests and views. (Christiano, 1996: 91-93) Simply put, all 
participants are formally and substantially equal. Everybody who wishes should be given 
the opportunity to participate. Here, formal equality represents formal procedures that 
ensure the necessary conditions for all affected parties to participate in the process of 
communicative deliberation to determine the public good. (Benhabib, 1996: 72-73) 
In particular, formal conditions of equality are necessary to ensure fairness through which 
participants can have similar powers and resources to affect the argumentative process of 
deliberation. Besides formal conditions of equality, deliberative theorists see the process 
as free in the sense that the participants are not bound by values or conditions other than 
those found in their own deliberation. (Bohman, 1996: 36) They stress that the 
deliberative democratic process should be rational and fact-oriented. Their understanding 
of reason resides not in the individual right for self-determination (i.e., private use of 
reason), but in the regulative norms of communication (i.e., public use of reason) and in 
forms of argumentation that contribute to a public conception of general interest through 
consensus.38 In this respect, communicative deliberation is a rationalizing process in 
which participants are required to voice their arguments for advancing and supporting 
their cases, or criticizing the proposals of others. For deliberative theorists, it is important 
that public deliberation function as a critical medium against formal political decision-
making. 
                                                 
38 The procedural character of democracy or about what dialogue requires in a given particular situation is 
proposal if it can be defended by appeal to common values which all members of society can reasonably 
be expected to accept for their own reasons. (Chambers, 1996: 101-105 and 186-187) 
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The deliberative approach assumes that democracy is a means used by essentially free and 
equal agents to secure agreements and mutual understandings necessary for obtaining the 
benefits of societal life and avoiding the costs of conflicts. It is also a communicative 
action since different voices and public assessment of those voices can take place in the 
generation of agreement and mutual understanding. 
The deliberative approach also assumes a capacity for impersonal reflection and mutual 
recognition of the value of each individual. The deliberative approach ascribes to each 
individual the competence to deliberate freely and rationally. (Cohen, 1996: 102-103) 
Thus, no individual can be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from participating 
in the communicative process. As a result, individuals see one another as ends rather than 
means in the pursuit of their own self-interest. 
Here, democratic communicative action refers to something more than the instrumental 
rationality provided by self-interest calculated models to the extent that participants 
engage responsively to one another toward mutual understanding and consensus. 
(Christiano, 1996: 83-87) Mutual understanding and consensus are reached through the 
force of better rational argument. But the arguments must be regulated by norms and 
procedures that are accepted by all participants as embodying the common interest. 
Otherwise, norms and procedures cannot be valid. Valid norms and procedures guard 
against distortions and differences in the deliberative process. 
For deliberative theorists, the basic structure of democracy is governed by principles and 
rules that are publicly agreed upon. (Rawls: 1993:175) Furthermore, these principles and 
rules are consistent with and supported by a sense of free individual deliberation that 
naturally arises within the relationships and rational attachments made possible by such a 
democracy. In deliberative democracy, there is a reciprocally assured confidence that 
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everyone will abide by the principles and rules that were previously agreed upon. Publicly 
agreed upon rules and procedures affirm an ideal of politics. Within this procedural and 
deliberative form of politics, rational agents benefit from living and working together in 
reaching mutual understanding about their differences. Mutual understanding can be 
achieved only if agents are able to recognize plurality in life—that they live together in 
different ways. This represents the recognition of the value of pluralism in terms of equal 
respect for all the different choices possible in life and the rejection of coerced 
agreement. 
At the same time, the deliberative approach does not see the pursuit of different self-
interests as incompatible with a democratic process that is oriented toward reaching 
agreement. Rather, in the deliberative democratic process, individuals go beyond their 
own conceptions of self-interest. The deliberative democratic process ensures that self-
interests are reflexive and not simply accepted as grounds for individual action without 
rational assessment by others. The deliberative democratic process guides participants to 
achieve consensus with a measure of critical assessment regarding prevailing interests. 
The deliberative democratic process is not only reflective of individual preferences, but 
affirmatively molds and shapes them towards an agreement. 
 
V.2.3.1. Habermas’s Dialogical Approach to Deliberative Democracy 
One of the many defining characteristics of deliberative democracy may be said to be that 
of Habermas’s concept of an ideal speech situations. Habermas inscribes to ideal speech 
situations an essential part of the dialogical project to construct a framework for 
democracy. As he focuses on communicative relations between individuals as the 
paradigm of ideal speech communities, he explores the dialogical properties of 
deliberative democracy. In this context, Habermas inserts the conditions of ideal speech 
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situations into the structure of public deliberation that work towards an agreement for 
setting the public policies. In the structure of public deliberation, general conditions of 
the ideal speech situation function as the practical force of reason or forceless force of 
the better argument for convergence of different preferences for the setting of public 
policies. Habermas believes that this function of the ideal speech situation can be attained 
only under maximally fair deliberative procedures that secure impartiality, equality, 
openness and lack of coercion and will guide the individual deliberation towards public 
interests. He thinks that deliberative procedures have to be materialized as a complex 
ensemble of practices of discourse ethics. (Habermas, 1996: 53) Those practices of 
discourse ethics constitute specific forms of normative consent or agreement, which 
make possible the allegiance to the deliberative procedures. It is because they are 
inscribed in agreements in ruling that deliberative procedures can be accepted and 
followed for the emergence and sustenance of ideal speech communities. They can be 
seen as rules that are agreed upon by all participants based on reasoning.  
Deliberative procedures ensure an active participation mechanism for the sustenance of 
autonomous expressions of individual preferences and the realization of public good. In 
this context, the Habermas model can be seen as the incorporation of both the 
republican focus as the common good and the liberal focus as individual liberty into a 
single framework. In this context, Habermas believes that morality is important for 
establishing fair conditions that are conducive to the reasoned communicative interaction 
of citizens. (Habermas, 1996: 23) To provide such fair conditions, Habermas suggests 
that communicative and deliberative democracy requires a kind of governance inserted by 
binding consensual rules, procedures, and institutions. On the one hand, these consensual 
rules, procedures, and institutions have often been thought of negatively as a matter of 
freedom from power, action or as protecting equality and freedom among participants in 
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the dialogical field. On the other hand, they are considered in terms of freedom to engage 
in the individual pursuit of the good.  
Besides embodying the regulative characteristics, consensual rules, procedures, and 
institutions, Habermas’s model of deliberative democracy also emphasizes the 
importance of the public sphere for supporting a rational public opinion or collective 
will-formation and uncoerced participant debate wherein different values and views 
might achieve their fullest expression. Habermas thinks that the public sphere provides a 
forum for dialogue within which citizens can find more opportunity to voice their 
concerns and to understand each other without coercion in order to pursue a personal 
agenda or act on behalf of outside interests. He believes that when people raise issues 
about their concern, they support their proposals which, when scrutinized, bring into 
being a deductive understanding in terms of true, truthful and appropriate. 
Since understanding is a necessary part of language itself, truthfulness and 
appropriateness of the propositions can be confirmed by reference to the way in which 
facts and knowledge are brought into play. In order to do that, all participants have to 
utilize the same level of language that refers to familiar facts or knowledge. Shared 
language develops communicative action in an open and sincere way. Habermas’s theory 
of deliberative democracy assumes the existence of a wide range of informal associations 
and shared language in the public sphere as important conditions of democracy. They are 
important because these organizations create channels for communication wherein ideal 
speech situations takes place and in which various issues can be openly debated and 
agreement can be reached on norms that are acceptable to everyone. 
In relation to this, Habermas distinguishes two types of public: weak and strong. The 
weak public refers to the informally organized sphere of democracy, ranging from private 
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associations to mass media located in civil society. Another hallmark of the weak public 
consists of a communication for informal public opinion-formation without reference to 
the greater decision-making process. The strong public refers to the formally organized 
institutions of the democratic system. It comprises legislative bodies, political parties and 
other institutions. The strong public consists of a communication that bears directly upon 
decision-making and action. (Habermas, 1996b: 298-309) Habermas argues that the role 
of deliberative communication in the public sphere not only identifies problems and 
makes them a subject of democratic discourse but also generates new opportunities for 
forming, refining and revising the different preferences toward consensus. 
Habermas takes individual preferences as endogenous to the democratic process, and 
conceives of the public good as separate from the expression of private interests and 
thus, is not considered an aggregation of those interests. This is not to say that citizens 
cannot express their own private preferences in the democratic process; indeed, they may 
but only to the extent that they are willing to discover a public good. In the processes of 
regulated and reasoned dialogue, critical examination of individual preferences molds and 
shapes them to become reflexive and responsive to the public good. (Habermas, 1996a: 
28) 
Habermas develops dialogical criteria for individual deliberations that are grounded in 
contextually defined or regulated communication through the public use of reason. 
(Habermas, 1996a: 29) The dialogical criteria offered by Habermas represents something 
more than the rationality of individual deliberation; it is a regulated and reasoned ideal 
speech situation among equal and free citizens. Participants in ideal speech situation are 
not merely to “respect” the viewpoints of others but to engage in a reasoned dialogue to 
move toward consensus. He argues that this is a special kind of reasoned dialogue that 
 205 
aims not at compromise but toward a convergence of judgments for mutual 
understanding—the agreement of free citizens. 
There are three general levels of conjecture in Habermas’s notion of reasoned dialogue: 
rationality alongside outcomes, regulation alongside procedures and norms and rhetoric 
for the processes of communication. (Habermas, 1996a: 28) First, rationality of 
communication underlines the production of cogent, consistent arguments. It requires 
that citizens avoid contradicting themselves and express meanings consistently. Second, 
regulation of communication requires that citizens engaged in reasoned dialogue or 
argumentation adopt a high level of inter-subjectivity, through which they can consider 
the validity of differences regardless of their immediate needs in the situation. This 
higher-level of inter-subjectivity of communication forces participants in reasoned 
dialogue to step back from their personal perspective and consider the relevant issues 
critically for the interests of the public Finally, rhetoric of communication requires that 
the structures of dialogue be immune to repression and inequality. 
For Habermas, agreement or mutual understanding can only be rationally motivated, and 
influences apart from reason cannot interfere with the participants’ decision-making. 
When participants are forced to agree with the argumentative reasoning of others, then 
dialogue cannot be considered rational. Therefore, the democratic context of dialogue 
requires that participants enter freely, with a genuine sense of equality. By identifying 
freedom and equality as necessary bases of reasoned dialogue, Habermas carries out his 
argument for democracy in terms of regulation. If and whenever participants exchange 
views or argue for the validity of their views, they must follow not only the norms of 
logical sense but also the norms of what is collectively accepted. 
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In this regard, Habermas’s view of deliberative democracy does not assume that citizens 
can come to a mutual understanding only through the exchange of views or that 
agreement would be a naïve discovery of one’s own comprehension. Rather, under 
conditions of rational argumentation in the processes of dialogue, citizens coordinate 
their actions in terms of consensus. The rational activity of argument presupposes an 
ideal of free agreement in judgment founded on good reason, in “forceless force of the 
better argument.” The actors involved characterize “forceless force of better argument” 
as persuasion that is free from domination or strategizing. This means that force of truth 
in the argumentative realm of dialogue will yield some consensus among participants, and 
the emerging consensus must be responsible for the best argument. 
As Habermas insists, the argumentative process of dialogue must be egalitarian and free 
in the most fundamental sense: this means that no one is accorded any privileged 
position, all are equal and all are bound to produce and question arguments. There should 
be no restrictions on the participation of these competent actors in the public realm. 
Under such conditions, the only remaining authority is that of a force of argument, which 
can be advanced on behalf of the reality of the rational account, the understanding and, 
equally important, the validity of normative decisions for the public. Thus, the most 
important function of the dialogical and deliberative realm of democracy is to produce 
reasons, to provide arguments—to strive for the public good. 
 
V.2.4. The Agonistic Approach to the Concept of Democracy 
One of the shortcomings of the deliberative approach is its incapability to respond to the 
dimension of conflict that the pluralism of values may entail. At this point, we need to 
turn to the agonistic model of democracy. The agonistic model of democracy is 
commonly identified with the thought of Carl Schmitt, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, 
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and James Tully. The agonistic model of democracy is mainly associated with principles 
of conflict or adversarial dialogue. This model refers to an interplay of contesting forces 
or voices. The agonistic conception of democracy derives from the analysis of agon in the 
Ancient Greek drama where protagonists and antagonists verbally engage in struggle. The 
concept of agonism is also identified with Athenian democracy, where popular face-to-
face confrontation and debate on public matters and the arena(s) in which such 
contestation took place shaped politics. (Foucault, 1982: 222-233) 
The agonistic model of democracy emphasizes the need for citizens to engage and 
communicate with one another actively. In other words, it does not look simply for 
values of democracy for co-existence in a plural society, but also looks for genuine 
adversarial dialogue between citizens. Embedded in this model is an affirmative role of 
conflict and contestation in democratic deliberation. (Tully, 1999a: 163) It argues against 
the dangers of the consensus-oriented model of deliberative democracy. While the 
agonistic model displays strong links with the republican idea of democracy in terms of 
active participation and unconditioned space, it also represents an extreme departure 
from republican collective presuppositions (i.e., civic virtue and the common good). The 
republican concern with the common good and civic virtue suggests a shared normative 
order that provides mediation not only between people but also between people and the 
government. For agonistic theorists, regulation is problematic because it arrests the 
tension upon which dialogical contestation is based. Therefore, agonistic theorists 
emphasize unconditioned communication rather than conditioned communication. 
For agonistic theorists, the first moment of regulative order is conditioning that creates 
departure for self-government or the separation and transformation of the ruler/ruled or 
author/reader into two roles. The next moment begins with the increasing ubiquity and 
hegemony of one-way utterances, unchecked by the possibility of immediate retort. As a 
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result, the republican model can easily devolve into monologue. In order to prevent this 
scenario from occurring, the agonistic model does not stress the conditioning roles of 
formal political structures or institutions for the inculcation of civic virtue or the 
materialization of normative order, but instead, the unconditioned political engagement 
and self-revelation in active participation. Agonistic active participation can be perceived 
as constitutive of freedom, rather than instrumentally facilitative of it. (Tully 1999a: 164) 
The agonistic model requires active participation in unconditioned space. 
The importance of unconditioned political engagement and self-revelation in active 
participation is fundamentally opposed to models that try to understand and salvage 
democracy by applying systems of abstract ideas to the practical circumstances of 
everyday life. For agonistic theorists, democracy cannot be deduced from abstract 
principles such as equality and individual freedom since it resists order, closure, centrality, 
extreme rationalism and social engineering. If the existence of a center is tacit, other ways 
of seeing and understanding the very nature of democracy can be ignored, repressed or 
marginalized. That is to say, democracy and its values are not universal but are 
conditional upon specific cultural, social and political perspectives. For the agonistic 
theorists, the components of democracy can only be found in agonistic action: the 
activities of conflicting, appearing, contesting, persuading, and deciding. 
The conception of agonistic democracy is not only significant for emphasizing the role of 
active or radical participation that generates the potential for extending the frontiers of 
democracy, but also it is in itself a critical action that disturbs the traditional patterns of 
democratic theory. Such is the case because the agonistic democratic model reflects not 
only on democratic practice but also on political theory, where it challenges attempts to 
develop a single, rational, systematic, and foundational ideal upon which democracy could 
be based and justified. In doing so, the agonistic approach has become a critical action at 
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its core, in a new and ineluctably dynamic form. The agonistic approach can be found in 
the political contestation of conceptions of democracy. 
The effects of the agonistic conception have been important, for it has called into 
question the very notions of epistemology that constitute contemporary democratic 
theory and practice. This questioning reorients democracy to a new perspective by 
destabilizing the foundations of everyday politics and the centers of truth. Emphasis on 
diversity and challenge to universality has lead to the acknowledgement of a plurality of 
competing views, of ways of life that are inharmonious or even in conflict with one other. 
The agonistic approach underscores the variety of irresolvable tensions and 
contradictions that are often incapable of formal, rational or intellectual resolution in 
terms of democracy. 
The agonistic approach does not offer a well-defined and systematic alternative model of 
democracy. Instead, the aim of agonistic approach is to push contemporary political 
theory and political practice toward new understandings, by revealing how the centers of 
truth and the foundations of everyday life have been hierarchically constructed and how 
certain views have been left out, pushed and relegated to the margins.39 Its legacy on 
current understandings of democracy has been to draw attention to radical participatory 
action that requires the recognition of the value of pluralism, of contingency, of anti-
foundationalism, and of particularity. 
In the agonistic model of democracy, radical participatory action allows for a more open 
space, foregrounding multiplicity over constructed unity, particularity over generality and 
marginality over centrality. Opening the space of democracy to the multitude means 
degrading particular discourses of democracy that may be too narrowly rationalistic and 
                                                 
39 Tully characterizes critical thinking as critical freedom. For him, critical freedom is a primary good of 
dialogical democracy. (Tully, 1995: 202-205)     
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argumentative and then to marginalize those groups whose preferences, interests, 
identities, or forms of discourse might differ. People’s preferences, interests, and 
identities are not given, but only emerge through discourse. One can only know oneself 
after experiencing the difference of others whose views one has not only to take into 
account.  This extends to the idea that if one wants exists in the society then one must 
also know one’s self. For this reason, multitudinous presumes an initial basis for 
democracy, not a particularly privileged discourse for the regulation of actions of the 
people but a dialogical contestation within a democratic agora. This means that the 
agonistic approach sees self-governance through recognition of differences in the 
unifying activities of dialogue.40 
The agonistic approach commits itself to dialogical contestation by celebrating 
differences through the exclusion of any efforts to reshape social values, be it praising 
civic virtue or creating political communities based on shared moral visions, a common 
culture or a simplified, continuity of political principles. (Mouffe, 1996: 252-53) It 
celebrates difference as a “source” for democratic politics. (Young, 1996: 126) In the 
agonistic model, differences generate democratic energies for coping with tensions or a 
position of care for pluralism in the present. 
To meet the changing circumstances of everyday life, the agonistic approach rules out 
reliance on rational methods, norms or communicative procedures for achieving 
democracy in terms of societal consensus. (Mouffe, 2000: 102-03; Young, 1990: 102-11) 
The agonistic approach emphasizes the practical process of dialogical contestation as 
containing moments of agonism. Such a dialogical contestation requires a substantive 
exchange of ideas that is simultaneously antagonistic and collaborative. The condition for 
                                                 
40 James Tully argues that there is a certain priority with respect to the recognition of cultural diversity as 
part of self-government. (Tully, 1995: 4-5)   
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having dialogical contestation of different viewpoints and positionalities is an agreement 
to be adversarial in a play of difference. This allows for the possibility that new thinking 
will develop. In turn, this will create further thinking. Therefore, dialogical contestation 
with its creative process can make any single set of beliefs or ideas temporary by forcing 
people to engage with whatever voices, or positionalities, any set of beliefs or ideas which 
are previously excluded. In short, dialogical contestation is necessary to break up the 
closedness of the democratic process. 
Dialogical contestation embodies an aspiration to engender agreement through the play 
of differences, but it does not presuppose that a historical truth will be revealed if 
participants follow the right rational procedures for achieving agreement. The strength of 
dialogical contestation involves a continual attaining and jeopardizing of agreement (i.e., 
temporary agreement). This means that in order to continue, dialogical contestation has 
to seek difference. Dialogical contestation finishes once final agreement is reached in 
terms of truth, and it stays alive only as long as there is enough difference or 
disagreement on truth propositions between participants to make dialogue necessary. In 
other words, without a firm and continuing sense of the difference, there can be no 
dialogical contestation. Dialogical contestation based on pragmatism inspires democratic 
practices that encourage individuals and groups to find sensible ways of living together in 
spite of their differences. 
This emphasis on difference or disagreement means that the agonistic approach places a 
premium on dialogue itself. Democracy, then, is a dialogical activity that has the 
rationality of disagreement and agreement as its very own rationality. The agonistic 
approach describes a form of democracy in which people can engage in mutual conflict, 
but one that can handle that disagreement by revealing points of controversy as well 
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places of common ground toward a temporary agreement that resolves the specific 
conflict. 
If there is too much self-interested orientation, then finding common ground can be 
almost impossible. In democracies, the pursuit of self-interest weakens the system of 
dialogical contestation by breaking the association between disagreement and agreement. 
The agonistic theorists understand that democracy cannot rest merely on the simple 
recognition of difference, which in itself homogenizes groups through particularistic 
identities, which denies individuality by emphasizing the uniqueness of a community or 
tradition and which attempts to freeze inter-relations through the specificity of norms 
and customs. These theorists argue that democracy itself can be shown to be one 
interactive concept, within which “difference” engenders dissimilarities through an 
articulation with self-governance, which is in an intersection with dialogue. Actions 
among groups and between individuals can then be seen as relevant through those 
actions which uphold self-governance; which are understood as continuous expressions 
of difference, and which have significant consequences on oneself through mutual 
coexistence. 
 
V.2.4.1. Tully’s Dialogical Approach to Agonistic Democracy 
James Tully sees agonistic democracy as an intercultural dialogue that demands that 
constitutions recognize and accommodate distinctiveness and indeed, to embody the 
inherent right to self-government. For democracy to represent a wide-ranging notion of 
justice, Tully stressed that just constitutions must include diverse intercultural and 
multicultural voices in order to create a cultural recognition within different co-existing 
intercultural identities. An open and fair democracy with a just constitution can only be 
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built on a fair system of recognition of cultural differences. Tully emphasizes three 
important conventions that are necessary to avoid conflicts that arise under modern 
constitutionalism: mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. (Tully, 1995: 16-17 
and 209) With these three conventions, Tully argues for a critical democracy that 
necessitates intercultural dialogue without the presupposition of a comprehensive 
language even though it is grounded in a “common” one that accommodates cultural 
diversity and which includes the distinctive ways and languages in which people speak. 
(Tully, 1995: 131-36) 
Reviewing the European constitutional tradition and applying it to descriptive stories 
from Aboriginal history, Tully reveals ignored aspects of the historical formation of 
constitutions and the current limitations of modern constitutionalism. In this regard, 
Tully points out that contemporary constitutions are a composite of two different 
languages. On the one hand, there is a monolithic or modern language that rises with the 
institutionalized and generalized use of constitutional terms (e.g., conceptions of people, 
popular sovereignty, citizenship, equality). For Tully, these terms all tend to presuppose 
the uniformity of a state with a centralized and unitary system of legal and political 
institutions. (Tully, 1995: 9) The establishment of a unitary political authority in 
constitutional texts often leads to the development of a mono-ethnic state on a multi-
ethnic polity with the destruction of the languages of indigenous minorities and their 
right to self-government. (Tully, 1995: 82-83) This uniform constitutional definition of 
the state reflects a denial of the ethnic diversity of the polity and the equality of a 
particular group in relation to others. 
On the other hand, Tully indicates that there are hidden languages in the historical 
formation of constitutions. These languages are hidden in the sense of being inaccessible 
to the limited modern languages of constitutionalism. Hidden languages of the 
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constitutional tradition have two sources. The first source refers to the western texts and 
organizations that have communicated with aboriginal cultures. The second source is 
closely related to the classical understanding of “ancient or common law.” (Tully, 1995: 
57) Both these hidden sources of the constitutional tradition represent an intercultural 
dialogue in which, despite the unequal situationalities of participants, negotiation, 
accommodation and cultural recognition have occurred. 
Tully states that contemporary constitutionalism consists of an assemblage of languages 
that represents complex sites of intercultural dialogue and struggles for power. He claims 
that these constitutional languages can be reconstructed to accommodate cultural 
diversity by means of an intercultural dialogue. Thus, for Tully, the democratic response 
to recognize and accommodate such communities and their culturally distinct ways of 
speaking and acting is intercultural dialogue. 
While emphasizing the politics of cultural recognition and intercultural dialogue within 
discourses of contemporary constitutionalism, Tully raises several issues that are central 
not only to the restructuration of contemporary constitutional politics but also to the 
practices of democracy. First, Tully criticizes the notion of culture or nation as “separate, 
bounded and internally uniform.” (Tully, 1995: 10) Instead, he believes that cultures are 
“overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated” and heavily interdependent in their 
structure and identity.” (Tully, 1995: 10) Tully makes a convincing argument that the 
main function of constitutionalism or democracy is the accommodation of the inter-
cultural nature of our identities. (Tully, 1995: 11) 
What Tully envisions here is inter-cultural dialogue between assemblages of the languages 
of constitutions and between all inter-cultural elements of society. For Tully, 
constitutions must be rewritten in a common intercultural language, which is collective 
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rather than imperial, within which all elements of the community can be understood and 
one that addresses to their reality. (Tully, 1995: 57) The common intercultural language 
must be inclusive and come from the diverse cultural dialogues of peoples themselves, 
rather than imposed by a central, assimilating force. Using three critical components: 
mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity, Tully believes that diverse elements 
of society must engage in constant intercultural constitutional dialogues and in mutual 
accommodation of their cultural differences. (Tully, 1995: 32-56) Constant intercultural 
constitutional dialogues help both the varied voices to be heard and the diverse 
circumstances of particular contexts to be taken into account. Intercultural constitutional 
dialogues allow for specific and collective decisions that meet special circumstances, 
relevant change and different points of view. 
Tully uses the symbology of Bill Reid’s sculpture the Spirit of Haida Gwaii to represent 
intercultural dialogue between the many “languages” and diverse elements of society, all 
simultaneously proceeding through life but with different priorities and goals. This 
sculpture is made of a long black bronze canoe carrying thirteen passengers paddling 
synchronously, all of whom are spirit creatures from the Haida mythology. (Tully, 1995: 
18) In the spirit of Haida Gwaii, each passenger has key status for the beauty of the 
canoe. If one of the figures comes to dominate the expression of the Spirit of Haida Gwaii, 
the beauty of sculpture is easily destroyed. Tully describes intercultural dialogue in 
connection to the passengers’ exchange of stories, of their claims and of their relations to 
each other. He uses the sculpture to highlight intercultural dialogue: the intercultural 
richness of the Haida mythology is a response to homogenizing discourses of modern 
constitutions. 
According to Tully, the equal representations of the figures of Haida in Reid’s Sculpture 
admirably communicate the desires of people who struggle for recognition in culturally 
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unique ways. (Tully, 1995: 25) For Tully, people’s claim for recognition is connected with 
their sense of belonging through which one can identify oneself with a particular culture 
and space. In Reid’s Sculpture, the passenger’s sense of belonging is based not on the 
exclusion of one another, but rather on a mutual reinforcement and an interconnected 
dialogical existence that is necessary for living together. This means that the recognition 
of cultural diversity in the sense of belonging and commitment to identification with 
particular space and time are strongly connected not only with public acknowledgment of 
one’s identity, but also with the respect that provides the affirmative base for an ethos of 
becoming. 
At the same time, the public acknowledgement and self-respecting affirmation of cultural 
diversity also comes with critical freedom that advances a critical positionality to one’s 
own identification and a tolerant and critical positionality towards identification of others. 
(Tully, 1995: 205-07) The critical freedom to question one’s identity and inherited 
practices, and the aspiration to belong to a culture and place, are two key elements often 
believed to be fundamentally opposed to each other. For Tully, rather, they are mutually 
reinforcing and interdependent on each other’s existence. For this reason, it is necessary 
to recognize that one’s position is simply one amongst a multiplicity of others—others 
who are near and not separate (they are all in the same canoe in an interconnected way; 
they are expressions of intercultural dialogue that interrupt self-centered particularity of 
self-understanding). Thus, critical freedom and the sense of belonging through 
intercultural dialogue stimulate and act on each other’s existence. 
 
V.3. The Dialogical Conception of Democracy 
Neither the deliberative nor the agonistic model of democracy seems sufficient to resolve 
the issue of conflict and agreement between individual and community on a dialogical 
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basis of democracy. The rationale behind those models requires that emphasis is placed 
firstly, on either the individual or the community, or secondly, on either conflict or 
agreement. But when one emphasis is extended to the extreme, the proposed model of 
democracy loses its dialogical quality. To reject, on the one hand, the importance of 
conflict or agreement for dialogue, or to deny, on the other hand, the integrity of the 
individual or the well being of the community for democracy is to attack the dialogical 
foundation of democracy. 
Given that argument, any functioning model of dialogue is oriented more toward conflict 
or agreement. Further, a particular dialogical approach may reflect different choices of 
emphasis at different times. Dialogical approaches reflecting different orientations may be 
categorized as conflict-centered or agreement-centered. 
The deliberative model can be seen as an agreement-centered dialogical approach. Its 
proponents argue that a democratic polity ought to be realized through dialogue between 
free and equal citizens. The argument each citizen puts forward in the process of 
deliberation only needs to be justifiable to others. That, however, leaves open the 
possibility of many different forms of argumentation. Problems occur when such an 
approach over-specifies the procedures of argumentation, thereby over-regulating it. In 
other words, the deliberative model, in effect, dictates what is required in order to self-
govern. Moreover, the deliberative approach over-emphasizes consent and uniformity. In 
essence, it downplays the tensions and adversary action that any dialogical democracy 
actually needs. 
In contrast, the agonistic model can be considered as a conflict-centered dialogical 
approach because it is ineluctably tied to adversarial action. It holds that there can be no 
dialogue without a firm and continuing sense of opposition. This model views 
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disagreement as indicative of not only pluralism but also the continuity of the entire 
process. As its advocates point out, dialogical democracy ends once perfect agreement is 
reached, and it only exists as long as there is enough disagreement to make dialogue 
possible. However, it may not be possible to implement the agonistic model practically 
because adversarial positions within dialogue can easily be destructive to the whole 
process of democracy. Further, in the agonistic approach, there is an emphasis on the 
absence of formal political structures. As this is the necessary condition fostering 
autonomous political judgments, chaos could ensue.  
As an alternative, Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue connects the tensions endemic to the idea 
of democracy without undermining the freedom of the individual or the unity of the 
people as a whole. It is principally committed to both the self-government of individuals 
and to the self-government of people as a whole. 
Bakhtin’s dialogical connection of individual-centered conflict and community-centered 
agreement is found in his understanding of the dialogization of languages. This insight 
creates a complex unity of oneself with the other in a dynamism combining the 
centripetal forces that tend to pull people toward a unity and the centrifugal forces that 
tend toward pulling people back out into variety and difference. Bakhtin (1981: 272) says: 
Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry 
on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization 
and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and 
disunification go forward.  
 
Bakhtin’s democratized language—dialogical, heteroglottic—becomes, at its best, unity in 
difference because of the mix and clash of individual and communal languages and 
perspectives. The unity in difference is the play of the centripetal and centrifugal forces. It 
represents a field of heteroglossia created by mutual conditionings between centripetal 
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forces that strive to keep things together and unified, and centrifugal forces that strive to 
keep things separate, apart and different. This play of the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces of language builds a complex unity of oneself with the other because deliberation 
in politics resides neither in one’s intention nor in what one deliberates but rather at a 
point between one’s intention and that of another. On the one hand, the deliberation 
(like the word one speaks) is heretofore “half someone else’s.” (Bakhtin 1981: 293-294) 
In other words, preferences are one’s own only when one populates it with one’s own 
meanings. On the other hand, the preference that one deliberates is also populated in 
turn with the intention of another, for in the active life of the society one’s intention is 
always directed toward the active understanding of the other, which is itself populated 
with its own intentions. This is the dialogization of languages. In this dialogization of 
languages, Bakhtin’s dialogical paradigm privileges the centrifugal forces that not only 
resist the totalization of the meaning of democracy but also decentralizes the meaning of 
democracy towards heteroglossia. (Bakhtin, 1981: 273, 295-96) His dialogical paradigm 
produces a complex mixture of languages of democracy. This complex mixture is a 
generative dialogized heteroglossia that struggles to overcome differences to ensure a 
minimum level of mutual understanding in politics, or of varying approaches to 
democracy. (Bakhtin, 1981: 271-73) 
Dialogized heteroglossia refers not only to the complex unity of centers but also to the 
functionality of multi-voiced discursive acts that are at work in the language of 
democracy. Dialogized heteroglossia occurs constantly through a process of 
hybridization, both deliberate and spontaneous. Hybridization “is a mixture of two social 
languages within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an 
utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another 
by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor.” (Bakhtin, 1981: 304, 347, 
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358) Hybridization is deliberative as a democratic device in the politics. It is also 
spontaneous and as such is the primary means of change in a politics.  
Hybridization is the primary means of combining individualistic and communitarian 
meanings of democracy. Neither the individual nor the community can exist in extreme 
conditions of unalloyed individualism or collectivism. Unless a political system is a hybrid 
of difference-centered and unity-centered features, it cannot be a democracy that is 
committed to both difference and unity through self-government on a dialogical basis. 
This is to say that a genuine democracy must be representative of dialogues of different 
approaches, emphases and meanings, and it must be able to combine all elements of 
particularistic and collectivistic meanings reflecting those of the individual and the 
community by moving toward dialogized heteroglossia. Otherwise, it cannot resolve the 
tension that ensues from a lop-sided particularism or a lop-sided wholism. 
Dialogized heteroglossia prevents the establishment of a democratic model to achieve 
some particular end because it is an act of understanding each voice from the perspective 
of the others. It resists the continual attempt of domination where certain voices 
subordinate other voices under its own parameters. Bakhtin implied that dialogized 
heteroglossia is an imperative of democracy in that different voices and languages 
required dialogical interaction before they could make themselves apparent. This 
interaction was necessary; otherwise, their identities remained unfinished and incomplete 
without dialogue. Bakhtin (1997: 252) writes 
When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue by its very essence 
cannot and must not come to an end… All else is means; dialogue is the 
end. A single voice ends nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the 
minimum for life, the minimum for existence…. Dialogue here is not the 
threshold of action, it is the action itself. It is not a means for revealing, 
for bringing to the surface the already ready-made character of a person: 
no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he 
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becomes for the first time what he is, and we repeat, not only for others 
but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. 
 
In this respect, if democracy refers to openness and readiness to engage in dialogue, it 
cannot be constructed as means for a common good, a foundational epistemology or a 
new political method, but rather as a self-regulating interaction. Self-regulation is a form 
of regulatory communication. Unlike other regulatory communications, this form of 
regulation is not imposed upon the interlocutors. This communication mode allows the 
individuals and groups to regulate themselves, i.e. to make decisions that will control or 
limit the behavior of their members. Thus, this form of regulation comes from the inside 
of the dialogue, which means self-government where there is no separation between ruler 
and ruled ones. Self-regulation is also a kind of self-organizing process enabling agents to 
rule themselves.  
The self-regulating and self-organizing characteristics of dialogue is not manipulated by 
dominance of belief that obligates attempts for reaching some determinate state or end 
(e.g. agreement or mutual understanding). At the heart of self-regulating practice is 
mutual respect and empathy. Mutual respect and empathy are positions that are not static 
and fixed, but are dynamic and grounded in the social world. Their authority comes from 
not grounding, expressed as a consensus of the participants but as recognition of 
differences without negations or understandings, that necessitates equality and freedom 
of participation in the realm of dialogue. The self-regulative process of dialogue, by its 
critical nature, is autonomous process that is not limited or confined by the constraints of 
essentiality such as truth and agreement. The function of dialogue is to bring about a 
democratic action that is free in itself, and not for the benefit for any individual or group. 
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In Bakhtinian terms, free action may be described as responsibility or responsive 
understanding and answerability. (Bakhtin, 1986: 68-69; 126-27) We can make some 
general points about responsibility as obligations to answer. Obligation to answer refers 
to self-regulation as a social, ethical activity of responsible agents. It makes utterances are 
genuinely free when they are taken out of obligation to answerability alone. That is to say, 
people must not act out of compulsion or mere self-interest. When someone acts with no 
other motivation than a sense of responsibility (i.e. civic virtue), he or she does so 
because he or she recognizes the value of dialogicality that is valid a priori. By contrast, if 
someone acts in order to engender a particular result, then he or she is motivated beyond 
mere responsibility.  
Moreover, responsibility (i.e., answerability) should entail respect for meanings of 
dialogicality. Anyone can act spontaneously. Chance events could produce positive 
results. But only through dialogue can people recognize new meanings and act out of 
respect for it. Thus, this position considers that meanings are of value and that they are 
an imperative of dialogue. By extension then, democracy that embodies this dialogue 
transcends all other concerns and interests. 
A particular point to note is that self-regulated and self-organized dialogue transcends the 
unity or homogeneity of identity that can be expressed by any person or group. It is not 
something that can be passed on to future generations. Rather, self-regulated and self-
organized dialogue is a discontinuity across time and place in terms of non-identity. As 
such, it is free of holistic meanings or totalistic views as well as clearly demarcated 
boundaries between conceptual categories. Self-regulated and self-organized dialogue is 
systematic in the sense it is a communicative framework that maximizes the likelihood 
that the participants can attain their own chosen ends 
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Self-regulated and self-organized dialogue consists of carnivalistic initiatives of 
spontaneity. Spontaneous dialogue is characterized by multi-voicedness, wherein 
participants pursue their own desires and ends and interact through a self-governing 
system of exchange rather than by being coordinated in terms of a specifiable goal. 
Indeed, one can say that spontaneous dialogue exists to serve democracy. Self-organizing 
dialogical democratic systems generally coordinate information, enabling the 
harmonization (as much as possible) of people’s independent pursuit of varied and 
unpredictable goals. This coordination process may be impeded or assisted by changes in 
the practical regulations generating the democratic order, but those participating within it 
cannot be regarded as means to be calculated efficiently if the order is to be truly 
spontaneous.  
It follows that the character of regulations and procedures found in an instrumentalist 
dialogical democracy differs from that found in a non-instrumentalist dialogical 
democracy. Because an instrumentalist dialogical democracy directly pursues a goal such 
as the common good, its regulations and procedures for participants reflect and subsist to 
that end. These regulations and procedures need not be direct instructions, but all can be 
oriented toward assisting that democracy in attaining its goals and in allocating different 
positionalities to different people. In the process, regulations and procedures can easily 
create new positions as centers within the dialogical endeavor of democracy. This means 
that hierarchies among people can be a direct result of regulations and procedures that 
are oriented toward achieving a democracy. 
In contrast, regulations and procedures generating a non-instrumentalist dialogical 
democracy are fundamentally egalitarian in that all people are in a give-and-take position 
in relationship to those regulations and procedures. That is, regulations and procedures 
are continuously adopted or changed. The character of a non-instrumentalist dialogical 
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democracy is closely connected with the notion of freedom that challenges the fixity of 
discourses in creative practice. Various views expressed in the field of dialogue can be 
seen in a dynamic with particularistic interpretations based on different experiences, 
across history, economic and social systems. Dialogue can then be seen as the expression 
of self-government, which can be used in different forms, in different arenas, and with 
different effects for different groups of people. 
Bakhtin’s approach to dialogue and hence democracy is about freedom and creating 
indeterminate spaces for change. The point and value of dialogue for people lie in 
spontaneous freedom. Spontaneity occurs when the unexpectedness and randomness of 
actions are attributed to the fact that those actions were responsively, reflexively and 
autonomously provoked rather than produced as the outcome of calculated deliberations. 
Each participant is autonomous; each intervenes in the other, not causally through 
dialogue in which one determines the other but by virtue of dialogical interaction. 
Dialogical interaction is a dynamic or temporized process. Each successive reply by one 
participant prompts reconfiguration within his or her partner, which in turn prompts a 
new configuration of the partner and so on. This ongoing process is emergent or creative 
in the sense that each reply is an act upon a previous or ongoing act. 
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism as a model of democracy entails a notion of citizenship that 
is egalitarian in character, and that refers to individuals’ power relations. Because its 
normative attitude is self-government, its aspiration is not that of reproducing collective 
identities in terms of sameness, but that of giving voice to political relations of capability 
that situates individuals belonging to a body of collectivity in a position of subordination. 
Thus, Bakhtin’s view of democracy rests on a conception of citizenship that unifies the 
two basic forms of equalities that have belonged to republican and liberal models of 
democracy. The first form is the equality of right. This concept implies a basic and 
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straightforward form of equality that grants all citizens the right to equal participation. 
The second form is equality of capability. This form of equality gives all citizens an equal 
opportunity to express their preferences publicly. The combination of both forms of 
equality accords substance to the self-regulated and self-organized character of dialogue 
that not only promotes consent but also interplay of contesting voices. 
 
V.4. Conclusion 
The major difference between the classical republican theory of democracy and the 
classical liberal theory of democracy lies in their different approaches to the principles of 
individual and society. Liberals emphasize the importance of individuals over the unity of 
the people as a whole or the community, while republicans stress that the priority must 
be to the well-being and unity of the people as a whole. To rephrase, a liberal theory of 
democracy considers the protection of individual freedoms fundamental to the very 
nature of democracy and rejects an emphasis on a strong role for morality in the 
conceptualization of democracy. In contrast, the classical republican approach favors the 
participation of the people in the political process for the realization of the good of the 
people as a whole. It also focuses on societal values for keeping morality well connected 
to democratic theory. For republicans, morality is important because they want 
simultaneously to protect the individual and society. These theorists aim to prompt the 
notion of justice by postulating equal respect for each citizen. At the same time, societal 
values are associated with the notion of solidarity as the realization of community as 
whole  
Democratic theories reflecting these different orientations of republican and liberal 
approaches may be categorized as individual-difference-centered or community-unity-
centered. These two categories reflect a distinction between what has been called self-
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determination of the person and self-determination of the whole. Self-determination of 
the person refers to the capacity of the individual to act autonomously. Self-
determination of the whole refers to the capacity of the people to self-govern. These 
theories attempt to organize the relationships of self-determination of the person in such 
a way that the integrity of the individual and the well-being of the community are 
protected or realized. Nevertheless, because practical political arrangements of democracy 
require choices of primary value on behalf of the individual or community, liberal and 
republican theories of democracy place different emphasis on behalf of the individual or 
community. Even when one side is privileged over the other, such recognition provides 
an alternative point of view for the establishment of dialogue for further 
conceptualization of the theory of democracy.  
Any particular model of democracy that can exist in practice will be an outcome of the 
dialogue between these two different theoretical emphases. These emphases also consist 
of fundamental differences, which cannot be easily settled without undermining the 
freedom of the individual or the rule of the people as a whole, both of which are key to 
an understanding of democracy in contemporary life. However, if each emphasis is 
extended to the extreme, democracy loses the dialogical characteristics necessary for its 
development. To deny the importance of the freedom of the individual or the rule of the 
people as a whole is to attack the dialogical base of democracy. Therefore, democracy has 
to commit to a dialogue not only between individual and community but also between 
liberal and republican approaches.  
In its dialogical attempt to reconcile the liberal tradition with the republican, the 
deliberative model assigns more of an emphasis on the possibility of achieving a fully 
inclusive rational consensus or agreement while agonistic model calls attention to the 
ineradicability of antagonism in the field of democracy. Certainly, by stating that 
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democracy cannot be reduced to the aggregation of preferences (taking place through 
political parties for which people would have the power to vote at regular intervals), both 
deliberative and agonistic models present comprehensive views of democracy. However, 
deliberative democrats tend to raise the tension or dichotic division between difference 
and unity and are therefore unable to come to terms with an adequate understanding of 
the main task of democracy. Both approaches to democracy appear to be either a 
rationalist one that leaves aside the crucial role played by contingency in the field of 
politics or one of conflict that pays no attention to the shared values that are necessary to 
constitute not only democracy but also dialogue.  
In contrast to polarized understandings of democracy, Bakhtin’s model of dialogue 
reflects a pluralism of language that supports the combination of different theoretical 
emphases as well as the attainment of difference in unity. The specificity of Bakhtin’s 
approach resides in promoting a form of consensus as well as difference. Another 
distinctiveness of the Bakhtinian approach is its attempt to provide a solid basis of 
allegiance to the notion of contingency as well as rationality by reconciling the idea of 
Socratic dialogue with the defense of carnivalistic dialogue. In this sense, the Bakhtinian 
approach to democratic theory acknowledges both the antagonistic character of politics 
and the importance of achieving an inclusive rational consensus. Therefore, it has more 
capacity to imagine the main challenge facing democratic politics today: how to establish 
a dialogical realm that will help mobilize a rationale and enthusiasm for democracy. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY 
VI.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have maintained that democracy develops in time and space 
not as a fixed universal concept, somehow contrived from a chorus of pluralistic voices 
into a single utterance, but as a contested political concept (i.e. self-government). For in 
presenting that self-government is the root concept of democracy, it has also been 
presented that it is a normative view, one that is dependent on comprehensive 
conceptions. Comprehensive normative conceptions represent different theories that not 
only attempt to construct the concept of democracy in different ways but also seek to 
describe background conditions of that ideal—the basic structure of democratic society. 41 
In other words, normative conceptions of democracy have two main features. The first is 
to have its basis in certain fundamental values latent in comprehensive theories and to be 
guided by deeper concepts of language and self-government. Secondly, normative 
conceptions of democracy are committed to set and to pursue particular ends, to 
construct and implement an idea of democracy. This idea is adopted and guided by 
metaphysical conceptions of the communitarianism and individualism. That means that 
these metaphysical conceptions formalize moral norms of democracy and act upon them. 
For these normative conceptions of democracy, the primary subject of democracy is the 
basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major political 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties. By major institutions it is 
understood the political constitution and the main procedural arrangements. Political 
                                                 
41 In his theory of justice, Rawls formulate basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice. He assumes that 
the basic structure of the society, which indicates constitutions and sub-set of social political and economic 
institutions enable people to meet the principles of justice. For this reason, the principles of justice that Rawls derives 
from the original position employ for organization of the basic structure of society. For Rawls, basic structures of 
society are involved with the distribution of primary goods that make people’s lives rich, fruitful, and enjoyable and 
social primary goods that include rights, liberties, power, opportunities, income, wealth, and self-respect. When 
persons enter the original position to derive principles of justice, they will be concerned with finding principles that 
will order the basic structure of society in not only a just manner but also in democratic way. (Rawls 1971: 3-17, 54-
90, 100-108, 258-265 and 1993: 175) 
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constitution is the primary subject of each conception of democracy because its effects 
are so profound and present from the start. It is a sub-set of political procedures and 
institutions, which, in turn, becomes a sub-set of political practices. The norms of 
constitution apply to all citizens, in a sense: they are constrained by the norms of 
constitution that constrain political institutions. Here a political institution refers to a 
group of citizen who follows rules. This means that the political constitution, which 
shapes the basic structure of institution, also regulates citizen’s behavior. Therefore, it is 
not only necessary to make the basic structure of democracy subject to supreme authority 
but also essential to make political constitution a subject of democracy. In other words, 
the dialogical democracy that we are considering is principally concerned with turn taking 
systems as basic structure of dialogue. The main feature of this turn taking system is to 
manage the reciprocal disposition between rulers and ruled one. This means that one can 
only be a ruler if he or she is ruled (i.e., self-government). Therefore, in this chapter, I will 
argue that in order to meet principles of self-government, it is necessary to establish a 
system of reciprocity that constantly shifts borders between rulers and ruled. 
In the initial section of this chapter, I argue that the different conceptions of democracy 
employ the idea of constitution as a normative, descriptive and regulative principle for 
eliciting setting each particular conception of democracy. The idea is that once these 
normative, descriptive and regulative principles are preferred, a constitution is shaped to 
embody those principles. In other words, different conceptions of democracy support 
various models of constitution involving a sustained and focused attempt to conduct 
behavior of citizens and actions of institutions according to identified norms and 
principles with intention of producing particular normative conception of democracy. A 
constitution that is formed to support particular different conceptions of democracy 
cannot be seen as a judicial activity performed only by officially authorized actors but its 
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very meaning is as wide as Tully and Habermas adopted. A constitution is thus 
understood here to be not only the communicative, intentional and goal directed but also 
dialogical involving unintended and unforeseen consequences produced by relations 
between addresser and addressee or author and reader. The constitution is emphasized 
here, as an “open text” that is always incomplete and subject to the ongoing exercise of 
self-government, as changing contexts and historical situations require. Because the 
dialogue is characterized by openness and reflexiveness, the principles of the constitution 
must remain open as reflexive so as well.  
In the second part of this chapter, I discuss classical accounts of the constitution – 
republican and liberal—and explain why the different conceptions of democracy seek to 
ground the constitution in generally agreed procedures. It will be argued that constitution 
is required by democracy because as a general procedure it corresponds to a conception 
of democracy (that is, it is a procedure that provides and secures equal rights and 
liberties), and because of its tendency to produce righteous outcomes (i.e. common 
good). It will also be maintained that constitution has authority above the will of the 
people only if it is dialogical, or (more strongly) if it is collectively dialogued by the 
people.  
In the third part of this chapter, I will discuss the circular and reciprocal relationship 
between democracy and the constitution. This relationship may entail that the 
constitution can be formulated prior to and above democracy or within the democracy 
and itself thereby framing the democracy. Each relationship corresponds to a distinctive 
moment of dialogism. The first refers to the extraordinary, instituting moment of 
intervention (i.e. mediator). To get collective decisions to be based on dialogue, it seems 
indispensable to employ a generally agreed procedure that conforms the principles of 
equality and freedom (that is, it is a procedure that not only recognize everyone’s equal 
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rights and liberties but also safe guards very notions of them against the tyranny of the 
majority). Second, democracy is contained by the constitution because constitution has 
authority only if it is based on actual consent, or (more strongly) if it is democratically 
authorized by the people as a whole. The second relationship represents the moment of 
formal, economic, political, and social institutions of society. This relationship protects, 
consolidates and reproduces the basic structure of democratic society. Basic structure of 
democratic society is about dialogue. Finally, the third relationship denotes the starting 
position from which people will decide on principles of democratic society. The idea is 
that once these principles of democratic society are concluded, then a constitution can be 
shaped to embody those principles. The constitution will then set up a governing 
democratic body, which will enact laws and regulation that accord with the constitution 
and therefore the basic principles of democratic community. At the end, administrators 
and individual citizens who must decide how to respond to the laws and regulation in the 
light of their own beliefs about the situation, and (at least in the case of individual 
citizens) their views of democracy. Here the starting position become a self-referential 
and self-reflexive dialogical position. Repeatedly, these citizen deliberations follow the 
conduct that is accord with the principles constitution. However, this cannot always the 
case. Sometimes the change in the superior position constitution is introduced. This 
change in the superior of positions of constitution means that there is also a change in 
the process of legitimatizing constitution as democratic. It is now will of the people mark 
out the conditions of constitution as the procedure or form of discourse as the central 
praxis of democracy 
VI.2. Conception of Democratic Constitution 
The conception of democracy cannot hinge on particular metaphysical principles for the 
regulation of the relations of political actors since each people have different his or her 
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own arrangement of life. What it is needed to establish referential set of principles, which 
enables political actors to live peacefully together despite their differences. These 
principles are the principles of constitution: they provide a way of assigning rights and 
duties in the basic institutions of democratic society and they define the appropriate 
distribution of the task and responsibilities of political institutions. Among actors with 
disparate aims and purposes, a shared conception of referential constitution establishes 
the bonds of citizenship and constitutes the fundamental charter of a well-ordered 
democratic association. In order to be completely legitimate and referential, such a 
constitution derives their validity from the sovereign will of the people (Rousseau, 1988: 
98-110). The close association of the constitution with the sovereign will of the people 
affirms conditions of self-government.  
The conditions of self-government refer to two level processes. In the first level, citizens 
who are sovereign communicative agent with right to rule, determine forms, ratifies 
constitution. This basic structure includes rules for holding office, exercising power, and 
making political decisions. It establishes basic rights, as well as the form and limits of the 
power. It also ensures people’s participation in decision-making, as well as government 
accountability, through freedom. In the second level, citizens become subject to the 
structures, rules and processes of constitutional system so laid down. Compliance with 
the constitutional provisions by the political actors would be secured through a system of 
checks and balances, notably including an independent judiciary, incorporated in the 
constitution itself. With constitutional rule, the citizen has become both sovereign 
communicative agent with right to rule and subject with right to be ruled. Right in this 
context refers to capability for it being capable of self-government that sovereign will of 
the people can realized. Unless citizens have rights to achieve this level of self-
government, the other moments of democracy cannot be accomplished. Therefore, these 
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two levels correspond to two fundamentally different forms of democratic activity. The 
first level of dialogue involves more about approval, while the second level involves 
endorsement. At the first level, basic principles for instituting basic rights and freedom 
are mark out. At the second level, basic principles for regulating the relationship between 
the rulers and ruled ones are defined 
Accordingly, to the principle of self-government constitutions carry out at least three 
broad functions in order to establish a democratic system:  First, it establishes basic 
structures that specify the basic rights and freedoms of citizens. Here structures refer on 
the one hand to the empowerment of capacities or developments of citizens, on the other 
hand to the limits and restrictions on the arbitrary use of power. In other words, 
affirmation and protection of basic rights and freedoms is the main purpose of the rule of 
constitution. To this end, the constitution establishes fundamental principles that 
determine the general structure of democratic system (Rawls, 1993:227). This 
constitutional democratic system is based on the separation of powers. Separation of 
powers means dividing power between executive, legislative and judicial branches. 
Separation of power by constitution creates systems check and balances that each 
executive, legislative and judicial branches capable to control the actions of one another.  
Second, constitutions ensure respect for people’s autonomy. This is the principle that all 
powers in a democracy ought to expand, not restrict, people’s potential to determine their 
own life. In order to do that constitution binds all the use of power to the rule of law. 
First, the rule of law of contributes on the one hand to the freedom of individuals who 
are able to believe, act, and express themselves freely so long as doing so does not violate 
the rights of other individuals, on other hand to equality of rights that provide means for 
equal treatment individual under the law. Second, the rule of law limits all power action 
for the good of freedom. Power holders are only able to take action provided they have 
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the authority. Moreover, they are not allowed to bestow themselves authority. Authority 
can only be given by the constitution or through will of the people. By binding authority 
to the rule of law, the freedom of the citizen is guaranteed.  
Third, constitution reflects the will of the political sovereign. In democratic system, 
people are the only source of governing power. (Rousseau 1998: 103) Hence they are the 
sovereign and their sovereign status gives them constitutional right to govern themselves.  
Sovereignty of people is democratic principle that reflects the will of the people and it 
forms bases for a majority rule. In democratic systems, the consistency of constitution 
with sovereignty of people also requires account for limitation of power of a majority rule 
in protecting everybody’s basic equal rights and freedom to govern themselves. 
Therefore, constitution can be considered as existing within a strained relationship to 
majority’s rule, since it serves in limiting power, even if this power is derived from the 
democratic principle of sovereignty of people. Constitutional constraints on rule of 
majority are consistent with popular sovereignty because these constraints are themselves 
chosen by the people for protection against the ruler (sovereign). In other words, 
constitutions are framed with the joint convictions and deep agreement of all its citizens 
to respect and safeguard the basic rights of freedom and equality with rights of 
participation. (Rawls 1993.229) Only with constitutional limitation of majority power, 
basic rights can be secured over the long term. Therefore, constitution can be seen as the 
principle of self-government and the dialogical rule that not only reflect the will of the 
people forming the majority’s rule but also prevents the majority’s rule from imposing 
restrictions on the freedoms and rights of the citizens is provided  
At three levels, constitution can also be conceived of as regulative of two kinds: principles 
structuring the composition and organization of the fundamental political institutions and 
principles specifying fundamental rights and liberties of citizenship. These principles 
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contain different sets of values. These values are central to shaping the characteristics of 
democracy according to the different conceptions. They contain a prescriptive quality of 
‘oughtness.’ Thus, they present what can be done, what ought to be done, as well as what 
should not be done. In this context, normative underpinnings of constitutions provide 
means and ends for the process of democracy. These means and ends can be called 
values of democracy and they reflect ideas such as freedom and equality. These ends are 
conceptual ideals and supply criteria on which to evaluate political action.  
The notion of regulation adopted here is that of process concerning the persistent 
attempt to adjust the actions of political actors according identified principles of 
democracy. Regulative function is thus not seen as an doings performed only by legal 
institutions, but the idea includes every constituent power of democratic people. In other 
words, the notion of regulation includes communications that occurs as a dialogue 
between rulers and ruled ones. Regulatory notions of constitution are significant feature 
of democracy in a number situation. First, the regulatory function of constitution is 
characterized by constraints on the governance. It involves compliance to the rules, 
standards and principles. Constraints on governance are consistent sovereignty of people. 
Therefore, they represent the constraints that are chosen by the people. This way 
regulative function of constitution creates strong emphasis on the addresser citizens as 
well as the addressed citizen that self-government that citizens are ruled by but also shape 
the structures in which they act. 
The second, the regulative function of constitution involves communicative activity with 
produce of shared meanings and understandings that form certainties at political and 
social bases of dialogical actions. The development of shared meanings and 
understandings is characterized by both collective reliance authority of the laws and rules 
of the democracy and where unleashed actions filtered. Here filtering unleashed actions 
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refers to dialogical space within and between rules in which democratic society exercise 
preference. The regulative aspects of constitutions also contain coordinative activity for 
the political process because only they conduct the actions of political agents according 
identified purposes of democracy such as sovereignty of people. As such, these 
conceptions prescribe how those agents should act within the political course in order to 
reach the goal of democracy. Therefore, they are closely connected with institutionalizing 
the rules and procedures for the processes of democracy or the regulation of actions that 
are likely to succeed in improving the dialogical quality of democracy.  
Thirdly, the constitution can be perceived as descriptive power in that it builds objects of 
democracy not just reflects them. The descriptive function of constitution portrays a 
system of political organization in which all is governed by the supreme rule, and in 
which only the people’s will can supersede and change the supreme rule. In portraying 
the form and character of a political system, the descriptive concept of constitution 
provides no basis on which to evaluate or justify different forms of democratic life. Thus, 
there is no basis upon which then advocating one form of democracy rather than 
another. It only establishes bases for an understanding of how the system of democracy 
works and what its constituent nature entails without imposing certain values on political 
agents, i.e. it does not attempt to suppress the political agent’s autonomous voice.  
The constitution combines some or all these normative, regulative and descriptive 
functions in varying degrees to comprise a series of specific and complex institutional 
operations which contribute to the construction of the dialogue with the authorial 
function within the context of democracy. The authorial function can be described in 
political terms as a superaddressee or anchor of meaning that provides some kind of 
fixed value to language and practices of democracy. Foucault specifically describes four 
main characteristics of the authorial function, which operate within a specific dialogical 
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context. (Foucault 1979b: 101-120) The first of these traits delves into the presence of 
power that performs within a certain political dynamic. This trait serves as a means of 
circulation, and it outlines the operation of certain discourses that determine both the 
development and the construction of the key institutions that shape governance in 
political society. The second meaning of the authorial function is that of the series of 
specific practices or group of practices, and complex procedures, which contribute to the 
construction of the referential locus within a certain political community. The third point 
of the authorial function stresses complex political and cultural operations whose 
functionality is to construct the higher authority or a superaddressee for not only 
expanding and enriching the dialogical practices without denying the free expression of 
preference political agents, but also insuring a “protection” through which minorities can 
flee the oppressions of the majority. Finally, the authorial function refers to a thoroughly 
consistent dialogic position that operates as a unifying agent for the generation of the 
unity of language as illustrative of heteroglossia. 
The authorial function of the constitution is more complex than it seems to be. It is part 
of a larger system of discourses, practices and procedures that serve to limit and restrict 
asymmetric relationships of power that constrain dialogue and shape the manner and 
direction of the political process toward the tyranny of the majority. This means that all 
democracies are at risk. Therefore, the authorial function of the constitution or 
superaddressee is required for democracy precisely because inequalities of power occur 
between political agents, and because democracy is always constrained by the power 
interests that impinge upon it. When the political process is constrained and directed 
towards the fixity of the good life in one direction that is determined by strong interests 
of power groups, it is necessary to establish a higher authority or superaddressee to create 
not only a referential point of impartiality through which the citizens take equal and 
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active role in determining their life process or protection through which people can flee 
the oppressions of majority, Subsequently, this higher authority or superaddressee can 
also cancel the imminent hierarchy between one and another or ruler and ruled 
altogether, but also a tripartite dialogue in which people are objects (of authorial 
consciousness) subjects (of their own directly governing will). 
The emphasis on this authorial function of the constitution is especially important for the 
constitutional theory of democracy, because it is useful in enabling the use of more 
interconnected details on the theory of democracy. These linked devices may serve to 
complement the understanding, distinguishing and situating classical conceptions of a 
constitution such as those embodied in the republican and liberal models of democracy. 
For example, republican constitutional theory has often described the authorial function 
of the constitution as guiding and enabling activity in the public’s pursuit of the common 
good. In contrast to the republican theory of the constitution, classical liberal thought 
identifies the authorial function of the constitution as practice of protection of freedoms. 
Unlike both the aforementioned theories, the dialogical approach perceives the authorial 
function of the constitution as the superaddressee or higher authority that an agent 
addresses from a direct context. The people participate in this political process not as 
objects of the authority’s consciousness but as free people, capable of standing alongside 
a higher authority. In this system, people are not only objects of authorial communication 
but also subjects of their own directly governing communicative action, and together they 
become a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices (Waldron, 1999: 83-87).  
In the theory of democracy, numerous approaches have been advanced for the discussion 
of the normative, regulative and descriptive conceptions of the constitution, and it would 
be impossible to cover all of them here. As a result, brief overviews of some of the 
classical approaches in favor of dialogical democracy will have to suffice. Therefore, I will 
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first emphasize classical republican and liberal theories as the most obvious point of view 
for explaining the rationale of the constitution with activity analogous to the authorial 
function in democratic activity. After describing the main characteristics of both these 
classical approaches, I will consider the dialogical concept of the constitution which will 
depict not only the ruler and ruled or one and another, a presence or observer but also 
that of a third participant, the superaddressee that takes part in the political process and 
becomes a participant in the dialogue, although on a special level. I refer to the third one 
as the higher authority and the activity as analogous to the authorial function of the 
constitution in democracy. 
Classical Republican 
Constitution  (e.g., Aristotle and 
Rousseau) 
Classical Liberal Constitution 
(e.g., Bentham and J. S. Mill) 
Dialogical Constitution 
(e.g. James Tully) 
Collective Rights (rights are 
necessary for realization of 
collective ability to pursue 
common good) 
 
 
Individual rights (rights are 
necessary individual ability to 
choose what one values in life) 
 
Performative Rights (rights are 
necessary for establishing active 
citizenship in the pursuit of 
autonomous, though 
interdependent lives 
Positive Liberty (freedom is civic 
achievement) 
Negative Liberty (freedom is 
natural attribution of individual) 
Critical Freedom (freedom is 
action)  
 
Common interests in goods 
(political participation is a crucial 
for the promotion of the 
common good) 
Aggregation of individual 
interests (political participation is 
a important for recognition of 
aggregation of individual self-
interests) 
Dialogue (political participation is 
important for empowerment of 
dialogue that elicits new and 
respectful relationships with 
shared understandings. 
Linear: Teleological/substantive 
(good before right) 
Perpendicular: 
Deontological/proceduralist 
(right before good) and 
Consequentalist/utilitarian 
(happiness as a good before right)  
Dialogical: 
Polyphonic/Intertextual 
Centralizing: Homogeneity, Unity 
of citizens  
Decentralizing: Plurality, 
Autonomy of citizens 
Simultaneously Centrifugal and 
Centripetal: Heteroglossia, Unity 
of citizens with difference 
Normative/Conductive Descriptive/Protective Regulative/ Facilitative 
Sovereign self-government  Checks and balances of power  Authorial function with general 
tone of superaddressee  
Positive/Constructive Negative/unconstructive, neutral Symmetrical/Deconstructive 
Value based Reason based Tripartite dialogue based (e.g. the 
relations of author, hero and 
reader) 
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VI.2.1. Classical Republican Conception of the Constitution 
Republicanism provides an influential view of the possibility of an appropriately designed 
constitution to achieve a democracy. A constitution is most often considered a vehicle for 
empowering certain conceptions of democracy, especially a constitution that citizens not 
only control but who also have a responsibility to uphold. Such conceptions are abstract, 
procedural, and rooted in the republican political philosophy that emphasizes the 
obligation of citizens to act virtuously in pursuit of the common good. Central to the 
republican approach is the principle of a common good that is publicly produced and 
limited in the democratic aims it embodies. However, simultaneously, it is also focused 
on the collectivity it must fulfill. Thus, the common good is only possible if constituted 
collectively and institutionalized by a constitution that is principally designed to “express” 
all the common interests held by the citizenry. 
Republicans have been consistently encouraged by the fact that constitutions are not a 
certain kind of institution that has to be desired in and for itself – i.e. as an intrinsic 
aspect of a certain kind of democracy. Rather they are a part of the instrumental 
regulation of a political system. They do pursue specific norms and incentives in the sense 
of tending towards a certain conception of democracy. Therefore, it is a conception 
whose details is and can be subject to discussion. Republican deliberation of the 
constitution as the background condition for democracy can be traced to ancient 
Athenian city-state. In Athenian city-state, constitution technically meant a political 
system based on liberty, a liberty that is core republican approach. Liberty means an 
exercise of self-government by a people. It signifies to rule and to be ruled in turn. 
(Artistotle, 1992: 362-364 or 1317a40-b17)  
The heart of the republican argument, to say again, is that the liberty of each individual 
reliant on social sense of being expressed in political community. Social sense of being of 
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each individual also depends on living together independently under just and equal laws – 
being ruled by constitution, as Aristotle states it - in an independent or self-governing 
republic. In ancient thought, living together independently under just and equal laws 
could mean many different things and require many different actions. Firstly, republican 
conception of liberty refers to a form of identity and social belonging. Aristotle notably 
express: “man is by nature political animal.” (Aristotle 1992: 59 or 12153a1-7). Then he 
suggests that their happiness (eudemonia), interlinked one another as it is with that of their 
wives, children and friends (Aristotle, 1996: 11-12 or 1097b8-14) It is for this reason that 
people come together to live in common social life. Since their happiness (eudemonia) 
requires communal achievement, people also come together to form political associations 
to provide necessary conditions for maintenance of social life. These conditions are 
expressed in household management and in constitutional rule of city-state, which binds 
all. (i.e. republic) (Aristotle, 1992:57-59 or 1256a1-b39; 1252a34-1252b27 and 1996: 153 
or 1141b34). Therefore, in Aristotle’s view, constitution as being authorized by 
independent political exercise of the will of the people is connected with three issues: it 
satisfies people’s compulsion towards a social life; it gives people a share in the 
eudemonia, which refers to their good life; and it helps people to live independently. 
Aristotle here suggests three ends for which the constitution has to work: social life, 
which expresses happiness with fulfillment of natural impulse; political life, which is to 
communicate the good that is shared by citizens; and independent life, which states 
individual life that has a value in itself. 
Secondly republican idea of liberty refers to a political status, set of rights for active 
participation and self-determination, as a political identity (the virtuous citizen). In 
connection to these points, Aristotle distinguished three different types constitution or 
political system: rule by “the one” (monarchy), by “the few” (oligarchy), and by “the 
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many” (polity). (Aristotle, 1992: 189-190; 1289a22-1279b10) The most important way in 
which these systems differ, in Aristotle’s view, is in their aims or goals (Aristotle, 1992 
1289a17-28), that is to say, in their ability to activate participation and common good. 
(Aristotle 1992: 428 or 1332a9-10) In other words, Aristotle’s categorization of 
constitution reliant on (1) the ends pursued by constitution and (2) the kind of authority 
exercised by their rule. For Aristotle the common good life has to be the chief end both 
for the constitution as a rule of the whole and for each of people individually. Those 
constitutions that contribute most to the common good (i.e. which contribute most to 
good action of people) are right type of constitution and those constitutions that 
contribute most to self-interest are deviant type of constituents. From here, Aristotle 
shaped another systematic distinction in types of constitutions, based on who ruled in 
constitution and how they support the selfish good of the ruling authority. He suggests 
that if the constitutional rule of monarchy only aims to increase the monarch's wealth and 
power, then constitutional rule becomes to represent a tyranny; if constitutional rule of 
aristocracy supports benefit of the few rich, Aristotle referred to such a constitutional rule 
as an oligarchy, and if the constitutional rule of polity supports benefit of the poor, 
Aristotle called such constitutional rule as democracy. (Aristotle 1992: 193-198, 333, 342 
and 362-363 or 1280a25-32, 1310a29, 1311a9-10 and 1317a40-41)  
The definitions and meanings of constitutions in Aristotle’s philosophy are 
uncomplicated especially within the context common good. For Aristotle, constitutions 
that are central to political life have to be reflection of the higher form of common good. 
Therefore, Aristotle’s account views right type of constitution as manifestation of 
common good while it considers deviant type of constitutions as image of particular 
interest. Right type of constitutions are distinguished by characteristics that those who 
rule act with regard to the interest of the whole, while deviant type of constitutions 
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contains characteristics those rulers who rule act in their own interest only. It is for this 
reason (i.e. to provide these necessary conditions to political system to act to the good of 
the whole) that the republican constitution is framed on the principle that its subjects are 
equal and free citizens and should hold government by turns. This principle implies that 
the responsibility of ruler is to exercise ruling not in the interest of the ruler but common 
good to both ruler and ruled because both ruler and ruled are same. The idea of 
responsibility indicates the sense of virtue. Virtue is a substance of doing the right things. 
(Aristotle 1976: 99-100 or 1105b26-1105b20) Therefore, citizens who hold government 
offices or who participates political process, should possesses the virtue for correctly 
understanding a situation and doing right thing for right end  (i.e., common good). 
Aristotle believes that if a special individual may possess a superior virtue, and therefore 
should be king. Thus, he maintains the idea that the rule of constitution, as interpreted by 
many rulers, should be virtuous. (Aristotle 1992: 395: or 1324a23-5) and (Pangle, 1987: 
111-113) Put another way, it is only in the right type of constitution that the virtues of a 
ruler coincide with that of a common good. (Aristotle: 1992: 190 or 1279a32 and 1996. 
231,232 or 1288a32-9, 1288b4) 
Because individual characters are differ from citizen to the citizen, the constitution should 
describe and endorse right conceptions of virtue. Rights conception of virtue are those 
based on human nature (active social life), so too the right type of constitution must also 
be based on the goods of social life, respecting needs, abilities, and freedom of 
individuals. The connection between the new issue of social life now raised and the issues 
of social life previously discussed is thus that both are determined by the fact of the 
constitution. It is that fact which determines the freedom of individual. It is also that 
point which shapes the relation of the good of political life to that of the good of the 
social life. This also means that self-government that is actuated this kind of positive 
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freedom because it allowed each citizen to participate in shaping the rules of conduct of 
social life (i.e. house management) that best promoted her own notion of happiness. 
(Aristotle, 1981: 361; 1317a40)   
The other freedom dimension of Aristotle’s view of constitution is ability to shape the 
conditions under which citizen lives their own social and political life. It is obvious how a 
constitutional rule can be thought to endorse this aspect of freedom. Part of a citizen’s 
life in a political association always will be regulated by constitution. To the extent the 
citizens can participate in determining how this constitutional rule is framed and the 
circumstances in which it will take effect, that citizens participates in shaping part of their 
own social and political life. Constitution is a form of democratic rule that allows this 
kind of participation; as such, it promotes the freedom derived from citizens ability to 
shape the conditions of their social and political life. 
Therefore, Aristotle believes that the purpose of every constitution is to help its subjects 
live the free life, and to achieve that goal, the active participation of the citizenry is 
required. (Aristotle, 1981: 362; 1317a40) Each citizen, through his or her situation, 
possesses different opinions about the good. The rule of constitution needs to be 
informed of a wide range of propositions to ensure that its policies equally apply to every 
citizen. Since the resources utilized to assess and improve ruling for helping citizens live 
the social and political good life cannot be circumscribed in advance, there is no single 
mode of experience of the good life on which all citizen’s preferences can be based. All 
citizens should have equal capacity to pursue their own social and political good life 
freely; this goal is the most fundamental value the constitution can safeguard. This is not 
just a virtue of the constitution, but the most significant self-governing capacity that 
citizens have in a democracy 
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The lines of Aristotle’s thinking appear most clearly as a republican constitution, which 
specially identifies positive framework, based positive dimensions of freedom. Republican 
notion of positive framework relies upon the availability of participation in ruling. 
Participation is the only way to establish the citizens’s positive freedom to shape their 
own social life. The republican constitution does not seek to institute negative freedom 
by imposing severe limitations on the powers of rulers because citizens represent both 
rulers and rulers with engagement in self-government or taking turns in ruling and being 
ruled by their equals. This process of self-government is valuable as not only it allows the 
ruled ones to participate in the authorship of the laws that govern them but also it is also 
solution to the problem of domination in which one citizens or group of citizens have 
disproportionate power over the other citizens. The affirmation of this view is 
demonstrated in the master/slave relationship in which the imaginary goodwill of the 
master, who does not interfere with his slave’s preferences, does not free the latter from 
the situation of domination that is to be a slave. For the republicans, even the case of the 
slave is one of negative freedom; they assume one would not necessarily be free even if 
there were no interference. (Pettit, 1999: 165-172)  
Therefore, the republican approach emphasizes the constitution as a context that 
promotes positive freedom as the citizenry’s ability to be masters of their own lives. At its 
heart, republicanism asserts that democracy is only possible via a constitution, particularly 
a constitution that individuals have control over and responsibility for. The elucidation of 
incentives and norms of a constitution for the achievement of republican conceptions of 
democracy tended to develop around two positions. The first one rests on a conception 
of communitarian republicanism that stems from the work of Aristotle and Rousseau. 
The second one reflects the ideas reflected in individualistic republicanism, which is 
evident within the texts of Machiavelli and Pettit.  
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Individualistic republicans emphasize the constitutive relationship between the idea of 
non-domination and the constitution in democracy. According to republican thought, the 
pursuit of the common good is not a natural attribute but rather a public achievement 
that requires a context where rules, structures, or regularities structure a citizenry’s 
interaction with the common good.  
These rules, structures, or regularities that are combined by a constitution enable liberty. 
Here liberty is understood as a background condition of democracy and it is often 
described as non-domination. (Pettit, 1999: 163-165) Non-domination is understood as 
the avoidance of subordination or the elimination of one’s capacity arbitrarily interfering 
in another person’s life. The republican idea of non-domination arises only by a 
constitution that is independent. An independent constitution is both defined and 
constrained by the principle of the sovereign self-government of the people and is 
publicly controlled and focused on a common or public good. Thus, those who are 
responsible for the practice of the constitution must be free from domination by the state 
and by factional interests. In this way, a constitution that is defined and constrained by 
the principle of the sovereign self-government of the people and communicates non-
arbitrary interference does not cause liberty but constitutes it as non-domination. 
Therefore, republican constitutions, understood as constitutions of liberty, enable a 
democratic condition that is defined by the functionality of the diminution or elimination 
of arbitrariness. In its enabling characteristics, the constitution denotes a particular 
political order for minimizing the potential for any arbitrary or partial exercises of power 
that can lead to oppression and/or the disproportionate influence of the government on 
the people. (Reynolds, 1987: 91) They refer to the construction of an institutional 
framework that, if it functions impartially, guides decision-making more effectively and 
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sensitively and prevents power-holders from invoking concealment and shutting 
themselves off from criticisms, counter-arguments and different viewpoints.  
In contrast to an individualist republican’s emphasis on non-domination, communitarian 
republicans emphasize a constitution that can seek only ends and employ only means that 
are derived from the common good. In other words, at the center of communitarian 
republican thought is a strong constitution with a clear notion of the common good that 
is the general will of the people. The enabling function of the constitution to those who 
live within and control political society is central to the underlying values of 
communitarian republicanism Thus, fundamental to the communitarian republican 
tradition is the existence of a constitution that is publicly controlled and limited in the 
aims it is able to endorse, but is also focused on the common good. Therefore, for 
communitarian republicans, the constitution has a value or teleological meaning: what the 
constitution is cannot be separated from what is of value to a person, group or society. 
The constitution exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring that into being. In other 
words, the constitution has an end, and every democratic structure that is supported by it 
has a purpose. The purpose, or justification, of the constitution in any given community 
is the formation of the common good. The common good is the key to democracy: it 
frees the people from limitation to the restricted field of one’s own self-interested activity; 
it gives absolute grounding to one’s existence; and it certifies one’s value of the good.  
General republican themes of the constitution are both defined and controlled by the 
conceptions of unity, positive liberty, active participation, civic virtue, common good and 
popular sovereignty. For republicans, the strength of democracy, and hence unity of a 
community, resides in the cohesion of its citizens. Cohesion is attained through their 
participation in collective self-rule, and the constitution provides the necessary resources 
for the effective unity of the people. It represents an agreement for the construction of a 
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political society that would have priority over the individual, in which active participation 
is seen as the epitome of freedom. That is, liberty is only possible through the experience 
of participation. Thus, participation in a political community is the constitution of 
positive liberty. Such a constitution provides essential institutional support that enables 
people to maintain their ability to participate and compels winners to treat losers with 
respect. More concretely stated, the institutional task of a constitution is to enable citizens 
to participate as free and equal in delineating common aims, to ensure that the state has 
the capacity to pursue that objective, and to provide citizens with the powers they need to 
make certain that the state properly exercises that capacity. At this point, the constitution 
inculcates civic virtue that encourages individuals to subordinate their private interests for 
the sake of the common good or for a deeper appreciation of the intrinsic importance of 
public affairs concerning the political community. 
When mentioning the virtuous quality of a constitution, republicans meant the greater 
accountability and responsiveness of decision makers to citizens, i.e., those who directly 
rule; and it enhances self-government by effacing the distinction between rulers and those 
ruled. The people are legitimately assembled as a sovereign body and all separation 
between rulers versus those ruled are removed. Emphasizing widespread unity between 
rulers and the ruled provides the means for the citizenry to pursue the good life as they 
see fit. It does not prescribe the greatest good for its citizens in advance, but always leaves 
the good open to modification.  
At this point, the republican idea of the constitution appears as both a means and an end 
in itself, and as both instrumental and functional.42 The constitution supports the free and 
                                                 
42 Here the idea of the good can be seen as a dynamic event directed at the enhancement of self and society. 
The idea of the good is always developing toward a higher, unachieved yet achievable good. To recognize 
the unachieved good is a step toward its actualizing, but the process of striving is never completed: not 
because one never gets to the next or higher good, but the idea of the good always remains in the process 
of moving from one point of view to another. 
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equal participation of all citizens in achieving their own good—as a shared experience 
respectful of differences. Moreover, through that experience, each citizen’s idea of the 
good (greater and personal) is enhanced and enriched, along with his or her sense of 
identity. Only by actively participating in the governing process and sharing in the 
common idea of achieving the good can citizens realize their own versions of the good 
life. 
 
VI.2.2. Classical Liberal Conception of the Constitution 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that liberalism provides a powerful statement of the 
potential of a constitutionally designed democracy to achieve and protect negative 
conceptions of liberty. In this regard, the liberal model produces normative and 
regulative, negative conceptions of the constitution that express strong concern for 
structuring democracy. This is the case in order to engender certain outcomes that these 
theoretical approaches hold are important for liberal conceptions of democracy. 
Firstly, constitutional outcomes are emphasized in terms of neutrality. Neutrality 
functions of the constitution occur here as an outcome reflecting tolerance, the primacy 
of individual rights over the good, freedom of speech, plurality, as well as the 
independence of institutions, courts and government. The neutrality functions of a 
constitution refer to the establishment of a general scheme or framework of procedures 
according to which political relations that appear among individuals and between an 
individual and the state or between organizations are evaluated as proper, legitimate and 
justified. The matter of neutrality is of course the matter of a specific image of 
democracy, but it is also a matter of liberal suggestions concerning political and social 
relations that appear among human beings. In fact, it is tied to a given conception of the 
individual. The individual, according to the liberal conception, is an agent who has a 
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natural orientation towards free choices as a matter of his/her existence. However, this 
orientation does not refer the individual to particular, preferred conceptions—for 
instance, to a republican conception—one is free to choose her/his good within the 
structure of a given common good. In this context, the liberal approach develops a 
theory of constitution that defines the conditions of neutrality where individuals are 
viewed as agents who have natural orientations toward the free choices of their existence.  
Another outcome is that of the protection of individual liberty from any abuse of power. 
The idea of individual liberty is secured in a structural context within which power is 
distributed. A constitution helps specify who holds political power, what that power 
entails, and how it might be employed for the achievement and protection of individual 
liberty. It creates a discourse for the liberal idea of negative liberty. The liberal idea of 
negative liberty is also closely connected with conditions of non-interference. The 
conditions surrounding non-interference require a constitution that intervenes in those 
political activities that enact or potentially enact conditions of domination. It defines 
conditions where institutions are viewed as being involved in the structures of limited 
power. These conditions are arranged to secure a liberal pattern of individual liberty and 
they are combined with the idea of non-interference. It puts effective restraints on 
governmental power so as to minimize the abuse of governmental power in order to free 
the power of the individual for self-government. (Castiglione, 1996: 18-21) 
The idea of limited power is built into the liberal constitution through the description and 
regulation of the use of political power. The description of the use of political power 
applies to issues where actions of a government are restricted to its legitimate use of 
power, all of which is controlled by the public and the constitution. (Mill, 1956: 4) The 
descriptive and regulative use of power or limited government promotes individual 
freedom while giving the people a formidable voice in their self-government. Limited 
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government is built into the constitution through restrictions on the arbitrary use of 
power. (Mill, 1958: 128, 175) Limited government is also reinforced by the checking of 
power-by-power. 43 The checking of power is based on a separation of different powers. 
The familiar constitutional separation of powers is only part of that institutional story. In 
the system of separation of powers, the constitution functionally divides the political 
power distinguishing the legislative, executive and judicial institution of powers so that no 
single institution has the ability to exercise great power without the agreement of other 
institutions.  
The separation of powers operates not only in different areas of democratic systems (i.e. 
the executive, judicial and legislative) but also in acts horizontally within each branch of a 
democratic system. Here, the separation of powers does not mean a complete separation 
and absolute demarcation between the judicial, executive and legislative powers of a 
democratic system. A complete separation could make a democratic system chaotic, 
impracticable, and potentially dangerous. For this reason, liberals have combined the idea 
of the separation of power with a checks and balances mechanism. By giving each area of 
                                                 
43 Montesquieu whose work is widely influential in liberal thought makes a very similar argument. 
Montesquieu has adapted the ancient principle of democracy by making the separation of powers into a 
constitutional system of checking power by power. (Montesquieu, 1952: 69) He argued for a strict 
separation of the three main state powers namely legislative, executive and judiciary because he was aware 
of the difference between the freedoms offered by democracy and that offered by monarchy. According 
to this scholar, the difference between two political systems is separation of the power. (Montesquieu, 
1952: 75) In a monarchy, the power of decision theoretically rests with just one individual. Because such 
monarchical systems do not have a system for controlling power, citizens are left at the mercy of those in 
power. Montesquieu (1952: 70) says that:  
 
 When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or same 
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from 
legislative and executive. 
 
 In democracy, liberty is secured because the power is divided among different and independent bodies of 
a constitution. He thought that such division of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions among 
separate and independent constitutional bodies limits the possibility of arbitrary excesses by government, 
since the sanction of all three bodies is required for the making, executing, and administering of 
constitution. (Montesquieu, 1952: 69) 
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the democratic system some control over the other two branches, the liberal 
constitutional system of checks and balances creates an elaborate web of control to 
prevent any one branch, person or party from accumulating all political power. That is, 
checks and balances work to prevent a tyrannical concentration of power. This means 
that the liberal negative emphasis on the constitution does not strongly endorse the 
sovereignty of executive power or the legislature. Instead, it not only recognizes the 
sovereignty of the people but also puts more emphasis on an independent judiciary that 
regularly conducts a review of legislative and executive acts. Independent judicial 
assessment is essential to the protection of individual freedom. (Craig, 1990: 265-269) 
Through an independent judiciary, liberal constitutionalism puts limits on the 
discretionary and emergency powers of the state. 
A further issue is that of individual rights. A liberal sees individual rights as the political 
means to prevent intervention. (Ingram, 1994: 99) Such rights are stated in the 
constitution in order to protect individual citizens and groups from certain decisions that 
a majority of citizens might want to make. The liberal constitutional notion of individual 
rights is divided between a characteristic, private dimension on the one hand, and a 
strongly legalized public dimension on the other. In this regard, the idea of citizenship 
rights is embodied in the notions of equal respect and self-government. For liberals, to be 
free means to be subject to one’s will rather than to the will of others. To be fully free 
thus means to rule oneself not only in private matters such as family and business but 
also in affairs that concern society as a whole, that is, self-government. The liberal idea of 
self-government cannot flow from values that are shared by everybody. Instead, self-
government is derived from the idea of equal respect. Equal respect also implies the 
social interaction between free and equal citizens who are autonomous and engage in 
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dialogue for developing and exercising their capacities to form and implement their own 
plans and projects. (Mill, 1956: 97)  
The idea of equal respect is institutionalized through a constitution, especially through 
recognition of the equal procedural and political rights of individuals. The constitution 
defines equality as rights, liberties, protections, duties, and responsibilities. (Arneson, 
1993: 192-193) Therefore, the liberal constitution can be seen as the source of individual 
rights (individuals as rights-holders). For example, the constitution pledges freedom of 
speech. That gives the individual permission (within limits) to say whatever he or she 
wants, and it forces the individual (within limits) to refrain from interfering with another’s 
right to express his or her opinion. Non-interference occurring as the avoidance of 
subordination or vulnerability depends on the constitutional constraint of the actions in 
the name of protecting individual rights. These constraints are rights based not on the 
grounds of some social convention, aggregate common good or dispensation from God, 
but by virtue of individuals having the moral autonomy and dignity that make them the 
bearers of rights. (Gray, 1986: 45-46) As such, procedures and rights form the heart of a 
deontological conception of the constitution that legitimately rules. The constitution and 
political decisions are binding to the degree to which they respect deontological norms 
(i.e., individual rights), which in turn justify constitutional order. Thus the liberal who 
affirms the priority of rights by calling attention to the contingent and arbitrary character 
of all historically conditioned conceptions of the good, value the constitution because it 
creates space for individual participation while it is protecting the individual autonomy. In 
this perspective, liberal theories of constitution differ from one another according to the 
ways in which each endorses processes of constitution. Some see constitution is as 
valuable in itself, as an expression or necessary outcome of fundamental moral principles. 
These theories are called deontological theories. Others see constitutional process as 
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important because it promotes certain consequences. These are call consequentialist 
theories. Both deontological and consequentialist theories come out in various ways. 
The deontological theories give importance to the constitution in democratic process 
because of an idea that its constitution has an inherent moral value. The dominant strain 
of deontological theories is individual based constitutionalism, which sees that people are 
benign and reasonable by nature, and their actions are right or wrong by virtue of their 
intrinsic nature, regardless of the consequences of those actions. Under this system, an 
action is judged by its own intrinsic nature and not by the extent to which it serves as an 
instrumentality in furthering one’s goals or aspirations. Therefore, this view urges the 
constitution not to interfere with individual choices and allows individuals to set 
collective and personal courses of action on their own.  
The deontological theory of the constitution values individual autonomy for its own sake 
and sees constitution as a necessary manifestation of that individual autonomy. 
Therefore, it endorses promote negative freedom in two ways. First, it secures that 
individual is essentially a choice maker and rational agent and therefore no individual 
should have unequal power over one another for preventing one’s rational capability of 
choice. Locke referred to this as the goal of civil society or constitutional government. 
Locke (1993: 159 or II.90) says that: 
For the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those 
inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from 
every man's being judge in his own Case, by setting up a known authority 
 
 
Locke suggests that this civil society can have any form of constitutional rule, so long as 
that the rule is not an absolute monarchy. He believes in an absolute monarchy the 
individual does not have a liberty to judge the absolute authority of monarch and 
therefore the monarchy reproduces the harms of a state of nature. (Locke, 1993: 159) or 
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II.90 What is necessary is a system of rule in which all individual consented to be bound 
equally with each other this system is constitution through which every citizen has an 
equal voice in shaping the world around them 
This meant that deontological theories provide freedom that is more positive or 
entitlement that gives a right to participate is decisions that affect them. This right is more 
about individual autonomy that not only recognize individuals’s ability to act free of 
constraint by others but also acknowledge individual freedom to judge of their own end 
or seek their own good in whatever way one sees This is positive aspect of deontological 
theories. It establishes procedural conditions for recognizing freedom to shape the 
conditions under which one lives one's life 
Therefore, for the deontological view, what matters is not the ends people choose but 
their rational capacity to choose them. This rational capacity to choose, which resides in 
individuals, is prior to any particular ends that are external to the individual. Such a view 
gives expression to an absolute form of non-interference. The individual is considered to 
be a self-reflective and separate moral agent, is assumed to have an intrinsic value and, 
hence, is worthy of respect. The deontological approach identifies a constitution as 
having the duty to act in ways that do not impinge on the freedom of the individual. 
Therefore, for the deontological approach, the liberal constitution has to reflect respect 
for, and the intrinsic value of, the individual as essentially a choice maker and rational 
agent. It has to reflect a positive entitlement of individuals to be involved in principles 
that affect them; an entitlement that follows from the importance of what it is to be an 
individual. In light of these points, the deontological approach does not try to embrace 
any conceptions of the good. It rules them off limits to constitutional theory. Therefore, 
the deontological approach embraces a model of the constitution that is ruled by 
principles that are not geared for any particular end or presupposes a particular 
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conception of the good. As such, deontological principles center on conceptions of 
neutrality. In other words, the constitution of a democracy is desirable in itself, 
independent of the consequences. This is the most important deontological feature of the 
constitution that appropriately endorses the neutrality of institutions and democratic 
processes. A deontological position stresses that the neutral status of a constitution 
cannot be judged by its consequences, but only by its objectives and meanings.  
Unlike deontological theories, the consequentialist theories do not consider the value of 
the constitution has intrinsic quality that is necessitated by some fundamental moral 
principle. As an alternative, consequentialist theories maintain positions that the 
constitution is important because it produces important effects on the democratic 
process. This means that constitution always exists for the sake of some end or purpose. 
First aim and purpose of constitution is democracy. Constitution protects democracy 
because it ultimately benefits not just individuals, but society. Therefore, Second aim of 
constitution is individual freedom or the ability to act free of constraint by others and to 
make decisions to shape the conditions under which one lives one's life. Under these 
principles, constitutions are only valuable democracy if they maximize democratic quality 
of political system. This practical usefulness of constitutions is evaluated solely by virtue 
of their effects on the society. In assessing the consequences and principles of a 
constitution, the only consideration that is important rests on the amount of happiness or 
unhappiness that a proposed constitution is to cause. (Sayre-McCord, 2001: 331-334) All 
other factors and considerations are irrelevant. Thus, the right kinds of constitutions are 
those that cause the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness. In calculating the 
happiness or unhappiness that a constitutional action or principle may cause, no one’s 
happiness is to be counted as more important than any other individual’s happiness. Each 
person’s well-being is equally important. Therefore, constitution ought to strive in all its 
 257 
procedural actions to maximize the sum of happiness in that society--act so as to 
maximize pleasure in the aggregate.  
The sum of happiness requires equal treatment of every individual member of society and 
an equal voice in determining what the laws will be in that society because happiness of 
each individual member bears equal weight in the sum of happiness. At this point, what 
matters when consequentialist approach evaluates the value of a constitution are not the 
intentions from which it is established but its consequences. This maxim engenders 
consequentialist approach to advocate utility as the principle that either approves or 
disapproves of principles of a constitution according to its tendency to increase or 
decrease everybody’s happiness. (Sayre-McCord, 2000: 330-335 and Ryan, 1990: 193) 
Consequentialist approaches develop principles for what could be termed ‘the utility 
principle’ of a constitution. Among consequentialists, Bentham strongly argues that a 
constitution should be dictated by the utility principle. (Bentham 1988: 58-59 and 104-
105) The utility principle implies that the constitution that produces the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number, namely of individuals, promotes happiness by means 
of a democracy structured by the rule of law.  
Bentham’s principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number recognizes the 
possibility of the infliction of harm or oppression by the governors upon the governed or 
one individual over another individual for the advancement of one’s own private and 
personal happiness at the expense of the public happiness – all of which is merely an 
aggregate of the happiness of individuals. (Rosen, 1982: 515) Consequentialists seek to 
avoid such situations as the abuse of power in a constitutional democracy, and therefore 
come up with a principle that is called ‘the harm principle’ for checking the abuse of 
power. The harm principle discloses that a constitutional system may only justifiably limit 
a person’s freedom if that person is somehow threatening to harm another person. (Mill, 
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1956: 13-16) The harm principle is intended to apply to any member of a democratic 
community in the sense of the self-protection of anyone who is able to become fully 
involved in the political activities of that democracy. This means that the harm principle 
of a constitution may only justify intervention to prevent harm in order to secure certain 
kinds of freedom that may lead to greater happiness.  
Consequentialist approach considered that granting people the right to exercise certain 
kinds of freedom would achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. 
The right to certain kinds of freedom is essential for having the capacity to develop as 
individuals. By individual development, consequentialist approach refers to the growth of 
the self that has a rational capability for possessing reflections on one’s own choices of 
action. Self-government can develop fully if individuals are given the freedom to make 
their own choices. This means that developing, as self-governing individuals would make 
individuals happier because each individual is more likely to know what will make him or 
her happy as an individual than others would. (Mill, 1956: 71) Individuals who have 
freedom of choice as an essential element of self-government will tend to act in a way 
that will make them happier than they could be if society dictated how they must 
perform. Therefore, it is essential that the liberal constitution enables and secures 
freedom of choice for each individual in order to achieve individual development that will 
lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of the people.  
Both the consequentialist and deontological approaches within liberal constitutional 
theory oppose each other, but both of them reveal a strong concern with individualism in 
their orientation towards constitutional democracy. Both emphasize a restriction of 
political power. The restriction of political power is built into the constitution through 
limited government. Limited government is reinforced by a system of separate 
institutions sharing power, creating elaborate checks and balances between the three 
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branches of government. Both of them regard majority tyranny as the animating 
problematic of democracy. (Mill, 1945: 7-8) In order to prevent majority tyranny they see 
the use of a constitution as a means to place substantive constraints on political 
majorities. Constitutions are fixed to protect individual citizens from certain decisions 
that a majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it 
deems to be the general or common interest. The most important powers of the 
constitution have often been rendered in terms of individual rights. Attempts to deal with 
the problem of the tyranny of majority have historically embraced individual rights. Both 
approaches endorse certain models of constitutionality that respect private preferences 
over that of collective deliberation because liberal politics is largely a matter of 
aggregating private interests. Liberals regard the aggregation of private interests as a 
functional requisite of a democratic constitution that guarantees tolerance of one sort or 
another. The constitutional guarantee of tolerance is typically expressed in terms of 
pluralism or the respect of difference. 
VI.2.3. Dialogical Conception of the Constitution 
In previous section, I have articulated and discussed the two different types of 
constitutional theory offered in support of the democratic process. First are republican 
theories that see constitution not valuable in itself, as an expression or necessary corollary 
of fundamental moral principles, but valuable because it is constitutive of democracy in 
the way of common good. It posits that constitutional support of active citizenry not only 
gives citizens the opportunity to reflect themselves while it allows them to shield 
themselves from domination but also serves to edify the citizens, to inculcate the right 
moral values and a sense of the common good.  
Second are liberal theories that consider constitution both valuable in itself and produces 
beneficial results (e.g. happiness) for society and individual. The deontological 
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characteristic of the liberal approach based on its fundamental principle that there is 
independent fact of the constitution as to what the best or right outcome is. Therefore, 
the deontological approach states that rule of constitution have to trail that truth of 
freedom. In contrast to deontological approach, consequential characteristic of liberal 
approaches refers to the fundamental premise that there is no process independence of 
constitution as to what the best consequence is. Therefore, consequential approach states 
that the rules constitution has to be framed in way of the best or right outcome. Best or 
right outcome coincided necessarily with the aggregate happiness/interest; that the 
aggregate interest is identical with the happiness/interest of the majority.  
Both republican and liberal theories appear to offer a different theoretical basis for 
endorsing constitution in democratic process. Both, after all, suppose significant in the 
process of constitutional rule. Firstly, they are not comprehensive and specific enough to 
cover all situations. In other words, they are not context sensitive. Secondly, both 
republican and liberal theories regarded as the sovereign body as a homogeneous and 
undivided collective unity. They fail to recognize plurality of life experiences and 
preferences that makes constitution as dialogical arena  
Both republican and liberal conceptions of the constitution have tendency to sees as 
constitution as monological form or as the whole of a single consciousness. In this 
understanding, the constitution is seen as a procedural means appropriately directed to 
fulfill a given task sought by monological conception of democracy. The constitution will 
relieve the top of the hierarchy of complete determination, but will confer the certainty 
that all decision-making will be made based on laws following an instrumental rationality 
to the liking of the hierarchy.  
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The hierarchical structure of monological form of constitution is one of the most 
important essentials in which the set of laws were observed, and it requires power that 
grants the hierarchy the possibility of imposing sanctions in case of a violation of the 
rules. The chain of orders from top to the bottom should secure the identity of the 
system and ensure the capability of the constitution to determine a set of policies, though 
at the top. Therefore, politics is not only constrained by the rigid and deterministic rules 
of the constitution, but also the constitution itself is determined by the rigidity of 
principles and rules that supposedly guide the constitution through instrumental 
reasoning. These principles and rules are also characterized by abstract procedural 
regulations possessing a hierarchy of fixed values and goals, such that some are more 
respected than others are. These hierarchies exist in the specific image of democracy, and 
in the internal structure of constitutions deliberately created to achieve specific outcomes. 
The essence of this hierarchy of values is that a structure of the constitution appears with 
explicit pressure or constraints from outside of the constitution. In other words, the 
constraints on the model are external to the particular structure of a constitution. They 
may not result from the interactions between political agents, whilst such constraints may 
be independent of the social characteristics of those agents. In this way, a regulation of 
constitution, hence political system, and its relations cannot evolve in either time or 
space, cannot maintain a well-established form. Since it refers to politics as a solid field of 
instrumental regulation, therefore it does not seek to discover new conceptions and 
relations of a constitution based on dialogism, the new political procedure. Both 
republican and liberal models of constitutions appear as systemic structures of law, but 
this systemic structure of law does not consist of a unity formed by the plurality of 
consciousnesses but a unity constituted by single consciousness. The unified functioning 
of laws and rules depends upon the fixed arrangement of the parts. In other words, the 
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systemic structure of a constitution has conceptions that are fixed; they are contained 
within none of the parts and exist at a lower level of description for fulfilling certain aims.  
In contrast, dialogical approach presumes that constitution is a dialogical form. Diaogical 
form of constitutions contains plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousnesses. This characteristic makes constitutions more context sensitive and 
inextricably links to the life experiences of people. Therefore, norms of constitution and 
life experiences of people are in a dialogical interaction. People’s understanding of life 
frames the constitution, which in turn is reflected back to the people in the form of 
ruling. Consequently, people’s views are entwined with constitution (they are both author 
and reader), carrying the implication that although people have the potential to shape 
their own world.  
Dialogical approach assumes that the unifying character of constitution does not lie in the 
pursuit of common good or aggregate interest but ahead of a dialogue, that is, ahead of 
self-government in the attempt of giving rise to policies that are more consistent with 
means of democracy: to rule and to be ruled in turn. The aggregate interest and common 
good are vague abstractions; they do not have homogenous and fixed identity for the 
very reason that it cannot be defined once and for all. Therefore, the aim of constitution 
has to the dialogue of the people defined by conditions mutual respect based on political 
equality and individual independence.  
Contrary to republican and liberal normative hierarchies of values and frozen images that 
the constitution embodies, the starting point of the dialogical approach, inspired by 
Bakhtin’s view of dialogism, focuses upon how constitution arises from the dialogical 
relations occurred between ruler and ruled ones and between author and reader. It is 
developed within the process of dialogue and becomes actualized as democracy, as it is 
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the objectified and scrutinized by political theory. The dialogical approach regards a 
constitution not only as a political/legal phenomenon but also as a linguistic 
phenomenon. This means that the constitution cannot fail to retain some relation to the 
linguistic world of which it is a part. Therefore, the constitution is fundamentally linked 
to the objectives and conceptions of democracy and internally linked to the language and 
its products. In this context, the primary function of a constitution is not only the 
regulations of the acts of autonomous agents in the political field but also the 
transmission of ‘order-acts’. Order-acts are understood as inherent parts of a pragmatic 
or performative language function; their role is to accomplish certain types of political 
actions in and through discourse. Hence, a constitution does not have as its main concern 
the representation of what constitutes democracy, but directly intervenes at the level of 
representations, transforming them according to the dictates of collective assemblages of 
imaginations. Collective assemblages of imaginations as components of languages are 
constellation of voices, produced in the field of dialogue. 
In the dialogical approach, a constitution is a communicative process that shaped and 
supported by dialogism of language. It is in this communicative and dialogical process 
that a constitution has been identified as the supreme building block in the struggle 
against monological authoritarianism. The dialogical process accorded to a constitution is 
also related to the understanding that a constitution necessitates much more than an 
abstract construction of the laws. A dialogical process of constitution necessitates a 
direction of political life on which durable institutions could be grounded. In this 
dialogical way of political life, constitutional conceptions are fluid, with old meanings 
giving way to new, critical interpretations and with new critical conceptions assuming the 
center stage. This means that constitution is not possessed by a fixed idea or meaning 
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rather it gives a life to ideas within a democratic community. It contains dialogical 
character of texts. 
The dialogical text of constitution contains two language centers within one context—the 
will of the authority or the author’s intention and will of the people/the reader’s intention 
(Waldron 199: 83-85). The most practical interrelation here presents a dialogue between 
the subject (ruler) and the object ruled. Any such exchange affects both sides of the 
dialogue: Two equally weighted discourses on the same theme, once having come 
together, must inevitably orient themselves to one another. Two embodied positions 
cannot lie side by side like two distinct and separate objects – they must come into unity; 
that is self-government. When the discourse of the constitutional text is subordinated to 
ruler’s intention, the self-governing voice becomes “objectified” and a fixed discourse 
results. Therefore, the dialogical approach attempts to incorporate into a constitution the 
surrounding objects into an image that exhibits no finished contours, an image 
completely injected with multi-dimensional elements and open-endedness. Therefore, it 
does not try to condition a constitution to pursue specific goals either in the sense of 
tending towards an instrumental regulation or towards a specific policy of the good. The 
reason is not that the constitution is an original authority that fosters a meta-logic or 
privileged meaning that can dictate rightness for the discourse of democracy, for one’s 
conscience, or for political decisions through instrumental rationality. Rather, it is that the 
constitution does in fact tend towards a particular fixed pattern of the text, but it is 
dialogical whose particulars are open, not finished, not finalized, as in those texts with 
monologic structures.  
Such a dialogical pattern of constitution takes roles of superaddressee as higher presence, 
activity or authority that a participants addresses beyond an immediate situation. 
Witnesses and judges democratic process while it remains democratically positioned the 
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third party ‘alongside’ the political actors so that no single point of view is privileged. It 
takes on a referential character within multiple and various forces rather than a single 
force. Therefore, it does not reflect a direct expression of the ruler’s truth but an active 
creation of the truth in the dialogical process with an equal and active participation of 
whole parties. This truth is a unified truth that nonetheless requires a plurality of voices 
and languages. Therefore, a dialogical constitution aims to expose the dialogical process 
to heteroglossia for the realization of a unified truth.  
Such dialogical pattern of constitution created as it is in many languages, presents two 
opposing tendencies. There is a centrifugal force dispersing it outward into an ever-
greater variety of voices, outward into a seeming disorder. In addition, there are various 
centripetal forces reserving constitution from overwhelming fluidity and variety. The 
dialogical drive to frame constitution that have some kind of coherence -- that is, formal 
unity -- is obviously a unity between centrifugal and centripetal force; it provides us with 
the best practice of democracy that does justice to variety of independent voices  
This quality of the constitution refers to functional dualism. On the one hand, a 
constitution conveys traditional meanings that stabilize threats of chaos, enforcing 
conformity for the very notion of the democracy. On other hand, it generates new 
meanings that can be full of the general tone of laughter, which represents a critical 
attitude or spirit outside the coercive limits imposed by a single discourse or ready-made 
thoughts of the truth. Laughter can be a mode of constitution that gives insights and 
subverts ossified hierarchies and stale judgments to allow for the rise of new potentialities 
and great changes. (Bakhtin, 1984: 73) This mode of constitution offers a clear 
conceptual vantage point from which existing conceptions and practices of democracy 
may be reflected upon, critically assessed and modified from a position outside their own 
confines.  
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A dialogical approach grants a strong emphasis to the notion of mutual respect as equality 
conditions of a constitution. Casting constitutional matters in the terms of quality of 
conditions makes dialogical democracy more plausible. An equality condition of a 
constitution refers not to the abstract universal right to deliberate but a capability or 
actual exercise of the right of all to participate in the political decision-making process. 
(Christiano, 1996: 3) With respect to these actual equal rights of participation, a 
constitution guarantees individual freedom to exercise a self-determinative power to 
undertake what every citizen wants without being constrained by other agents and 
political authorities to the extent that such actions do not interfere with the same freedom 
to execute those others possess. In this regard, equality conditions of a constitution refer 
to a dialogical description and not a metaphysical conception. They apply to the part and 
not to the whole of political life. This means that equality conditions are not an all-at-
once fixed and inborn set of limits. Given human diversity, equal capability arises from 
many stimuli and which can be directed or redirected, given conditions that cooperate 
with it. In other words, equal capabilities of people change depending upon changing 
conditions. A man may be able to determine his life, when he has sufficient skills, wealth, 
materials, and tools on hand. His capability to act is not something purely “inside of 
him.” The term equal capability is dialogical because it refers to temporality of what a 
person can do here and now, given available resources, and what he could do, if certain 
absent conditions were made present. In other words, equality capability represents 
changing and interactive characteristics of positive freedom through which one is able 
pursue ends and desires that depend on the ends and desires one possesses and what 
freedom one has in order to convert external and internal resources into the 
achievements of his/her ends. 
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Equality of capabilities as part of dialogical freedom is a condition and component of 
democracy. It interactively connects freedom to the power of participation. This means 
that the endurance of equal capabilities and opportunities through a constitution can 
create effective different potentialities for each participant in order that he/she has an 
occasion and opportunity to deliberate in the political process. For example, Sen 
describes capability with freedoms that play detrimental roles in regard to one’s reflection 
on the alternative arrangements of functioning that one can achieve (i.e. beings and 
doings), and from which one can select one combination” (Sen, 1992: 31 and 56-73) This 
understanding of capabilities can be ascertained as a good that is structured as 
functioning. Functioning can be characterized by parts and of the states of a person (i.e., 
beings and doings—including self-governance and self-respect the person actually 
achieves). (Sen, 1992: 31) In that sense, for Sen, capability is not only a means but also an 
end in itself, supplemented and supported by other basic rights. Capabilities have intrinsic 
importance for the person’s achievement of well-being. To stress this intrinsic value, 
Sen’s idea of capabilities appears as freedom, such as freedom from lack of food and 
under nourishment, freedom to take education for reading and writing. (Sen, 1992: 39) In 
this view, equality conditions of dialogical conception of constitution can be seen a 
matter of achieved situation and proceedings. By extension, the capacity to achieve self-
determination is a matter of the combinations of beings and doings within a person’s 
reach.  
A dialogical process requires a capacity for freedom of action for its completion; 
reflection is incomplete without equality of capabilities. No individual is sovereign unto 
oneself unless it consists of equal capabilities because without the equality of the 
capabilities there is no positive freedom. In addition, outside, such a freedom one cannot 
be effectively self-governing. 
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Capabilities and resources change depending upon shifting conditions. Capabilities of 
people can develop as consequences of interactions; they cannot be realized before the 
interactions have occurred. The accomplishment of self-governance through positive 
freedom, which consists of the development of capacities with the help of resources, 
requires the adaptation of social conditions. It also requires cooperation and 
accommodation to the capacities of people. What a person is able or unable to do 
depends upon what others can or cannot do, their capacities, the presence and movement 
of their reactions. The freedom of some may mean the restraint of others. Thus, there is 
no such thing as freedom as well as self-governance isolated from the activities of others. 
Though freedom is the fulfillment of distinctive individual capacities for self-governance, 
freedom is always linked to the other. The freeing and activation of individual freedom in 
relation to the active participation is inseparable from constitutional conditions. 
Besides equality conditions, a dialogical conception of constitutions emphasizes the 
position that active participation remains pivotal to the democratic process. From the 
constitution, it is expected that a positive framework for citizens will be produced as well 
as a route to develop the capacity effectively participating within the dialogical process of 
the democracy. This capacity is not innate. It requires that citizens acquire through 
experience and character formation the qualities and traits necessary for dialogical 
communication. Nevertheless, this does not imply that a dialogical model is imposing the 
notion of the good into the democratic process. Dialogical conceptions of a constitution 
reject any role for the notion of the good in democratic discourse. The reason is that 
although each participant may possess elements of the good, it is impossible to identify 
the criteria constituting the common good. Further, any identification of the democratic 
discourse with common good can lead to closure and finality of its dialogical quality. 
Given an importance to ensuring the openness of the democratic process to the 
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difference, a dialogical constitution excludes any fixed criteria or discourse that defines 
public good. It posits a dialogical realm in which active participants autonomously choose 
the good for themselves with no commitments prior to these choices, creating 
themselves. In such a realm with no pre-existing, unchosen good, the only political 
obligation can be to respect the dialogical process of expression itself. Hence, the 
dialogical commitment to cultivation of the characters merely reflects the conditions 
necessary to ensure that these participants have the freedom to express their own 
preferences and values. Nevertheless, it does not order its components, political or 
otherwise, according to any predetermined concrete plan or goal. Nevertheless, it is 
characterized by structures of speech genre not in the sense of efficiently utilizing 
resources to attain a particular goal, but rather in providing a regulation, which potentially 
maximizes the capability that participants will participate effectively into political process.  
The effectiveness of a dialogical conception of democracy depends on questioning and 
critically examining its own discourses. This is necessary because if the essentialist 
conditions of the discourses gain precedence over democracy, the democracy itself can 
become a monologue of illegitimacy. At this point, dialogical conceptions endorse the 
constitution that “overpopulated” with the critical and regulative intentions because both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces operate in environment of dialogue.  
 
VI.3. Dialogical Constitutional Democracy  
In earlier chapters, I argued that democracy should be seen in three ways: first, as a 
dialogue; second, as a way of language use; and third, as a political process. As such, 
democracy is also a discourse. Discourse analysis of democracy requires specific focus on 
the formal (institutional) and informal (language use) aspects of self-regulatory process 
that is partially explored. Self-regulation is in large part of both ongoing communicative 
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processes. Communications between all those involved in discourse system of democracy 
are formative, coordinative and functional. Formative aspects of discourse system of 
democracy contain authorial posture, to construct identities and relations of between 
those involved in political process. A functional aspect of discourse of democracy reflects 
certain institutional frameworks that are designed to achieve certain ends such individual 
freedom and political equality. Coordinative aspects refer to ideological/educative activity 
for producing meanings and shared sense of understanding as to political practices and 
rules. 
These three aspects of dialogical constitutions represents significant feature of self-
regulation. The word self refer to political actors. It could mean both individual and the 
people as a collective body. The terms regulation refers to structuring the rules and 
procedures of conduct between the actors, represented in the dialogical process of the 
democracy. The concept of self-regulation means that the individuals who define norms 
and structures procedures to provide not only contents to the political actions but also to 
produce the means to enforce a self-imposed restriction on one own actions. Therefore, 
self-regulation has three components: (1) legislation that is, defining appropriate norms 
and procedural structures; (2) enforcement, such as initiating a self-imposed restriction of 
the sovereign freedom of action; and (3) openness, that is, equal and free participation  or 
active involvement of political agents for making system to continuously reorganizes itself 
in response to environment in a dynamic, nonlinear way. 
Effective self-regulation requires active a circuitous relation between the two: the rule of 
people and the rule of constitution. The will of people gives the authority for the rule of 
constitution. The rule of the constitution protects and enables the will of people. This 
circular relation is not a cause-and-effect relation where the good and value are 
determined by those holding the most power. This relationship is based on equilibrium 
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not on an opposition between subject and object, author and reader and between rulers 
and ruled. The idea here is not an emphasis on only the restrictive and regulative or 
freeing and deregulating character of democracy through constitution but both/and. 
restriction/freedom have meaning and significance in relation to each other. (Laclau, 
1996: 52-53) The dialogical sense of constitution depends on this vantage point, 
maintaining both conditions and points of perspective at the same time. This means that 
dialogism is the epistemology of constitutions. In a constitution where meaning of 
democracy is only comprehensible in terms of other meaning of democracy, where a 
actions always bespeaks other actions, and where political process is constantly being 
forced centripetally toward unity, and forced centrifugally into relations of difference, 
dialogism is the way meaning of democracy is produced.  
The angle point of democracy is between empowerment of the freedom and restriction 
of the freedom. Indeed, once one starts thinking of democracy in terms of dialogue, it is 
more difficult to maintain the dyadic character of this empowerment and restriction as a 
either/or situation. For in any ongoing democratic process, all restrictive and 
empowering moments may recur with none defining democracy as such. Such a view of 
diverse forms, purposes, and relations is partly a corrective to what I have called the 
dialogization of constitution. A dialogical understanding of constitution requires not only 
a recognition of multiple moments within it, some inevitably “restrictive” while others 
“empowering”; some convergent toward unity and mutual understanding, others 
transgressive and dispersive but also constitution of these moments for freeing further 
conditions of dialogical democracy. This means that dialogical democracy can be shaped 
as it is in many languages, presents two opposing tendencies. There are a centrifugal force 
dispersing people outward into an ever-greater variety of voices, outward into a seeming 
chaos. And there are various centripetal forces reserving them from overwhelming 
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fluidity and variety. The drive to constitutional democracy that have some kind of 
coherence -- that is, formal unity -- is obviously a centripetal force; it provide unity that 
does justice to variety of voices 
In this context, the diaogical function of constitution is related to democracy in three 
ways: it is prior to and above democracy, within democracy and itself framing democracy. 
The first relationship refers to the moment when the constitution is given supreme 
authority to set out the rules for engagement. Without that provision, protection of 
individual freedom, especially freedom of expression, is not possible. The constitution 
safeguards differences on the basis that all citizens are of equal status and forms a 
bulwark against the tyranny of the majority, which limits effective participation in the 
democratic process and weakens the capacity of every citizen to pursue his or her own 
well-being. (Hamburger, 1990: 251-57) As John Stuart Mill (1991: 8) noted: 
The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most 
numerous or most active part of the people—the majority, or those who 
succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority. The people, 
consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number, and 
precautions are as much needed against this as against any abuses of 
power.  
 
The second relationship refers to the moment of formal and procedural application of 
the constitution in a democracy. This relationship consolidates and reproduces the 
practice of democracy, for democracy requires an institutional and regulative basis if it is 
to be one of self-government. Thus, we can see this relationship as the following: on the 
one hand, democracy is the expression of the will of the people, who themselves are 
authors of its constitution; on the other hand, democracy is an act of self-limitation, since 
the constitution is a self-imposed system of norms.  
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The third relationship puts democracy next to the constitution. This relationship 
safeguards and reproduces politics in an unconditioned space, allowing for moments of 
spontaneous mobilization and informal intervention that can exists side-by-side with the 
established constitutional order. It refers to the people’s sovereignty over constitution 
making. (Morris, 2000: 9-11) Democracy as the expression of self-government or will of 
the people is not possible without the capacity of people to shape its constitution.  
The constitution is instrumental to democracy at a number of levels. The constitution 
provides the normative and procedural framework for democracy. (Post, 1993: 169-70) It 
is the institutional arrangement for defining, realizing and establishing the legitimacy of 
the power of the people. It also serves as a mechanism for limiting the exercise of that 
power. (Castiglione, 1996: 9-10) Such a mechanism is necessary because democracy is not 
possible without open, public deliberation in which each individual can fully participate. 
Further, the constitution provides a stable framework for decision-making, especially 
when there are shifts in political power. Beyond that, the constitution supports 
democracy as a dialogical way of life, as an interplay (as opposed to a mere plurality) of 
voices in society, including the sense in which each voice is both identical to and different 
from the rest. 
To conceive democracy, then, is to ask what the constitution does for democracy. First, 
the constitution has its own intrinsic value: it embodies the reflective image of 
democracy. The constitution is the binding output of all citizens, either directly or 
through representatives. Second, it is the ultimate frame of reference for certain rules, 
discourses and exercises of power, which is invoked in all manner of ways to perform, to 
organize, to control, to achieve democracy as a desired political system. (Barber, 1996: 58) 
Third, the constitution serves as a mechanism for effecting change without political 
upheaval or oppression. In this respect, the constitution provides a system of general 
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rules by which citizens can participate in the decision-making process equally and freely, 
being able to express their own views and preferences. 
In addition, the constitution fortifies the dialogical realm of the political process. 
Individual views are informed by the views of others, in either accepting or refusing 
them. The language of the constitution recognizes the presence and formative role of 
different voices upon political discourse. If the constitution is meant to be the realization 
of free and equal participation in the political process, it has to ensure dialogue. Without 
dialogue, no political system can accommodate the views and preferences of all its 
citizens. Hence, democracy and self-government are both weakened.  
As an ideal reflection of an inclusive dialogue, the constitution not only affirms the 
sovereignty of the people, but it also guarantees difference in unity. The purpose of the 
constitution faces basic conflicts, perhaps rationally insoluble, between opposing 
obligations, between freedom and constraint, between tolerance and intolerance. 
Therefore, the freedom found in a constitutional democracy must be regulated. 
Constitutional freedom means control over individual actions to secure individual 
freedoms. Otherwise, dialogue will not be possible, as some individuals will be able to 
express their wills and others will not do so. There are two aspects to constitutional 
democracy. On the one hand, it is a closed process that prevents monolithic authority. 
On the other hand, it is an open process that allows for the free and equal expression and 
consideration of all and sundry opinions.  
The regulative aspect of the constitution is built on ideas of political equality and of a 
legitimate use of power. An ideal constitutional democratic process enables public 
dialogue, the aim of which is to maximize participation. This requires rules and 
institutions that establish dialogue between convergence and divergence. A convergence 
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of views is necessary for policy-making. However, that should not restrict personal 
freedom, as institutionalized in civil and individual rights, which are themselves protected 
by the constitution. The constitution exists independently, and the power-holders (i.e., 
government) are limited in their authority. It requires of the limited governing body to 
distinguish the private, personal from the public and political, to separate the individual 
good from the greater good; it gives fundamental recognition to individual needs. 
(Sunstein, 1988b: 338-42) 
Political equality implies an equality of input. For constitutional democracy to work, the 
decision-making agency must be in dialogue with its citizens. If the decision-making 
agency affects policies unilaterally, it may cross the line from being a representative 
governing body to an autocratic one. For this reason, it is necessary to have the 
constitution place limits on the discretionary and emergency power of the government. 
(Elster, 1998: 2-4) The equality objective of the constitution provides people with a 
means for self-governance. Moreover, the constitutional application of political equality 
collectively binds the policies of the government as outcomes that address and serve the 
common interest. Through the equality objective, the constitution prevents the decision-
making agency from advancing one interest over another. Instead, it encourages 
consideration of all relevant views. 
By its dialogical nature, the constitution is both positive and negative; it both enables and 
restricts. The characteristics here are not the positive or the negative but both/and. As 
such, the constitution is a balancing act between competing powers found in any 
governing body. (Loveland, 1996: 11-22) To achieve balance, the constitution can 
mandate a separation of power between agents, be it vertical or horizontal, thereby 
creating checks and balances so that no agent can become too powerful and hence 
dangerous. (Holmes, 1988: 238) 
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On the positive side, the constitution enables people to be both active and responsible. 
The term of empowerment can refer to what a person can do here and now, given the 
available resources and a certain system of general rules. The positive side of the 
constitution encourages individual capacities with the equal distribution of rights and 
opportunities and the arrangement of an environment that allows everyone to participate 
in the political process of ruling and being ruled (i.e., in the exercise of power). (Berry, 
1993: 82) Constitutional empowerment also means active dialogue between citizens and 
power-holders in the exercise of power, in the decisions that will shape their lives. The 
expressions of every individual will lie at the heart of constitutional democracy. In 
expressing their wills, citizens can define and control no only the course of politics but 
also their own direction of life. 
As the constitution guarantees difference in unity, it fosters a climate where there is 
tolerance for dissent and room for individuals and groups to retain and develop their own 
identities while sharing the larger goals of the body politic. In short, constitutional 
empowerment refers to self-determination in both the public and private spheres. Self-
determination is based on freedom, the capacity of a self-determined body to do what he 
or she wants without being constrained by other individuals and political authorities. 
(Laclau, 1996: 52)  
On the negative side, the constitution puts restraints on the exercise of power since one’s 
freedom to act must not infringe upon the freedom of others to act. (Castiglione, 1996: 
10-11) Individual action does exist in isolation. By restricting the free exercise of power, 
the constitution secures negative freedom: namely, freedom from coercion by particular 
individuals or groups, or from the arbitrary use of power by the government. To this end, 
the negative function of the constitution imposes limits on majority rule, either in the 
public or private domain, by protecting individual rights. (Castiglione, 1996: 18-21)  
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The constraining power of the constitution represents the will of the people as well as its 
stature outside of and above the rule of the people. The authors of the legal norms of the 
constitution are the people themselves. (Henkin, 1994: 41-42) This means that the rule of 
the people is constrained by those very norms that the constitution puts into effect. Thus, 
in practice, self-government refers not to an absolute, omnipotent and limitless 
constitutive will, but to a constrained will that is imposed upon oneself by oneself. 
(Holmes, 1988: 231) This indicates the dialogical quality of self-government, the dialogue 
between freedom and self-regulation.  
The constitution functions as a watchdog on the exercise of power, governs political life 
from the outside and operates within an institutional framework that safeguards 
individual rights. (Slagstad, 1988: 138-49) Further, the types of constraint imposed by the 
constitution, the mechanisms it provides and the elements to which it applies are specific 
because they form an ordered way life, creating modes of behavior, meaning and self-
understanding. In this respect, the negative side of the constitution demands an 
independent judiciary that regularly conducts reviews of legislative and executive acts to 
ascertain any abuses of power. Here, we can speak of Foucault’s idea of governmentality, 
the idea of creating a total system of rules and general conduct whereby everything would 
be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the need for external intervention.44 
In both its positive and negative aspects, the constitution is ascribed supreme authority to 
achieve a desired outcome—i.e., dialogical democracy. A democratic society cannot exist 
without regulation of the exercise of power. For the people to consent to be governed, 
they must be able to voice their constituent power as consent (or dissent). For the 
government to make laws, the people must be informed about the nature of the choices. 
                                                 
44 Foucault (1979: 101) states, “the way in which the conduct of a whole of individuals is found implicated, 
in an ever more marked fashion, in the exercise of sovereign power.” 
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For the people to retain the constitution within their control and dependence, they must 
be able to transform the rules. The supreme authority of the constitution also limits the 
sovereignty of individuals in order that it does not transgress the freedom of the whole. 
The power of the constitution and the power of the people are interrelated in two ways: 
as a hypothetical or real contract, underlying the consent as self-generated will of the 
people based on dialogue. (Chambers, 1998: 143-73)  
As a hypothetical contract, the power of the constitution and the power of the people are 
unambiguously settled into an agreement of rational individuals and made binding into 
the future.45 The hypothetical contract is based on the idea that rational individuals, who 
see themselves as equals with inalienable rights, come together to set up structures of 
common living to protect their rights to life, liberty and property. Locke (1993.126 or 
II.23) referred to this as the issue of freedom: 
This Freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and 
closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but 
by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man, not having 
the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, 
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary 
power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. 
 
The main characteristics of contract based constitution is transformation every act of 
ruling authority into an act of constraint by the individual's own consent because it 
assumed that each individual agreed to be ruled by the will of himself or willpower of the 
political community/government. If an individual has consented to rule by the willpower 
of the political community, which is constitutional government, one necessarily has also 
agreed to whatever particular choices the ruling authority of constitution might make. 
                                                 
45 This view of constitutionalism is often associated with contractualism. Contractualism refers to the idea 
that constitutions are made legitimate by the consent of the governed, which represents the hypothetical 
or real notion of agreement. See, for example, Castiglione, (1996: 15-18). 
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Here, individual freedom is not really being restricted by government at all: one has acted 
autonomously in granting her general tacit consent to all specific limitations on one’s 
absolute freedom that political community may enforce. In similar vein, Locke says: 
 
Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being 
able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but his own 
consent; it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient 
declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of any 
government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit 
consent, which will concern our present case. 
 
The other characteristic of contract-based constitutions is equality and mutual respect. 
Locke (1993: 166 or II.4) explains: 
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is 
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more 
evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously 
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same 
faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without 
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all 
should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, 
and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted 
right to dominion and sovereignty 
 
Constitutional acknowledgement of an equal voice to each citizen in the formation of the 
public will supposes that every individual has an opportunity to participate in ruling and 
that no one individual or group of individuals is allowed to ruling. Constitutions 
promotion of ruling through consent supposes that every individual, through 
participation, has the opportunity to be among the consenting people with respect to 
issue. This meant that respect for one’s own freedom to participate necessarily entails 
respect for everyone else’s freedom because they all agreed to be bound equally with each 
other for realizing their freedom. There is an identity of interests in consenting; that is, we 
all benefit from being in political society ruled by constitution (as opposed to being in a 
state of nature). Thus, being consenting to be ruled by constitution generates advantages 
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(i.e. equalities and freedom). This leads rise of mutual respect.  Mutual respect means that 
each partner has an equal right to rule the conditions of the contract (i.e., the 
constitution) and to be ruled by the conditions of the contract. If the bond between the 
power of constitution and the power of the people is to be sustainable, individuals must 
listen to each other, respond to each other and justify their claims to each other. 
(Benhabib, 1989: 153) Simply put, the parties, for their own self-interest, have to respect 
the rights of others under the terms of the contract. The instituting source of the 
connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people is the 
consent of free and equal individuals to be governed. (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985: 19-
31)   
The consent based constitution to be governed works at two levels: at the level of the 
textual formation and of ongoing interpretation. By consenting to the supreme authority 
of the constitution, free and equal individuals reduce the arbitrary state of nature while 
protecting the broadest set of mutual freedoms. The exercise of power can only justified 
within the parameters set out by the constitution. Constitutional intervention can also be 
justified when it removes social or political forces that infringe on individual freedoms. 
Therefore, the constitution ensures self-determination to every citizen and prevents the 
discriminatory use of power that checks or diminishes, either explicitly or implicitly, the 
free expression of views and preferences. (Loveland, 1996: 11) 
Further, the connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the 
people can be realized through dialogism. The power of the constitution is based on an 
open-ended public dialogue, which serves as the procedural and constitutive means for 
invoking the power of the people. The commitment to the constitution and its 
interpretation as an open-ended public dialogue involves the exchange of ideas, the 
reevaluation of previous courses and the consideration of new ones between citizens and 
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between citizens and institutional agencies. It is when public dialogue breaks down, not 
when some group loses the ability to take part in the decision-making process that the 
connection between the power of the constitution and the power of the people is broken. 
Hence, the power of the constitution may degenerate into oppression or 
authoritarianism. (Chambers, 1998: 163-77)  
Dialogue also legitimates the power of the constitution by protecting and enabling the 
expression of differences amidst plurality. However, what is the other basis of dialogism 
in terms of the constitution? Two answers are suggested. The democratic process can 
produce a dialogue-based constitution by stimulating either a new interpretation of 
previously united views or a different realization of already convergent values. The key to 
a dialogue-based constitution is the application of the idea of “the sovereignty of the 
people,” which gives ultimate authority to the subjects of the constitution. When citizens 
freely and equally interact with each other, they actually take part in formulating the rules 
of their self-government. The constitution can be seen as important part of the self-
governing process, which simultaneously ensures and limits the citizen’s right to exercise 
power. (Weber, 1978: 214-17) 
Beyond that, it is important to say that the connection between the power of the 
constitution and the power of the people rests on the idea of fairness. It is through the 
constitution that exercises of power become representative of justice and equality in 
social and political bodies. As Rousseau has written: “Agreement and laws are therefore 
necessary for uniting rights to duties and bringing justice back to its objective.” 
(Rousseau, 1988: 106) In relation to the idea of justice, the constitution has three 
references. First, it refers to fair ruling scheme to some rational act that interprets it. 
(Rousseau, 1988: 107) Second, it refers to a referential scheme for the agent in the 
corresponding rational act. (Rousseau, 1988: 117) Finally, it refers to a referential scheme 
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in some power capacity, which connects it with the ruled. (Rousseau, 1988: 93) Through 
the referential triad, the constitution performs the task of organizing the function of 
dialogue and connecting distinctive traits of subject, object and interpreter on the 
positions of citizenship. The very act of a constitution establishes a certain orientation 
toward the citizens with representation of the practices of power. (Arneson, 1993: 192-
202) Citizens are both the source and the agent of this power. (Rousseau, 1988: 88 and 
106) They are also interpreters who dwell on the frontiers of language and make 
impromptu meanings in order to determine in what capacity the agent stands in for the 
rule of the constitution. (Rousseau, 1988: 107-109)  
VI.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the key to the successful establishment of the 
background conditions of democracy is the constitution. A constitution that exists 
alongside the establishment of appropriate institutions clearly makes a significant 
difference with regard to the achievement of the goals embodied in conceptions of 
democracy such as a discourse formation or as a dialogue, including active participation, 
separation of powers, checks and balances, as well as individual protections.  
In these conceptions, constitutions can be viewed in two distinct senses. In one, a 
constitution is necessarily seen as dialogic. The second sense of a constitution contains 
three kinds of components: normative, descriptive, and regulative. The normative 
component of a constitution refers to a desirable state of affairs for the model and 
direction of democracy. It elucidates a constitutional theory of institutional arrangement 
in order to arrive at political decisions in which citizens as political equals acquire the self-
governed power to participate in the political process as well as the ability to reach 
decisions via various means of dialogue. The descriptive component of a constitution 
explains or describes what democracy actually entails. These descriptions narrate two 
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important themes. One is how to represent varying types of democracies and, second 
deals with means and methods to set up democracy as dialogical systems of governance 
in which citizens can be both subject and authors of actions. The regulative component 
of a constitution prepares and prescribes actions or institutional structures which are 
likely to succeed in setting or improving the dialogical and democratic quality of the 
political system 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Dialogism was the umbrella concept for this entire project. I attempted to expand it as 
the epistemology of a heteroglossic world of democracy. In a heteroglossic world where a 
worldview, preference and decision is only understandable in terms of other worldviews 
preferences or decisions, where a meaning always communicates other meanings, and 
where public language is constantly being forced centripetally toward unity, and forced 
centrifugally into relations of difference and ambiguity, democracy is the way that the 
meanings of worldviews, preferences and decisions are made. It is the ongoing process of 
making decisions interconnected, in the sense of being ultimately fixed to other decisions. 
Democracy is factual primarily in terms of the relations people have to one another, or 
the relations the producers of those decisions have to one another. Democracy both 
justifies and is justified by dialogism, the connected plurality of voices and the associated 
interrelation of meanings, views and decisions across people. 
 
Dialogism is central to Dostoevesky’s understanding of democratic society. He perceived 
and conceived his world primarily in terms of a dialogical community: different voices 
and consciousnesses all present and competing in the same place at the same time. The 
dialogism is to be respected: it is a goal, not merely a means to an end. His dialogism is 
more than simply communication of voices. Rather, it is as open-ended event occurs as 
the interaction of structures: whether they be voices, words or ideas. His book Brothers 
Karamazov materializes the dialogism not only between voices and the consciousness of 
the various characters that are opposed to one another but also through a dialogue of 
view points produced out of the inter-character dialogue of voices and consciousness. 
The characters and situations always stand for more than themselves. There is always 
plurality of independent and unmerged voices. In the Grand Inquisitor section in Book 
V, Chapter 5, the dialogue of a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
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consciousnesses are represented by the tormented, doubting Ivan who seeks a rational 
explanation for things that comes to being in the world and the gentle, loving, and wise 
Alyosha who hold a natural, strong faith in God that turn into a genuine love for people. 
The Grand Inquisitor section also provides a dialogue between the Inquisitor and Jesus -- 
who remains silent, but whose presence makes the addresser shape his expressions to his 
presence, to his views and unvoiced objections. In this dialogue, Grand Inquisitor says:  
“Decide who was right: You or the One who questioned You that day? 
Remember the first question, though not in literal terms, its sense was 
this: ‘You want to go into the world, and are going there with empty 
hands, with a kind of promise of freedom which they in their simplicity 
and inborn turpitude are unable even to comprehend, which they go in 
fear and aware of —for nothing has ever been more unendurable to man 
and human society than freedom! Look, you see those stones in that 
naked, burning hot wilderness. Turn them into loaves and mankind will 
go trotting after you like a flock, grateful and obedient, though ever 
fearful that you may take away your hand and that your loaves may cease 
to come their way.’” 
 
The Grand Inquisitor thinks that freedom is too great a burden for the weak therefore it 
is the root of the people’s unhappiness. The earthly institution of the authority has 
liberated the people of their freedom in order to make them happy. However, they 
become slaves in order to be fed. He suggests that earthly institutional authority offers to 
feed them and deceives them because people need stability and security. He thinks that 
security and stability requires rejection the banner of freedom and the bread from heaven 
and acceptance of the banner of earthly bread.  
In Karamazov Brothers, Dostoevsky establishes a fundamental link between people and 
their freedom. Dostoevsky suggests that freedom is constitutive of the fundamental 
nature of people. It is a source of being human. Hence, people must achieve their 
freedom in order to realize their very being. It is a goal of individual and political 
community, not merely a means to an end. The condition of freedom may seem to be 
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guaranteeing independence of each individual and ensuring that no outside force can 
control and determine their choices with regard to life. But throughout The Brothers 
Karamazov, Dostoevsky portrays freedom as a paradox, one that particularly afflicts those 
characters who have freedom of choice. Freedom can be seen as a paradox because it 
places a burden on people to voluntarily reject the securities, comforts, and protections of 
the ideologies and doctrines in favor of the uncertainties. Dostoevsky suggests that most 
people are too weak to follow inner consciences to make this choice hence they are 
destined to have unhappy lives.  
The condition of freedom may seem to be democracy, guaranteeing the independence of 
each individual and ensuring that no outside force can impose their choices. Here 
democracy can be conceived in two ways: as a form of life and political process. When 
we consider it as a form of life, then democracy represents certain characteristics of 
individual and social existence – that is, it is not simply a forced choice concerning the 
way people should live together. Democracy as a form of life reflects two aspects of 
social existence as a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses 
and formation of a genuine polyphony of fully valid views. Therefore, that if democracy 
as a political process is to conform to democracy as a way of life, it must promote 
dialogic exchange one another and encourage the rise of new voices, new forms of 
freedom. 
In considering democracy as both a way of life and political process, the first chapter 
focused on the conception of dialogue with a specific elaboration of some circumstances 
and conditions that inspire promise and constitute freedom of the people. It has 
attempted to weave together threads of different meanings of dialogue, which have been 
gleaned, from a variety of sources in order to reconstruct a new language of democracy. 
In doing this, it has modified certain notions, or used them in a different manner than 
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usual, in order to give a clearer picture of the impact and conceptions of dialogue for 
different types of democracy. 
The first chapter has described dialogue as consisting of three elements: an addresser, an 
addressee/respondent, and a communicative and reciprocal relation between the two. 
Discussing the general meaning of dialogue that consists of these three elements points to 
three important facts: First, it is an external mode of communication that occurs between 
individuals who reciprocally exchange utterances and understandings. Second, it occurs in 
and through the use of language. Third, it is an internal mode of communication that 
occurs in the stages of self-understanding. 
Discussion of conditions and circumstances of dialogue in these three contexts allow us 
to identify dialogue as multidirectional, open ended, and polyphonic, multivocal 
communicative practice that has regulative quality or external authority other than 
potentially both agreeing and disagreeing parties.  
It is a complex and non-linear communicative process determined by the interrelations of 
voices because meaning which is not an inherent property of things or persons, emerges 
through interaction, interrelationship, and responsive understanding. There is no external 
regulative quality or authoritative source of dialogue other than participants who hold 
regimes of truth. A regulative basis of dialogue is responsive understanding and self-
governance. Responsive understanding does not depend on the good feelings one might 
have for others. Instead, it is encountered in dialogical qualities as a sense of capacity for 
one’s actions; a sense of responsibility to those who are dialogued; and an attachment to 
those who have opened their understanding for others. It is found in a respect for the 
values of one’s own and others’ views and preferences; recognition of one’s mutual 
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compassion for a communication; and understanding of the meaning others impart to 
their expressions of beliefs, values and preferences. 
Self-governance is also a fundamental component in the process of dialogue. Self-
government means creating a common ground for relationships that are harmonious, 
synergistic, cooperative, respectful and mutually beneficial. When people are divided by 
their independence, the patterns of disconnection tend to reinforce separation, 
fragmentation and divisiveness. Self-governance is a connection of the sense of 
responsibility and is predicated on respect to and between one and the other. In the field 
of dialogue, it is expressed by a turn taking system. The main function of this turn taking 
system is to manage the sequential disposition of communication for perceiving, 
inquiring into, and shifting various underlying patterns of influence, as well as creating 
entirely new kinds of outputs. It conditions the information exchange between two (or 
more) interlocutors and ensures an efficient transmission between them.  
The concept of dialogue is as diverse as the number of different elements and the 
circumstances that are involved. However, some guidelines do exist that color the 
classification of varying dialogical conceptions. One way to classify different conceptions 
of dialogue is with interlocutors who reposition themselves from one mode of 
communication to another or one end to another. This repositioning of interlocutors can 
be described from three perspectives: the regulative, truth-oriented and celebratory. 
These are types of interaction that entails different models of dialogues 
The regulative model is dialogue that is the juxtaposition of various points of view and 
claims with regard to a specific object (syncrisis). Such a dialogue involves the resolution 
of disagreement and the formulation of compromise. Hence, it is directed toward 
consensus and agreement. It has a persuasive character. The basic forms of dialogical 
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persuasion refer to the use of particular evidence or methods of reasoning (inductive or 
deductive) to prove that a certain viewpoint has greater validity than other viewpoints. In 
this regard, there must be at first a regulative model of dialogue based on contestation of 
ideas, or a contrasting a series of arguments, that seek to challenge each other. Secondly, 
the contestation of ideas and claims are objectified through an agreement that 
participants aim to satisfy.  
The truth-oriented model is dialogue that contains a deliberate reference to truth as an 
end-point of the communicative process. It involves an intentional process in which an 
examination of views and claims through questioning and the formulation of specific 
answers establish new ways to reveal truths that are partly or wholly warranted by the 
participants. This examination includes critical discussions whereby participants try to 
establish critical propositions or, alternatively, critically outline that certain proposals 
cannot be accepted given a contemporary situation.  
The initial situation of the celebratory form of interaction refers to a dialogue that is 
considered an end in itself. This means that there can be no prior ends of dialogue. The 
positive value of pluralism defines a fundamental striving or end in the dialogue without, 
however, specifying the end. All this means that while interlocutors may have some 
overarching aims, when it comes to participating in dialogue it is not possible to have 
clear objectives beforehand with respect to the sorts of issue examined and decisions 
deliberated. Participating with this sort of objective can undermine the very basis on 
which dialogue flourishes.  
Therefore, in the celebratory from of dialogue, interlocutors do not try to impose one 
view on others. This is not to say that they participate in dialogue with a blank sheet. 
They may have some sort of general agenda – a list of some of the views or acts that they 
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might like to see to be endorsed. They can ask each other to endorse their views – but 
both agreeing and conflicting on a subject matter is a mutual activity. There is a continual 
interplay between agreement and conflict on subject matters. In the same way, there is a 
continual interplay between means and ends. Therefore, it does not imply a 
communicative exchange for reaching agreement, or finding common answers. 
Therefore, it seeks to establish unity in difference. 
However, once we begin to discuss different models of dialogue oriented towards 
developing a substantive vision of democracy in which the various dialogical practices 
such as active participation and equal respect are recognized as shaping outcomes of 
political systems, various themes arise about the priorities of these processes. To deal 
with various themes of democracy, the fourth and fifth chapters addressed different ideas 
and narratives of democracy and were sustained by a vision of frame-reflexive dialogue 
between competing visions of the good life. Discussions on different conceptions of 
democracy are thus clearly aimed towards producing basic principles on which 
democracy should be based. 
These discussions once again deal with more or less the same issues of dialogue because 
different conceptions of democracy generate themselves through dialogue. The 
conceptions and practices of democracy are the political function of the dialogue. The 
basic political function of dialogue for democracy is self-government, where the political 
world is not divided into those who rule and those who are ruled. Self-government is 
capability of citizens for taking an active role in policy decision-making. It depends on 
both the active participation and responsibility of citizens who take the initiative to 
engage in dialogue about the policy choices. It is the act of unity established through 
continuous generative or formative process of dialogue. 
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Self-government is a fundamental component in the process of democracy building. 
Democracy building means creating a dialogical infrastructure for relationships that are 
creative, open, and inclusive cooperative, respectful and mutually beneficial. When people 
are divided by their language differences, the patterns of relating tend to reinforce 
separation, fragmentation and divisiveness. In situations of severe clashes of languages, 
the lack of dialogue breeds uncertainty and cycles of chaos. Dialogue is a way of 
constructing bridges across the chasms of languages that are historically dialogically 
specific, contain signs from different registers, dialects, sociolects, or genres and evolved 
out of the power relations within particular social structures and function largely 
(although not unassailably) to reproduce these power relations. And because language is 
always evolving, its living, dialogical form is constantly resisting what Bakhtin has labeled 
the centripetal pull towards centralization and unification. Some theorists such as 
Habermas propose a conception of democracy that envisions a deliberative conception 
of dialogue that recalls a reconciliation of the social tensions of pluralistic language in the 
moments of democracy. Here deliberative dialogue is seen from the point of view of the 
outcome or horizon for reconciling consensus, and therefore it is expected to establish 
substantive procedures of dialogue to reduce differences by amalgamating different 
interests into unity. I have labeled this model an end-oriented (deliberative) model of 
dialogical democracy. In this model, dialogue is about procedures and goals rather than 
the process in itself. 
Alternatively, other models of democracy emphasize the celebration of heteroglossia as 
they called it a norm of democracy. They celebrate heteroglossia as the meeting in 
language of democracy in which each language expresses itself in its own unique ways, as 
opposed to monoglossia, the single language that tries to impose itself as the authority 
and the truth. The celebratory model of democracy is concerned with means of 
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communication among different languages. Therefore, it is specifically dedicated to one’s 
own reflection on heteroglossia within dialogical contexts and the responsive 
understanding that takes place across language differences. According to celebratory 
model of dialogue, only a concept of democracy that is based on an end in itself or a 
model of democracy that is based on dialogized heteroglossia within a single polity could 
recognize and protect the ability to reflect on the celebration of differences within social 
and cultural contexts. Dialogized heteroglossia of concept is important because what 
matters for a democracy is not the mere plurality of specific languages, social and political 
forces. Instead, what is significant in regards to democracy is the dialogue itself in which 
different languages and forces are continuously juxtaposed with or counter posed against 
one another in political action.  
The dialogized heteroglossia or dialogism of democracy requires the concrete political 
context of languages to be exposed and revealed as the force that determines its “form” 
and its “content,” determining it not from without, but from within. Dialogue 
reverberates actual intersections of languages within a particular context of democracy 
generally, in those relating to “content,” as well as the “formal” aspects themselves. 
Therefore, oppressive power persuasion is circumvented through a rejection of the 
dichotomy between means and ends, while the emphasis is placed on the critical moment 
more than on a consensus over an impartial definition of the public good. I have labeled 
this a celebratory model of dialogical democracy. 
The difference between the end-oriented model of dialogical democracy and the 
celebratory model of dialogical democracy primarily pertains to the way we can consider 
dialogue. On the one hand, the end-oriented model demands a persuasive mode of 
communication to overcome sources of conflicts in the field of dialogue. For this model, 
the sources of conflicts range from different opinions on a certain public issue to 
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different political views or from disagreements over certain ways of life to competing 
interests. Conflicts arise when people use different languages that have incommensurable 
purposes and are characterized by different understandings. Because there are no 
absolute criteria that apply across the incommensurability of languages, conflicts become 
the main problems of democracy. To enforce absolute criteria for the incommensurability 
of different language usages is to enforce the criteria of dialogue with facts of reason and 
persuasion. In other words, all language claims are passed through dialogue, but it is a 
dialogue with evaluative standards built-in: language claims rest upon reasoned rules that 
can be, and should be, critically questioned and redeemed. The grounding value of 
different language claims in the end-oriented model of democracy lays in the uncoerced 
consensus that such dialogue must achieve — including, significantly, critical reflection 
on the conditions under which that agreement is obtained. These conditions — 
uncoerced consensus and the reasoned rules (discursively redeemed) that regulate the 
interaction of languages — provide to the outcomes of dialogue a commonality not 
based upon absolute claims of truth or rightness, but outcomes secured on the criterion 
of valid agreement among those concerned parties of democracy. 
On the other hand, the celebratory model of dialogical democracy stresses the moments 
of dialogue that have not been formed with an eye towards producing a particular result. 
Instead, the idea is that dialogue as presented here is what is demanded by respect for 
each different claim, proposition and view regardless of what the outcome of it may be. 
As in the problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics, Bakhtin mentioned that dialogue is good in 
itself, and the celebratory model of dialogical democracy carries a commitment to a 
model of dialogue that puts emphasis on a continuity of difference. (Bakhtin, 1997: 252) 
The emphasis on the continuity of difference in the field of dialogue is meant to be 
counter-corrective, a centrifugal pulling against a centripetal force, in that it insists upon 
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the legitimacy of departure from certain dominant regulative norms that are supposed to 
orient communicative actions for producing a kind of convergence or particular 
agreement on any controversial issue. The celebratory model attempts to promote a 
dialogical representation of self-reflexivity and self-respect within diverse language 
groups. It is then released in order to represent the meaning and significance of their own 
way of life. At a more subtle level, the celebratory model tries to establish the dialogical 
basis of a unity forged between otherwise disparate language groups which are joined in 
this respect at minimum because that they share a concern with justifying difference itself. 
Furthermore, the celebratory model seeks to espouse what might be called a kind of 
relativism, of denying the universality of regulative norms, not by reasoning against them, 
but by arguing exceptions to their scope of applicability on the grounds of democracy. In 
other words, the celebratory model seeks to promote the conditions of dialogue within 
categories of difference overlapped with positions of equal relative power and the 
identification of grounds for active responsive understanding. In this context, the 
celebratory model of dialogical democracy is concerned more with the capacity to enter 
into the types of practical and contextual dialogical relations in which people inquire, 
disagree, adjudicate, explain, or argue without making reference to the outcome 
(consensus). 
The dispositions of the celebratory concept of dialogue are described in the second and 
third chapter. The dispositions are manifested in the ways that participants address with 
and are addressed by one another within a language system that is active in the immediate 
cultural and social context (or, in internal reflection, the ways that people represent-
communicating voices internally as they reflect upon a issue). In this category, language 
functions in a political context. The words that people utter not only describe or capture 
an experience, situation or idea or make available a meaning for the possibility of 
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understanding but also create relations of power between one another. As is consistently 
examined here, language involves the political relationship between interlocutors. This 
relationship, however, is manifested precisely in the contradictory paths of centralization 
and decentralization.  
Bakhtin describes the centripetal (central) forces of language as those that work a 
“verbal–ideological unification of relationship” into a kind of political monologia. This 
situation operates according to the centripetal force of politics: the addresser of 
monologic language is trying to push all the elements of politics in all of its various 
rhetorical modes into one single form, coming from one central point. The centripetal 
force of monologia seeks to erase the differences among the languages of society in order 
to present one unified mode of politics. Monologia is a system wherein one language is 
privileged; a situation wherein that language must be utilized by everyone in that society 
and where various institutions enforce this privileged language situation. Therefore, it 
denies that there exist any other voices beyond, with the same freedom, capable of 
responding on an equal footing. For monologue, the other remains entirely and only an 
object of one voice, and cannot reveal another voice. It does not look forward to 
including more than one voice. Monologue makes do without a plurality of voices; that is 
why to some extent it objectivizes all political life. Monologue pretends to be the last 
expression. 
In contrast to the monologia of the centripetal force of language, the centrifugal force of 
language tends to push things away from a central point and out in all directions so as to 
stratify relationships into a kind of heteroglossia. Heteroglossia (hetero (mixed) glossial 
(tongue)) is a meeting of voices that express themselves in their own ways, as opposed to 
“monoglossia,” the single language that tries to impose itself as the authority, the truth. 
Heteroglossia is a linguistic realm of multiple voices consisting value of equality. 
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Heteroglossia is a fluctuating, living complex of communicative systems that is constantly 
in dialogue with other languages, shaped by and at the same time shaping them. It 
contains multiple strands of discourses and voices that infiltrate and intersect each other 
in a variety of ways. These different strands, discourse and voices gain their identities in 
dialogue with one another. This suggests that this dialogue could lead to different ways of 
shaping people’s lives and could also illustrate why democracy cannot be a fixed form, 
why there is no one language in democracy that has authority over all others, and why 
democracy is instead a play of many languages, discourses and voices that are not 
determined by the authority of the single author, but by the heteroglossia from which the 
author arrives. In this context, the language of democracy is a heteroglossia that contains 
communication among many  and varied languages that do not exclude each other, but 
rather intersect with each other in many different ways. It is based on alterable meanings 
that are modifiable as different languages are exposed to new voices. Therefore, it is 
specifically dedicated to the responsive understanding that is developed through a 
dialogical process, which explicitly recognizes different languages, voices and 
perspectives, with different claims and views held by diverse constituencies.  
In the sixth chapter, I have proposed the employment of a constitution as a background 
condition of democracy in order to enable and protect heteroglossia in the dialogical 
realm of democracy. First, I have tried to examine and illustrate how such a constitution 
can provide the means to a dialogical democracy, and what sorts of outcomes might arise 
from it. Second, I have tried to show why such a constitution as a background condition 
of democracy is distinctive. But what makes it so important? I have based this notion on 
four grounds:  its importance in improving and protecting the dialogical field of 
democracy; its significance in fostering the equal opportunities of participation in 
dialogue dealing with the rights of citizens; its value in placing ruling authority under 
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control and thus strengthening the freedom of people; and its meaning in possibly 
moving towards systemic unity of differences. 
I have argued that constitutions have two aspects in and for democracy. Those are both 
protective and enabling functions. It acts as a binding set of rules that—dialogically read 
and are externally enforced by judicial institutions against political actors—improves and 
protects the dialogical quality of democracy. For example, when a particular agent has 
substantially more power for controlling the direction of the communicative process than 
other agents, the relationship is not dialogical. A dialogical relationship requires that 
power be reciprocal or balanced. Similarly to dialogue, democracy is a political 
relationship characterized by equality of functioning capabilities. This does not mean 
there should - or could - be equality between all individuals in earnings or social position 
or any other particular form of power. In annotating the rights of citizens, the 
constitution creates conditions for equal opportunities of participation or equality for the 
realization of different patterns of being. (Sen, 1993: 33) This means that it creates the 
conditions for freedom to pursue different patterns of action that lead to different 
lifestyles in political society. For this reason, it puts strictures on the ruling authority that 
strengthen people’s freedoms and respects their different choices and lifestyle 
preferences. The constitution is one of the ways through which respect for different ways 
of living may be forced. Constitutional enforcement of respect for different lifestyle 
preferences depends substantially on the control of all forms of power practices in 
political society. Therefore, the constitution seeks to establish a self-regulative context for 
control of power in and for democracy. This context is comprised of the conditions, 
forces, structures that not only involve self-regulation for the structuring of politics for 
democracy, but also contains referential meaning for the formation of democracy.  
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The self-regulative function of a constitution is formed by political institutions such as 
laws, customs, and forms of political organization. This fact is imperative in democracy, 
and it is only possible where political agents are self-governed. There are three 
constitutional means to regulate the powers of political agents:  diffusion of power, 
legitimate use of power, checks and balances. A distribution of power arrangement refers 
to the diffusion of the power in political society in order to prevent an individual or small 
group from exercising significant power over the rest of society. A legitimate use of 
power configuration indicates constitutional responsibility to those (the people) over 
whom it is exercised. (Note here that “responsible” translates into “answerable”). These 
constitutional checks and balances refer to the division of power between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches, and between the central and local levels of government. 
Each political agent’s power in the democratic system is thus balanced by the powers of 
other political agents who have a different focus of interests.  
Self-regulative aspects of constitutions form active citizenries that enable the conditions 
for engaged participation and also protect polyglot dialogue within the political process, 
which is closely associated with the generation of rights of citizenship. Among these 
rights are freedoms of thought, religion, expression, movement the right to assembly, the 
right to organize, vote, and equality before the law. Constitutions provide the means for 
the generation and cultivation of institutional capabilities of dialogical democracy. What 
are the capabilities of dialogical democracy? These institutional capabilities include the 
abilities of different political bodies to engage in meaningful dialogue on even the most 
divisive issues, to identify and frame political issues from multiple viewpoints, to build 
unity in difference and cultivate relationships. This unity refers to anything that holds a 
political society intact. In connection to this idea of unity, the purpose of the constitution 
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is not only to strengthen the symbiotic relationship between rulers and ruled, center and 
local, but also to support common meanings for self-regulative quality of democracy. 
To sum up, in this dissertation I have attempted to underline the reasons why democracy 
needs to be viewed as a dialogue, a interactive relationship in which people creatively 
participate in the political process to shape their lives. The concept of dialogue that I have 
emphasized is in part driven by an idea that requires an active suspension of certain 
“givens” of political theory in order to view arrangements from novel perspectives. It is a 
conscious commitment for the exploration of new possibilities. It requires attention to 
create an interactive realm in which differences are used as occasions for examining 
underlying assumptions and sources of democracy.  
The dialogical imagination of democracy does not exist in any absolute form. It exists 
only in relation to political theory, taking into account people’s different preferences and 
the political system’s ability to satisfy those predilections. People generally become 
conscious of the dialogical concept of democracy as a political problem or objective only 
when a gap develops between their preferences and the system’s ability to satisfy those 
choices. Although most people think of the dialogical notion of democracy as active 
participation, that is but one inherent facet only. 
Dialogical democracy is about the systemic ability to respond to the people’s views and 
preferences. It has three aspects. First is responsive understanding, which is the 
realization and recognition of different views and preferences and of possibilities for 
expressing and fulfilling them. Second is freedom that involves an availability of means 
and opportunities for responding to people’s preferences and views. Third is freedom 
from restrictions, coercion, and other factors blocking active participation. These three 
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aspects of dialogical democracy are inseparable; there can be no political form of 
dialogical democracy unless all three are present. 
All three aspects of dialogical democracy are closely connected to the communicative 
capability of people to act on their values and views. The communicative capability of 
people is closely connected to the notion of communicative authorship. After all, the 
term author comes from a Latin word meaning, simply to make, to create, to originate 
and to prompt. Authorship is seen as a dynamic, creative and interactive relationship, not 
the uni-directional power relationship derived from a single source. When communicative 
authorship is understood as derived from relationships among and between people, not 
from power over people, suddenly the categories of performer and performed-upon are 
no longer mutually limited.  
The authorship of the people is intimately related to the notion of freedom. On the one 
hand, freedom is an element for generating greater authorship for people who practice it. 
On the other, dialogical patterns of authorship greatly determine the extent to which 
enabling forms of freedom can be put into effect. In other words, empowering the 
authorship of people often involves assisting them to discover the genuine patterns of 
self-determination in their lives.  
In addition to these conceptualizations, I have tried in this dissertation to imagine as a 
Bakhtinian dialogical conception the unleashing of democracy from dogmas and fixity of 
truths. This imagination is a part of interactive and open-ended exploration to ascertain 
what elements of a democracy function well in political society. It revolves the very 
concept of democracy around critical, constructive, open and confrontational 
relationships based on a mutual recognition or equal respect. It tries to sense beyond 
what is expressed to what is not elucidated. It mirrors the idea of democracy with what is 
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enabling relationships, active participation and responsive understanding. It considers 
active citizenry not only as an opportunity for people to develop their own authorship 
with others, to determine their own lives, but also as a requirement of democracy as a 
political regime, that is both responsible enough and creative enough to address the 
values and the interests of people. Therefore, it approaches the concept of dialogue as a 
vehicle to expand the power of active citizenry, to transform people’s understanding of 
themselves, to strengthen the relationship between them. 
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